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Abstract
"The sight of the little madeleine had recalled nothing to my mind before I  
tasted  it...."but"....as  soon  as  I  had  recognized  the  taste  of  the  piece  of 
madeleine soaked in her decoction of lime-blossom which my aunt used to  
give me .... immediately the old grey house upon the street, where her room 
was, rose up like a stage set to attach itself to the little pavilion opening on 
to the garden which had been built out behind it for my parents."
Marcel Proust (1871-1922), Remembrance of Things Past 
When we think of an apple, do we actually feel the same as when we eat it? 
The central theme of this work is to understand whether the permanent representation of 
an object corresponds to a reactivation of sensations we perceived when we actually had it 
in our hands.
A recent debate in cognitive neuroscience, in fact, is concerned with the possibility that 
the neural systems that mediate overt action and sensory experience are causally involved 
in the neural representation of actions and real objects. On the other hand, more classical 
models postulate a relative separation between the how system and the what system, the 
former being more related to action, the latter more related to visual and semantic object 
representation. Such a classical view does not deny that the two streams normally have a 
close interaction but, based on neuropsychological and behavioral evidence, it holds that 
they  can  work  separately  in  the  case  of  selective  brain  damage  or  in  particular 
experimental conditions.
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In this thesis I will explore the possible role of the motor processes in understanding 
objects and actions by studying brain damaged patients performing a series of action- and 
object-related tasks. In Chapter I, I will briefly introduce the literature on the relationship 
between actions and concepts of  both healthy and brain damaged subjects.  Chapter  II 
reports a study on a group of 37 stroke patients who have been tested for their ability to 
recognize and use objects, as well as to recognize and imitate actions. In this group I found 
double dissociations suggesting that these tasks depend on separable cognitive processes. 
In  Chapter  III,  I  will  describe  a  double  dissociation  study  in  which  we  compared  the 
performance  of  two  patients  with  apraxia  with  that  of  two  patients  with  semantic 
impairment, and I will show how the object knowledge of the latter patients decline in time 
although they maintained relatively good ability to use objects. Finally, in Chapter IV I will 
analyze the performance of a new series of apraxic patients on a set of tasks aimed at 
testing a computational model which accounts for the errors that apraxic patients make 
when using objects.
The results will not completely fit with the embodied theories of knowledge. Rather, they 
are compatible with “disembodied” models that postulate a separation between the object 
conceptual knowledge and the sensory-motor input and output systems.
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Chapter I. 
Literature Review
1.1. Embodied and disembodied theories of actions and objects 
representation
There are two main theoretical views on the role of the sensory-motor information in the 
representation of actions and concepts: the embodied (or modal) and the disembodied (or 
amodal) approaches (for a discussion, see Mahon and Caramazza, 2005).
According to the embodied approach, the sensory-motor content has a substantial role in 
the representation of actions and concepts. The boldest versions of this approach claim 
that the conceptual content is reducible to sensory-motor content (e.g. Gallese and Lakoff, 
2005; Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, and Wilson, 2003; Pulvermuller; 2001). These authors 
hold that the key role of the sensory-motor systems is not only linked to the perception of, 
and learning about, the real world, but it is also essential for permanent representation of 
concepts.  During the processing of a word,  an action,  or a concept,  the sensory-motor 
information  is  newly  in  use  through  a  process  of  reactivation,  also  called  simulation 
(Gallese and Lakoff,  2005) or  re-enactment (Barsalou et al.,  2003).  Simulation is used 
during development in order to learn to understand others'  mental  states and produce 
congruent responses to the external stimuli. At the same time, similarly to Vygotsky's idea 
of  Zones of Proximal Development  (ZDL), the mechanism of simulation must allow the 
formation of the Self (Gallese, Migone and Eagle, 2006), and has to be different from the 
other's  actions.  For  this  reason,  the  simulation  mechianisms  develop  inhibitory 
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mechanisms,  in order to avoid that the individual  merely reproduces the action of the 
other.  In children and adult subjects, the process of re-enactment tends to be unconscious, 
as opposed to the mental imagery that is considered to be a conscious process (Barsalou, 
1999). Similarly, the ‘‘direct matching hypothesis’’ postulates that the actions performed by 
others  are  recognized  by  activating  the  same  spatiomotor  representations  used  for 
performing the actions themselves (e.g. Prinz, 1997).
In  contrast,  disembodied  theories  of  knowledge  hold  that  concepts  are  not  totally 
grounded  in  the  sensory-motor  systems;  rather,  the  sensorimotor  processes  are  not 
sufficient  to  exhaust  all  we  know  about  concepts  (e.g.,  Caramazza,  Hillis,  Rapp,  and 
Romani,  1990;  Humphreys  and  Forde,  2001;  Plaut,  2002;  Tyler  and  Moss,  2001; 
Warrington and McCarthy, 1987). After a sensorimotor experience, information is stored 
in  an  “amodal”  format:   sensorimotor  representations  are  transduced  into  a  symbolic 
representation, such as a feature list, semantic network, or frame. 
An example of embodied vs. disembodied concept is reported in Figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1 (adapted from Barsalou et al., 2003) (a) In amodal (disembodied) symbol systems, neural 
representations are established initially to represent objects in vision. Subsequently, however, these neural 
representations are transduced into another representation language that is amodal, such as a feature list, 
semantic  network or frame. Once established,  these amodal  descriptions provide the knowledge used in 
cognitive processes, such as memory, language and thought. (b) In perceptual (embodied) symbol systems, 
neural  representations  similarly  represent  objects  in  vision.  Rather  than  being  transduced  into  amodal 
descriptions,  however,  visual  representations  are  partially  captured  by  conjunctive  neurons  in  nearby 
association areas. Later, in the absence of sensory input, activating these conjunctive neurons partially re-
enacts the earlier visual states.  These re-enactments contribute to the knowledge that supports memory, 
language and thought.  This figure illustrates knowledge acquired through vision, but analogous accounts 
exist for acquiring knowledge in the other modalities (e.g. audition, action, emotion).
1.2. Neurophysiological studies in monkeys: the Mirror Neuron 
System
In 1992, Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese and Rizzolatti performed the first study in 
which  the Mirror  Neurons  (hereafter:  MN) were  described.  While  recording  the  brain 
activity from the monkey cortex in vivo, they found a percentage of neurons in the area F5 
of the ventral premotor cortex, that fired not only when the monkey performed an action 
-like grasping a piece of food- but also when it  saw the same action performed by the 
experimenter. This particular type of neurons was therefore named “mirror”, because the 
observed action seemed to be reflected in the motor representation of the same action of 
the observer. 
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In this circuit, the congruence between observed and performed action can be very strict 
(strictly congruent MN) or broad (broadly congruent MN), the latter being more diffused. 
Another class of neurons found in this circuit, called “canonical” neurons, fire when the 
monkey performs the action, but also when the monkey sees the object involved in that 
action alone (e.g. the piece of  food). 
In addition, MNs discharge only when the effector is biological, rather than mechanical, 
(e.g. a hand but not a mechanical arm, see Figure 1.2.) and only if the hand interacts with a 
real object: mimicked actions do not activate the MNs, and the presence of the object alone 
is not sufficient either (Rizzolatti and Luppino, 2001).
In  a  study  by  Umiltà  et  al.  (2001),  it  was  shown  that  the  MN  fire  also  when  the 
experimenter  grasps  a  hidden  object  behind  an  occluder,  suggesting  that  the  MNS  is 
necessary,  to  some  extent,  to  understand  action  goals.  More  recent  experiments  have 
demonstrated that there are also audio-visual MNs, that fire for example when the monkey 
cracks a nut and also when it hears the noise of a nut being cracked (Koehler et al., 2002).
Based on the reported findings, it has been claimed by Rizzolatti, Fogassi and Gallese 
(2001) that the Mirror Neuron System (MNS) is a circuit central not only for imitation, but 
also for understanding actions, goals and intentions of others. Moreover, the fact that the 
area F5 of the monkey can be considered as the homologue of the human Broca’s area 
(Binkofski  and Buccino,  2004),  led some authors  to  claim that  the MNS is  a  possible 
precursor,  as  an  anatomical  base,  for  the  evolution  and  understanding  of  language 
(Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998). In fact, MN were described also for mouth actions, such as 
communicative or ingestive actions (Ferrari, Gallese, Rizzolatti and Fogassi, 2003). 
The  existence  of  the  MNS  has  been  considered  strong  evidence  of  the  strong  links 
between  action  performance  and  action  perception  in  the  brain,  as  well  as  for  the 
embodied cognition hypothesis.
More evidence for embodied theories of knowledge comes from imaging and behavioral 
studies conducted on healthy humans.
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Figure 1.2. Visual and motor responses of a mirror neuron in area F5. a) A piece of food is placed on a tray 
and presented to the monkey. The experimenter grasps the food, then moves the tray with the food towards 
the  monkey.  Strong  activation  is  present  in  F5  during  observation  of  the  experimenter’s  grasping 
movements, and while the same action is performed by the monkey. Note that the neural discharge (lower 
panel) is absent when the food is presented and moved towards the monkey.  b) A similar experimental 
condition, except that the experimenter grasps the food with pliers. Note the absence of a neural response 
when the observed action is performed with a tool. Rasters and histograms show activity before and after the 
point at which the experimenter touched the food (vertical  bar).  Source:  Rizzolatti,  Fogassi  and Gallese, 
2001.
1.3.Studies of healthy participants
1.3.1 Imaging studies
Object representation. Experiments conducted using neuroimaging techniques have 
shown that there is usually a co-occurring activation in the ventral premotor cortices when 
healthy subjects process information about manipulable objects relative to other categories 
of  stimuli.  This  happens  even  in  tasks  that  do  not  require  the  explicit  use  of  motor 
information, such as for instance silent naming or passive watching. For example, Chao 
and Martin (2000) found an activation of the left ventral premotor and posterior parietal 
cortices for tools but not for faces, animals, or houses, both in passive viewing and in silent 
naming tasks. Martin et al. (1996) found similar activation for naming tools compared to 
naming animals (see also Grafton et al.,  1997; Perani et al.,  1995). Recently it was also 
demonstrated (Mahon et al., 2007) that visual information about manipulable objects is 
represented separately from that of arbitrarily manipulable objects in the ventral stream. 
In this study, the authors found that stimulus-specific repetition suppression (RS) in one 
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region of the ventral stream is biased according to motor-relevant properties of objects, 
suggesting that neural specificity for ‘tools’ in the ventral stream is driven by similarity 
metrics computed using motor-relevant information represented in dorsal structures.
Action representation. A circuit homologous to the monkey MNS has been described 
in humans for action understanding and action observation tasks (Buccino, Lui, Canessa, 
Patteri, Lagravinese, Benuzzi, Porro, Rizzolatti, 2004). In general, there is an overlap in 
brain activation during action observation and action execution in premotor and parietal 
areas (Buccino et al., 2004; Buccino et al., 2001; Decety and Grezes, 1999). It has been 
found  also  that  the  circuits  involved  in  action  observation  and  execution  are 
somatotopically organized: in fact, the pars opercularis of the IFG reflects the observation 
of distal  hand and mouth actions,  whereas the precentral  cortex reflects proximal  arm 
actions and neck movements (Buccino, Binkofski, Fink, Fadiga, Fogassi et al., 2001).
Using PET, Rumiati, Weiss, Shallice, Ottoboni, Noth, Zilles, and Fink (2004) found that 
the production of object-related pantomimes activated the left inferior parietal lobe and 
the  ventrolateral  prefrontal  cortex,  in  a  circuit  partially  overlapping  with  the  MNS. 
However, subtraction analysis revealed that the pantomime-to-object task and the object 
naming task led to activation also in different brain areas. This result is at variance with 
predictions of embodied theories claiming that the object representation should overlap 
with the sensory-motor information stored in the motor and premotor areas.
1.3.2. Behavioral studies
Objects.  Experiments  using  Stimulus-Response  Compatibility  paradigms (SRC)  have 
brought evidence of a correspondence not only between seen and performed action, but 
also between object  shape and motor response.  The term  affordances refers  to action-
relevant  characteristics  of  the object  or  its  surface (Michaels,  1988;  Gibson,  1979):  the 
shape of an object can, in fact, facilitate particular types of actions but not others. Tucker 
and  Ellis  (1998)  demonstrated  that  simply  viewing  an  object,  in  a  task  that  does  not 
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require explicit processing of its motor-related features -e.g. judging if an object is upright 
or inverted- potentiates the response with the hand most suitable to reach and grasp the 
seen object. More recently, the same authors (Tucker and Ellis, 2001) have shown that, in 
a category judgment, the type of grasp (precision or power grip) is facilitated if the size of 
the  object  to  judge  is  compatible  with  the  grip  used  to  perform  the  response.  Taken 
together,  these  behavioral  results  seem to  suggest  that  the visual  representation  of  an 
object and its motor counterpart are anatomically and functionally embedded and, when 
the  execution  of  an  action  is  guided  by  a  visual  stimulus,  the  more  the  stimulus  is 
compatible to the action, the more the execution of that action is facilitated.
However, other behavioral studies brought evidence for an independent representation 
at  least  at  the  cognitive  level.  For  example,  Rumiati  and  Humphreys  (1998)  asked 
participants to name or pantomime, under time deadline condition, the use of objects in 
response to pictures or written words. Based on the subjects' types of errors, the authors 
concluded that participants were using a direct visual  route when gesturing to pictures 
(prevalence of “visual” errors); whereas they used an indirect, semantic route when they 
had to pantomime to written words (“semantic” errors only). The existence of a dual route 
also  for  imitation  will  be  discussed  in  the  paragraph  about  the  neuropsychological 
literature.
Actions.  Several  behavioral  studies  have  shown  that  there  is  a  strict  link  between 
perceived and executed actions. For example, using stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) 
paradigms, it has been demonstrated that the observed movement of a finger can influence 
a finger tapping task, as the response is faster in compatible trials than in incompatible 
trials (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlaeger and Prinz, 2000), even using a simple response 
task (Brass, Bekkering and Prinz, 2001).  Similar results  were found in a reaching-and-
grasping task by Craighero, Bello, Fadiga and Rizzolatti (2002), in which subjects were 
shown a picture of a hand before grasping a bar oriented in different angles: reaction times 
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were faster if the prime picture corresponded to the final hand posture required to grasp 
the bar.
1.4. Limb Apraxia: an overview
If  action and object conceptual knowledge were based on motor simulation processes 
(which take place in the motor areas), then, damage to the sensory-motor system would 
significantly affect conceptual processing of actions and objects. The ideal way to test this 
hypothesis is to assess the fine-grained conceptual knowledge of tools and manipulable 
objects of patients that have lost the ability to use them correctly, like patients with limb 
apraxia. In this thesis I will present three studies on such a relation between action and 
object knowledge in patients with brain lesions, with particular focus on limb apraxia.
The term apraxia refers to a primary deficit in voluntary goal-directed movements, not 
due to a loss of perceptual input (like agnosia, anaesthesia, deafness or blindness) or motor 
output deficits (hemiplegia, tremor, ataxia). It is frequently characterized by  automatic-
voluntary  dissociation,  as  patients  cannot  perform  an  action  in  the  experimental  or 
clinical setting, but they might be able to do it spontaneously in the everyday life. The word 
apraxia was used for the first time by Steinthal (1871) to describe particular errors made 
by aphasic  patients  that  had lost  their  ability  to use objects  properly.  In the following 
paragraphs  I  will  describe  two  main  forms  of  limb  apraxia  and  a  cognitive 
neuropsychological  model  of  limb praxis  put  forward to  explain  both pathological  and 
normal behavior.
1.4.1. Ideational Apraxia (IA) and Object Use
Ideational Apraxia has been characterized as an impairment of object use, manifested in 
incorrect selection and conceptually inappropriate use of tools (Morlaas, 1928; De Renzi, 
Pieczuro and Vignolo, 1968; De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988; Ochipa, Rothi and Heilman, 
1989, 1992), but also in erroneous sequencing of actions that require the consecutive use of 
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several  objects  to  achieve  a  certain  goal  (Pick,  1905;  Liepmann,  1920;  Lehmkuhl  and 
Poeck,  1981;  Poeck,  1983).  IA  is  usually  associated  with  lesions  to  the  left  posterior 
temporo-parietal  regions  (Liepmann,  1920;  De  Ajuriaguerra,  Hecaen  and  Angelergues, 
1960; De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988). As patients affected by IA make errors that are not 
attributable to motor problems, even when the ipsilesional hand is used to perform the 
tasks, it was hypothesized that high motor control of both hands is lateralized in the left 
hemisphere.
According to Roy and Square (1985), IA is a result of the disruption of the  conceptual 
praxis system that contains abstract information about a) knowledge of objects and tools 
functions, b)  decontextualized knowledge of actions, c) knowledge of serial organization of 
actions.  The  conceptual  praxis  system  is  separate  from  the  production system,  which 
includes  the  knowledge  of  actions  in  their  sensorimotor  form,  as  well  as  the  actions 
programs for skilled movements (including the mechanisms that translate such programs 
into a motor activity). Similarly, other neuropsychologists have proposed that IA derives 
from a conceptual disruption of the action program at a central (symbolic) level, as it is 
often associated with a loss of functional and manipulation knowledge about objects even 
in visual and verbal tasks that do not require their actual use (Lehmkuhl and Poeck, 1981; 
Roy, 1981; Ochipa, Rothi and Heilman, 1989, 1992). According to this view, IA patients 
should also fail in discriminating correct from incorrect actions when performed by others, 
because the motor representation is lost at the central level. Morlaas (1928) introduced the 
term “agnosia of usage” to describe IA patients as incapable of recognizing objects in order 
to use them. 
 Functional knowledge of objects however can be found intact in patients with IA, in fact 
they  can  still  be  able  to  classify  erroneous  actions  and  even  sort  pictures  of  action 
sequences in which they commit errors (Rumiati et al., 2001). The models that separate 
conceptual information from functional and manipulation knowledge are most suited to 
explain the deficits  encountered in the literature.  Finally,  Zangwill  (1960) hypothesized 
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that IA is just a severe form of IMA (see next paragraph) but the existence of the double 
dissociation between the two deficits (e.g. De Renzi et al., 1968; De Renzi and Lucchelli, 
1988) led this argument being ruled out.
1.4.2. Ideomotor Apraxia (IMA) and action imitation
According to the Roy and Square model (1985), IMA is the result of impairment to the 
production subcomponent of the action system. Patients with IMA are still able to plan a 
motor sequence correctly, but they fail in executing it. Moreover they should still be able to 
use objects, because their conceptual knowledge of an action is intact. The most sensitive 
task to investigate this deficit is asking the patient to imitate: in this task, he/she is not 
required to generate a motor plan but only to execute it after having seen it done. In IMA 
patients, it is possible to encounter conceptual errors (like lexicalizations1, body-part-as-
tool2, bad hand configuration, clumsiness) or kinematic alterations, for example in speed, 
amplitude and frequency of the movement.  IMA has been observed in association with 
lesions in the left inferior parietal cortex (Liepmann, 1920; De Renzi et al., 1968), although 
it has been documented also after damage to the basal ganglia and thalamus. 
Finkelburg  (1870)  proposed  that  IMA  is  due  to  a  more  general  disturbance  of  the 
representation of symbols, including gestures and verbal languages (“asymbolia”), as it is 
usually associated to language impairments. However, Liepmann (1905) noted that one of 
his patients with IMA did not show signs of aphasia, and that the patients were not able to 
reproduce  the  gestures  even  by  imitation,  discarding  the  “asymbolia”  hypothesis.  He 
instead proposed that, in right-handers, the mechanism responsible for skilled movements 
of  both  hands  is  situated  in  the  left  hemisphere.  In  1965,  Geschwind  proposed  a 
disconnection model  similar  to Wernicke's  (1874)  model  of  language,  in which IMA is 
caused by lesions to the arcuate fasciculus or the supramarginal gyrus, so as to interrupt 
1Lexicalization: a meaningless action is tranformed in a meaningful actions existing in the patient's 
repertoire
2Body part as tool: e.g.: using the index finger as a toothbrush when imitating the action of brushing teeth
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the flow of information from the language areas to the anterior motor associative areas. 
More  recently,  it  was  proposed  that  IMA  is  caused by  damage  to  the  visuo-kinestesic 
engrams  for  skilled  movements,  or  to  the  connections  between  these  and  the  motor 
associative areas (Heilman, 1979; Heilman and Rothi, 1985). According to Goldenberg and 
colleagues (1996) IMA is the result of an inability to encode movements on body-based 
coordinates,  involving  the  body  schema  representation:  the  patients  affected  by  IMA 
cannot encode the end-state of limb posture relative to the body, so the kinematic errors 
that they produce result from attempts to imitate the posture of the examiner. A recent 
study by Tessari and colleagues (2007) offered an alternative model of imitation, which I 
will describe in detail in the next paragraph.
1.4.3. A Cognitive Neuropsychological model of limb praxis
Rothi,  Ochipa  and  Heilman  (1991)  proposed  a  composite  model  of  praxis  based  on 
dissociations reported in the literature. A model, represented in Figure 1.3., was originally 
developed to account for the different subtypes of IMA but it is also suitable to interpret 
normal behaviour. It postulates a separation between units that store the meaning of the 
actions (semantics) and units that store the motor features of an action (Action lexicons, or 
praxicons).  The authors  believe  that movement   formulae are  represented  and stored 
permanently in the brain (specifically, in the left parietal lobe) so that they can be recalled 
from memory in case of need, without reconstructing them de novo at each request. This is 
consistent with the fact that patient with apraxia due to parietal lesions were also impaired 
at recognizing pantomimes, whereas apraxic patients with anterior lesions were good at 
this task (Heilman et al., 1982). Observations of patients who perform worse at imitation 
of pantomimes than production of  pantomimes on verbal  command, and patients who 
show the reverse pattern,  suggest  that  there  is  a separation between input  and output 
action praxicons. Evidence of input modality-specific apraxias (Rothi, Mack and Heilman, 
19
1986)  led  the  authors  to  hypothesize  that  three  different  types  of  inputs  (auditory, 
visual/gestural and visual/object) can reach the input praxicon. 
Another important  feature of  this model  is  the existence of  a non-semantic  route for 
imitation, which allows imitation of unfamiliar actions through a visuo-motor conversion 
mechanism.
Figure 1.3.. Rothi et al. (1991) modelof praxis processing , as revised in Heilman and Rothi (2003) and its 
relation to semantics, naming, and word and object recognition.
Tessari and colleagues (2007) tested the dual-route model for imitation using a sample of 
32 brain-damaged subjects. They found a double dissociation between patients who could 
not imitate novel meaningless gestures but were preserved at the imitation of meaningful 
gestures,  versus patients who showed the opposite pattern. The authors interpreted the 
first deficit as a result of damage to the semantic route for action, whereas the opposite 
pattern should result from a breakdown of the direct route. These data, together with other 
studies that found selective impairments in the imitation of meaningful (Bartolo, Cubelli 
and Della Sala, 2001) or meaningless actions (Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1997) support 
the view that the two types of actions are imitated via different cognitive mechanisms (see 
Figure 1.4.). 
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Based on the neuropsychological literature, models that propose a fractionation within 
the praxis system are most suitable to explain the dissociation found in patients, compared 
with models that postulate the existence of a unique mechanism underlying praxis and 
semantics.
Figure 1.4.  The two route model for explaining imitation of actions. Following visual analysis, known, 
meaningful actions automatically activate the selection of the semantic long-term memory route. The direct 
route is selected to imitate novel, meaningless actions, but it is also used to reproduce both meaningful and 
meaningless actions when these are presented intermingled. ST/WM = short term/ working memory. (Taken 
from Tessari et al., 2007)
1.5.  Neuropsychological  studies  of  the  relationship  between 
actions and objects representation
1.5.1. Actions.
The neuropsychological  evidence in favor of the embodied cognition theory is, so far, 
very scarce. This is probably because the double dissociation methodology (Shallice, 1988), 
is most suited for investigating the independence of two cognitive functions rather than 
associations  of  deficits.  Embodied  theories  of  cognition  assume  that  sensory  motor 
information is necessary for the semantic knowledge of actions and objects (e.g. Gallese 
and Lakoff, 2005). The following prediction is that a patient who has lost his/her motor 
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ability, should also retain impoverished knowledge about the objects or the actions that 
he/she is no longer able to produce.  In particular, patients with IMA would be unable to 
recognize the gestures that they are not able to perform, and patients with IA would loose 
their  fine  conceptual  knowledge  about  objects.  A  recent  study  by  Buxbaum,  Kyle  and 
Menon (2005) addressed this issue by asking 44 patients with left hemisphere stroke to 
perform a series of object-related tasks. Analyzing the results at the group level, there was 
a significant correlation between the ability to imitate object-related pantomimes and the 
pantomime recognition task. In addition, because the maximum overlap of lesions was in 
the left inferior parietal lobe, the authors attributed a central role to this structure in the 
recognition and production of actions.
These associations seem to support the view that motor processes play a central role in 
the processing and recognition of actions.  However, such correlations were not found in a 
similar study of imitation conducted by Tessari, Canessa, Ukmar and Rumiati (2007). The 
study failed to find significant correlation between performance of a pantomime imitation 
task and a pantomime recognition task (r = .32, p = .07). A more detailed discussion about 
this issue will be presented in chapter III, in which a similar group study is described.
Existing  single  case  studies  do  not  seem to  go  in  the  same direction  either.  In  fact, 
double dissociations between  object use and object recognition have been described, as 
well  as  between  action  imitation  and  action  recognition.   For  example,  the  selective 
impairment in recognizing pantomimes (i.e. pantomime agnosia) has been first reported 
by Rothi, Mack, and Heilman (1986) and by Bell (1994) for patients who were no longer 
able  to  name  and  recognize  pantomimes,  despite  their  relatively  preserved  ability  to 
produce object-related actions. On the opposite side there are patients who, despite severe 
IMA, can still recognize object-associated pantomimes. Patient GW for instance, described 
by Rapcsak,  Ochipa, Anderson, and Poizner (1995),  was unable to produce any correct 
pantomimes of object use either on visual presentation of objects (on a total of 15 stimuli), 
verbal  command,  or  using  imitation.  However,  he  could  name all  15  object-associated 
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pantomimes presented, and he could discriminate correct from incorrect pantomimes of 
object use (14/15).  Rumiati, Zanini, Vorano and Shallice (2001) described patients DR and 
FG,  with  severe  ideomotor  and ideational  apraxia,  who were  able  to  recognize  object-
associated actions (DR: 15/15; FG: 14/15). FG and DR were also tested on multiple object 
tasks  (such  as  making  coffee  or  preparing  a  letter  to  post),  which  test  the  ability  of 
sequencing  a  series  of  steps  and  subgoals:  they  made  significantly  more  errors  than 
controls, however they were good at sequencing cards depicting the different steps of the 
same activities  (9/10  in  both  patients).  Moreover,  FG could  discriminate  correct  from 
incorrect  pantomimes  of  actions  (19/20)  even  when  the  experimenter  reproduced  the 
same errors that he had made in a previous session.
1.5.2. Objects. 
fMRI studies seem to suggest a strong association between visual-semantic processing of 
manipulable tools and involvement of premotor and parietal  areas.  If  these areas were 
necessary  for  semantic  processing  of  objects  (as  claimed,  for  example,  by  Gallese  and 
Lakoff, 2005), then IA patients would be impaired at recognizing objects or, at some level, 
they would retain impoverished knowledge of the objects’ details. 
Neuropsychological results do not support the idea of embodiment of objects concepts. 
For  example,  patients  with  IA  with  no  semantic  impairments  have  been  repeatedly 
described (Buxbaum and Saffran, 2002; Buxbaum, Sirigu, Schwartz, and Klatzky, 2003; 
Buxbaum, Veramonti,  and Schwartz,  2000; Cubelli  et al.,  2000; Halsband et al.,  2001; 
Hodges,  Spatt,  and  Patterson,  1999;  Montomura  and  Yamadori,  1994;  Moreaud, 
Charnallet,  and  Pellat,  1998;  Ochipa  et  al.,  1989;  Rapcsak  et  al.,  1995;  Rosci,  Chiesa, 
Laiacona, and Capitani, 2003). IA patients have been also described as having completely 
preserved  performance  on  tests  tapping  semantic  knowledge  of  the  same objects  they 
failed  to  use  (patients  DR  and  FG  in  Rumiati  et  al.,  2001;  patient  HB  in  Buxbaum, 
Schwartz  and  Carew,  1997).  Several  patients  with  spared  semantic  knowledge  in  the 
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presence of an object-use impairment have been reported (Ochipa, Rothi and Heilman, 
1989; case 3 in Hodges, Spatt and Patterson, 1999; Buxbaum, Veramonti and Schwartz, 
2000). 
On the other hand, there are patients with semantic disorders who are still able to use 
objects  correctly.  For  example,  Lauro-Grotto,  Piccini  and Shallice  (1997)  reported that 
patient  RM, who was  impaired  in  naming,  recognizing  and semantic  tasks  concerning 
objects, was still able to use objects in everyday life. Patient DM described by Buxbaum et 
al. (1997) showed a similar pattern. It has been proposed that the spared ability to use 
objects  correctly  depends  on  objects'  affordances  and  preserved  mechanical  problem 
solving skills (Hodges, Bozeat, Lambon Ralph, Patterson and Spatt, 2000).
A double dissociation between the ability to perform tasks tapping semantic information 
about objects and the movements necessary to use them appropriately suggest that these 
two abilities may be independent and have different neural substrates (see Rumiati et al., 
2004).  However,  the  fact  that  not  all  of  the  aforementioned  studies  used  the  same 
materials across patients (or even across tasks), may give rise to some objections about the 
nature of  the dissociations found (see for  example  Hillis  and Caramazza,  1991).  In the 
studies that I present, the double dissociations that we detected are always based on the 
same items presented in different conditions.
Vision for action and vision for perception
The most represented sensory modality in the brain of nonhuman primates is certainly 
vision. In fact, anatomical and physiological studies have revealed that there are at least 
thirty separable visual areas occupying almost half the total volume of the monkey brain 
(Von  Der  Heydt,  Peterhans  and  Baumgartner,  1984;  Desimone  and  Schein,  1987).  In 
primates, the visual areas are classically subdivided into two main functionally specialized 
processing pathways: a “ventral stream” for object vision, and a “dorsal stream” for spatial 
vision (Ungerleider and Miskhin, 1982).  Lesion studies in monkeys have indeed shown 
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that  lesion of inferior  temporal  cartex causes severe deficits  in performance on a wide 
variety of visual discrimination tasks (e.g. pattern, object, color), but not on visuospatial 
tasks  like  visually  guided  reaching  (Gaffan,  Harrison and Gaffan,  1986).  On the  other 
hand, posterior parietal lesions do not affect visual object discrimination performance; but 
instead cause severe deficits in visuospatial performance (for a review, see Ungerleider and 
Miskin, 1982). 
As for humans, it has been shown that appropriate reaching and grasping can still be 
possible  even if an adequate three-dimensional representation of the object to be grasped 
is  lost.  Goodale,  Milner,  Jokobson,  and Carey (1991)  described patient  DF,  affected by 
visual  form  agnosia  due  to  bilateral  occipital  lesion.  DF  was  severely  impaired  in 
perceptually judging the orientation of a line and could not indicate with her fingers the 
size  of  visually  presented  objects  (Milner,  Pereett,  Johnston,  Benson,  Jordan,  Heeley, 
Bettucci, Mortara, Mutani, Terazzi and Davidson, 1991). Despite her agnosic deficits, DF 
could orient her hand correctly in a posting task and her reaching-grasping movements 
were characterized by a normal correlation between the grip and the size of the objects. In 
contrast, Goodale, Meenan, Bulthoff, Nicolle and Racicot (1994) have shown that accurate, 
conscious visual information about an object may not be satisfactorily used by an intact 
motor system. RV, the patient they studied with bilateral occipital lesion, failed to grasp 
objects  that  he  was  almost  perfectly  able  to  recognize.  Taken  together,  this  double 
dissociation has been used to support the position that the “what” system is involved in the 
identification of objects and is impaired in DF but spared in RV. The “what” system is 
separate from the “how” system (damaged in DF bu spared in RV) guiding the action of the 
agent toward the stimuli. (Milner and Goodale, 1993, 1995). According to the authors, the 
“vision-for-perception” and the “vision for action” systems, that normally cooperate in an 
intact brain, can be selectively damaged by brain lesions and give rise to such patterns of 
behaviour.  More recently,  the dichotomy between dorsal  and ventral  streams has been 
further articulated to include the function of a “how” system in the dorsal stream. This may 
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contain the representation of affordances,  namely the learned associations between the 
objects and the basic motor components necessary for their use, such as the orientation 
and the shape of the hand grip (Grèzes et al., 2003; Tucker and Ellis, 1998; 2001; Ellis and 
Tucker, 2000). Such a “how” system of the dorsal pathway would also involve higher-level 
action  representations  acquired  by  past  experience,  which  are  lost  in  patients  with 
Ideational Apraxia (Rumiati etal., 2001).
The  functional  separation  between  the  two visual  pathways  has  also  been  shown by 
means of experimental manipulations in healthy subjects. Visual illusions can be used to 
show a discrepancy between what we perceive and what our motor system actually does. 
Kroliczak, Heard, Goodale and Gregory (2006), employed the “hollow face illusion”  to 
show that what subjects had reported to perceive (i.e. a three-dimensional protruding face, 
even if the surface of the face was the concave inside of a mask) was in fact different from 
their  actual  behavior.  Although they were fooled by this  illusion,  the actions that  they 
directed at the face were not influenced by perception.  In fact, if they were asked to touch 
a ‘bug-like’ target stuck on the face, they actually reached out to the correct point in space 
(see  1.5.).  Similar  results  with  visual  illusions  have  been  observed  with  perception  of 
orientation (Dyde and Milner, 2002) and with the Ebbinghaus illusion (Aglioti, Goodale 
and De Souza, 1995).
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Figure 1.5. The “hollow-face” illusion used in the experiment of Kroliczak et al., 2006.
1.6. A computational account: the contention scheduling model
1.6.1. Description of the model
In 1986, Norman and Shallice proposed a computational model suited to explain both 
action slips of normal subjects and the types of errors made by brain damaged patients. 
Norman and Shallice's model was composed of two main units: a supervisory attentional 
system (SAS) and a contention scheduling system (CS); the model is represented in Figure 
1.6. According to the authors, the SAS acts when conscious attentional control is required 
and it provides excitatory or inhibitory inputs to the contention scheduling system, which 
is engaged in the control of routine behaviour. Damage to the SAS would cause a form of 
apraxia defined as “frontal” by Luria (1966),  described for example by Schwartz,  Reed, 
Montgomery, Palmer, and Mayer (1991). Frontal apraxic patients in fact commit specific 
errors,  such  as  step  omissions,  anticipations,  argument  errors,  and  perseverations 
affecting the correct planning of an action sequence. These errors  are due to the weakened 
top-down influence from the SAS to the other component of the system.
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Figure 1.6. The Norman and Shallice's model of action control (1986)
Complementary to the SAS is the CS system, that, in contrast, is involved in the control of 
routine activities and comes into play after a familiar sequence of actions is selected by the 
SAS.  According  to  the  authors,  CS  is  composed  of  three  main  networks:  the  schema 
network, the resource network and the object network (see Figure 1.7.). The role of CS is to 
select the appropriate subgoals of well-learned sequences: for example, when preparing 
Italian coffee, pouring water in the base of the moka should be done before adding coffee 
in the filter. The specific subcomponents of routine tasks are labeled with the term action 
schemas. Action schemas can exist for low-level actions (e.g. to grasp, to pick up, to put 
down)  or  higher  level  goals  (e.g.  spreading  marmalade).  Action  schemas  are  closely 
dependent on object affordances and have specific action goals. The activation of a schema 
unit  is  influenced  by  five  factors:  top-down  influence,  environmental  influence,  self 
influence and random noise.
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 Figure 1.7. The principal components of the contention scheduling implementation by Cooper and Shallice 
(2000).
Within  the  schema  network,  activations  interact  through  a  variety  of  excitatory  and 
inhibitory mechanisms. A selection process coordinates the schema network, interfacing 
with  the  object  representation,  resource,  and motor  systems.  The  selection  of  a  given 
schema occurs when the activation of its unit exceeds a threshold (Figure 1.8.). Selection of 
a  high-level  schema  modifies  the  flow  of  activation  in  the  schema  network  such  that 
component schemas of the selected schema receive additional excitation (thus increasing 
their likelihood of selection). Low level schemas correspond to discrete actions (such as 
pick-up,  put-down).  Selection  at  this  level  leads  first  to  the  assignment  of  object 
representations and resources to the corresponding action and then to the execution of 
that action. Furthermore, distinct from other studies which propose that routine tasks are 
sequentially organized (Botvinick and Plaut, 2004), Cooper and Shallice (2000)'s model 
considers the architecture of the task hierarchical:  higher levels represent progressively 
larger scale aspects of the tasks (see Figure 1.8)
In the next paragraph I will  discuss how, distinct from frontal  apraxia,  which can be 
interpreted  as   a  deficit  of  the  SAS,  Ideational  Apraxia  (IA)  could  be  caused  by  a 
malfunctioning of CS (Rumiati et al., 2001).
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Figure 1.8. Schema/goal organisation in the coffee preparation domain. Schemas are indicated by italic 
type and goals by bold type (taken from Cooper and Shallice, 2000).
1.6.2. The simulation of apraxic errors
According to Rumiati et al. (2001), Ideational apraxia (IA) can be the result of a deficit in 
the contention scheduling system, bringing evidence against theories that explain IA as a 
general  deficit of action sequencing (Lehmkuhl and Poeck,  1981; Poeck and Lehmkuhl, 
1980).  The authors were able to show that  there are qualitative  differences among the 
errors of a frontal patient with disexecutive syndrome (WH2) and the two apraxic patients 
mentioned above, FG and DR. In particular, the frontal patient was not able to sequence 
pictures depicting everyday multi-step actions, whereas FG and DR performed the task 
normally (see also Zanini, Rumiati and Shallice, 2002). On the other hand, FG and DR 
failed in a Multiple-Object-Task (MOT) in which they were required to perform sequences 
of actions, (such as preparing coffee or preparing a letter to post) whereas WH2 performed 
well in the MOT. 
More recently,  Cooper (2007) reproduced the pattern of error for the two IA patients 
described by Rumiati  and colleagues (2001),  by lesioning the connections among units 
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inside the CS system. The author considered the qualitative differences between the errors 
of FG and DR, and concluded that both patients have a general action selection deficit that 
may  be  modelled  by  the  addition  of  noise  to  the  schema  and  object  representation 
networks. DR’s deficit is best accounted for by assuming, in addition, the complete lesion 
of  the  object  representation  to  schema  links,  but  keeping  intact  schema  to  object 
representation links. Whereas FG’s errors are best accounted for by assuming, in addition, 
a  partial  lesion  of  the  schema  to  object  representation  links  with  intact  object 
representation to schema links. The simulations thus support the view that DR and FG 
have related but distinct deficits, and may account for the different error profiles that one 
could find in IA patients. In chapter IV we will explore the Cooper and Shallice’s (2000) 
model in a multiple single case study.
IPM and SAS/CS: a unifying perspective
Both Rothi (1991)'s model and the SAS/CS model of Cooper of Shallice (2000) have so 
far successfully accounted for dissociations found in patients. While the first one takes in 
account  all  aspects  of  praxis  production  and understanding,  the  second is  focused  on 
routine activities that involve objects and tools, and their control from higher cognitive 
functions. However, the two models are not mutually exclusive: rather, the SAS/CS model 
integrates and expands the IPM considering higher cognitive functions such as attention 
and planning. Indeed, the two models have several similarities:
a) both models consider the object recognition module/object representation network as 
separate from the actual “semantics”;
b) the notion of praxeme can be considered almost analogous to that of action schema;
c) both models can predict the behavior of patients based on the damage to modules or 
disconnections between them.
In this thesis I will try to bring evidence for the validity of both models, which will be 
contrasted with the strong embodied views of conceptual knowledge.
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Chapter II
The Role of Motor Simulation in Action and 
Object Recognition: Studies on Brain 
Damaged Patients
Abstract. As discussed in the introduction an important issue in contemporary cognitive 
neuroscience  concerns  the  role  of  motor  production  processes  in  perceptual  and 
conceptual analysis. To address this issue, in this study we analysed the performance of a 
large group of unilateral  stroke patients  across a range of  tasks using the same set  of 
common  manipulable  objects.  All  patients3 (n  =  37)  were  tested  for  their  ability  to 
demonstrate  the  use  of  objects,  recognize  objects,  recognize  corresponding  object 
associated  pantomimes,  and  imitate  those  same  pantomimes.  Results  will  show  that 
damage to the motor processes does not significantly affect the ability to recognize actions 
and objects, and vice versa.
3Behavioral data of the 37 patients are published in Negri et al. (2007b).
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INTRODUCTION
In this study I will examine the role of those motor processes that subserve object use in 
recognizing  visually  presented  object-associated  actions,  and  in  recognizing  visually 
presented objects. I will focus on this particular topic for the following reason. Studying 
action recognition  and object  recognition  offers  a  stringent  test  of  the  hypothesis  that 
motor  production  processes  play  a  critical  role  in  perceptual  and conceptual  analysis. 
Cognitive  neuropsychological  analyses  of  apraxic  patients  provide  a  direct  means  for 
testing the degree to which motor systems are involved in the recognition of actions and 
objects.  Thus,  if  motor  production systems are  necessary in order  to recognize actions 
and/or  manipulable  objects,  then  patients  with  Ideational  Apraxia  (defined  as 
impairments in using objects that cannot be attributed to aphasia, sensory impairment, or 
an  impairment  to  basic  motor  responses;  Pick,  1905;  Liepmann  1920;  De  Renzi  and 
Lucchelli, 1988) will necessarily be impaired for recognizing actions associated with the 
use of those objects, and/or recognizing the objects themselves. 
Neurophysiological and Imaging studies (see Chapter I for a review) indeed indicate that 
the  observation  of  actions  and  manipulable  objects  results  in  activation  of  neural 
structures  in  the  observer  that  mediate  overt  action.  We will  refer  to  such  automatic 
activation  of  motor  production  processes  in  the  course  of  observing  actions  and 
manipulable objects as ‘motor simulation.’ A number of authors have argued, on the basis 
of  such activation evidence,  that  motor  simulation,  as defined herein,  is  constitutively 
involved in perceptual and conceptual processing of actions and/or manipulable objects 
(e.g., Buxbaum, Kyle, and Menon, 2005; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Gallese, 2005; Helbig, 
Graf, and Kiefer, 2006; Martin, Ungerleider, and Haxby, 2000; Pulvermüller, 2005; for an 
earlier proposal of this idea, see Allport, 1985). We refer to the hypotheses that the motor 
system is necessarily involved in action and object recognition as the Motor Theory of 
Action  Recognition  and  the  Motor  Theory  of  Object  Recognition,  respectively.  Two 
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versions of the Motor Theories of Action and Object Representation can be distinguished 
(for discussion, see Mahon and Caramazza, 2005). In one version, there is an overlap in 
the  processes  subserving  action  production  and action  (and object)  recognition.  On a 
second  version,  while  the  processes  subserving  action  production  are  functionally 
separable from those subserving the recognition of actions and objects, the activation of 
such  motor  processes  is  necessary  in  order  for  successful  recognition  to  proceed. 
Critically,  in  both  formulations  of  the  Motor  Theories  of  Action/Object  Recognition, 
activation  of  motor  information  is  necessary  in  order  to  successfully  recognize  and 
understand actions and objects. 
Neuropsychological  investigations  of  apraxic  patients  suggest  that  the  ability  to  use 
objects is not necessary in order to either recognize those objects or to recognize actions 
associated with their  use.  For  example,  authors  have  reported patients  demonstrating 
impairments for using objects but relatively spared ability to recognize object associated 
gestures (see Chapter I for a discussion). On the basis of such dissociations, it has been 
proposed that there are separate input and output ‘praxicons’ (e.g., Heilman and Rothi, 
2003,  see  Figure  1.3.).  In  this  study,  we  will  refer  to  such  input  and  output 
representations, as input and output ‘praxemes’. The term ‘praxeme’ is intended to evoke 
an  analogy  that  has  been  drawn  between  models  of  apraxia  and  models  of  language 
processing,  without reference to the analogous term used in linguistics.  By analogy to 
models of language processing, input praxemes refer to representations that are tied to 
perceptual analysis of actions, while output praxemes are those representations that are 
tied  to  processes  subserving  innervation  of  effectors.  We  can  refer  to  the  model  that 
assumes separate input and output praxemes as the Independent Praxemes Model (IPM). 
The  prediction  of  the  IPM  (see  Cubelli  et  al.,  2000;  Rothi  et  al.,  1991)  is  that  an 
impairment for using objects will not necessarily be associated with an impairment for 
recognizing the corresponding object-associated movements.
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Recently  however,  a  strong  form  the  Motor  Theory  of  Action  Recognition  has  been 
advocated  on  the  basis  of  neuropsychological  data.  Buxbaum  and  colleagues  (2005) 
analyzed  patterns  of  association  of  impairments  across  a  group  of  patients  on  action 
imitation and action recognition tasks.  A significant correlation was observed between the 
performance of patients in recognizing pantomimes and their performance in imitating 
pantomimes. On the basis of the correlation observed between pantomime recognition 
and pantomime imitation, Buxbaum and colleagues argued that the same representations 
are used for both the production and perception of object directed (i.e., transitive) hand 
actions.  Those  authors  proposed  that  such  shared  representations  are  located, 
neuroanatomically, in the left inferior parietal lobule. However, studies with similar tasks 
and  sbjects  failed  to  find  significant  correlations  between  pantomime  imitation  and 
recognition (Tessari, Canessa, Ukmar, and Rumiati, 2007) 
In general, studies based on analyses of a large number of patients who are tested on the 
same materials and evaluated with the same methods and error criteria have an advantage 
of providing a relatively broad view of the relation between cognitive processes.  At the 
same time however,  focusing  only  on  correlations  in  performance  across  tasks  at  the 
group level, we run the risk of overlooking single cases that present dissociations that are 
not in line with group level trends.  Moreover, part of the contrasting results reported in 
literature may be due to the type of analysis done on the patients' scores. For example, the 
use of chi-square can be misleading, as this measure is highly prone to type I and type II 
errors. The use of chi-square might be problematic also if controls show advantage for one 
of the two analysed tasks. In this case, even the lack of absolute difference in the score of 
the patients can be important (Laws and Sartori, 2005, Crawford and Garthwaite, 2005).
For the above mentioned reasons, the present study adopts both approaches. First, we 
study a large group of unselected patients in order to document group level correlations in 
performance across praxis tasks. We then provide analyses of the behavioral profiles at the 
single case level using a reliable test to detect dissociations (Crawford and Garthwaite, 
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2005)  to  study potential  exceptions  to  the group level  pattern.  This  methods assesses 
whether the discrepancy observed in the patient is significantly different from that present 
in controls. Previous studies that have analyzed praxis performance of multiple patients 
within the same study, and across the same materials, have focused either only on group 
level trends (Buxbaum et al., 2005), single case analyses (Cubelli et al., 2000), or have not 
observed both the group level trends and the dissociations at the single case level (Rosci et 
al., 2003; Tessari et al., 2007). 
The substantive issues at stake in the present study are as follows. First, are output 
praxemes  functionally  separable  from:  input  praxemes  and  the  processes  subserving 
visual  object  recognition?   Second,  in  the  measure  to  which  output  praxemes  are 
functionally separable from input praxemes and from processes subserving visual object 
recognition,  is  motor  simulation  (i.e.,  the  activation  of  output  praxemes)  necessary  in 
order for successful recognition of actions and manipulable objects to occur?  
METHODS
Participants
Patients.  Thirty-seven  consecutively  admitted  patients  (mean age  63.9  + 10.4  years; 
education  9.3  + 3.9  years)  took  part  in  the  study.  Patients  were  recruited  from  the 
rehabilitation ward of the Ospedali Riuniti in Trieste. Only patients with focal unilateral 
brain lesions and no previous neurological history were included. CT- or MRI-scans were 
available for 35 patients. The lesions for those 35 patients were mapped using MRIcro 
software  (www.mricro.com)  onto  a  standard  MRIcro  template  by  a  neuroradiologist 
(M.U.) who was unaware of the aims of the study. The Brodmann areas (see Appendix 
2.1.) involved in the lesions have been identified using MRIcro software4.
Controls. Twenty-five neurologically healthy individuals matched for age and education 
(mean age 66  + 11;  education 8.96  + 4.1)  with the patient group were recruited from 
4 see Chapter III for a detailed description of this procedure
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patients’  and  staff’s  relatives,  as  well  as  from  the  rehabilitation  ward  of  the  Ospedali 
Riuniti  in  Trieste,  where  they  were  treated  following  orthopedic  surgery.  They  were 
administered the Edinburgh Handedness questionnaire (Oldfield, 1971) and took part in 
the  experimental  session  only  if  they  were  right-handed.  They  performed  the  object-
related  tasks  described  below  with  their  dominant  hand.  A  second  group  of  control 
subjects recruited on the basis of the same criteria (N = 11; right-handed, age 69.9 + 6.85; 
education 10.4 + 4.2) were tested on the action imitation task described below using their 
non-dominant (i.e., left) hand. This was in order to have a suitable baseline with which to 
compare the performance of patients, who due to hemiparesis, were not able to complete 
the tasks with their dominant hand. There were no differences (all t’s < 1, independent 
samples) between the controls groups, or the control groups and the patient groups, for 
either age or education. 
The Revised Standardized Difference Test (RSDT) was computed to detect classical and 
strong dissociations, as suggested by Crawford and Garthwaite (2006), using the software 
released with the article by Crawford and Garthwaite (2005).  Classical dissociations, in 
which a patient was impaired compared to controls on task A, but within the normal range 
on task B, were determined based on the significance values of the t scores, taking into 
account the correlation within controls across the two tasks. Strong dissociations, in which 
a patient was impaired on both tasks A and B compared to controls, but relatively more 
impaired on task A were also determined with the RSDT method. Because a number of 
patients with apraxic deficits were not able to perform praxis tests with their dominant 
hand, we computed separate t scores for pantomime imitation based on the performance 
of the group of 11 controls who performed those tasks with their non-dominant left hand. 
The pattern of findings for the pantomime imitation task remained the same regardless of 
which control group was used as the baseline (see Table 2.1. for all data).
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Neuropsychological assessment
All 37 patients were administered a neuropsychological assessment evaluating language, 
praxis, visuo-spatial abilities, executive functions and memory. They were tested in a quiet 
room in the hospital or at home. The neuropsychological results for all 37 patients are 
summarized in Appendix 2.1.
Experimental study
In all experimental tasks, no feedback was provided to participants (patients or controls) 
about  their  performance,  either  verbally  or  in  any  other  way.  The  order  of  tasks  was 
counterbalanced across participants, whereas the order of presentation of the items was 
fixed for the imitation tasks and randomized for the object use task. All patients and the 
group  of  twenty-five  controls  completed  the  following  tasks,  over  the  same  set  of  29 
objects of common use (the complete set of stimuli is listed in Appendix 2.2.).
• Object recognition. Patients and controls (n = 25) were asked to name the 29 objects, 
presented as colored photographs. For each item, a participant’s response was scored ‘0’ if 
they were not able to name the object and ‘1’ if they named the object correctly. Dialectal 
names were considered acceptable (i.e., scored as ‘1’). The maximum possible score was 
29/29.  Because the objective of  the object  naming task was to determine whether the 
patients were able to recognize the object at a basic level, patients were allowed to self-
correct  after  making  phonological  errors  or  dysfluencies.  If  the  patient  produced  the 
correct name after having made a phonological error, the response was scored as correct. 
However, semantic paraphasias, even at the first attempt, were scored as errors. In place 
of  the  naming  task,  patients  with  severe  language  impairments  were  administered  a 
multiple choice task in which three color photographs were presented simultaneously, and 
the  experimenter  said  aloud  the  name  of  the  target  photograph.  Distractors  were 
semantically related to the target (e.g., target: pen; distractors: eraser, scissors). The list of 
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distractors for the multiple choice test for object recognition and pantomime recognition 
(see below) is reported in Appendix 2.3.
• Pantomime  recognition.  Patients  and  controls  (n  =  25)  were  asked  to  name  29 
pantomimes  of  object  use  (with  the  object  absent),  performed  by  the  experimenter. 
Responses were scored as correct (1  point) either if  the patient named the action (e.g. 
“hammering”, “you are driving a nail”) or the object involved in the action (e.g. “you are 
using a hammer”). Responses were scored as incorrect (0 points) if the participant did not 
correctly  recognize  the action.  The maximum possible  score  was 29/29.  Patients  with 
severe language impairments completed a multiple choice task in which they were asked 
to  indicate  the  picture  (out  of  three)  depicting  the  action  pantomimed  by  the 
experimenter.  Distractors  were  semantically  related  photographs  and,  when  possible, 
depicted an action visually similar to the target (e.g., target: brushing teeth: distractors: 
washing hands; shaving). The materials for the multiple choice version of the pantomime 
recognition test are listed in Appendix 2.3.
• Imitation  of  Pantomimes.  All  participants  were  asked  to  imitate  the  pantomimes 
corresponding to the same 29 objects demonstrated by the experimenter.  The objects were 
not  visible  during  this  task.  Performance  was  videotaped  and  subsequently  scored  as 
follows: 2 points were given if the action was correctly imitated, 1 point if the action was 
imitated with errors but still recognizable, and 0 points if the action was not recognizable. 
The maximum possible score was 58/58. One group of controls (n = 25) performed this 
task with the dominant right hand, while the other group of controls (n = 11) performed 
this task with their non-dominant left hand.
• Object use.  Patients and controls (n = 25) were asked to demonstrate, with the object 
in hand, the use of the 29 objects.  The same videotaping and scoring criteria were applied 
as were used in the Imitation of Pantomimes Task (2 points were given if the object was 
used correctly, 1 point if the action was performed with errors but still recognizable, and 0 
points if the action was not recognizable). The maximum possible score was 58/58.
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• Imitation of Intransitive actions. All participants were asked to perform a separate 
imitation task, similar to that devised by De Renzi et al. (1980).  This task involves the 
imitation of 20 intransitive actions (i.e., in which objects are not involved), including 10 
meaningless (e.g. raising thumb and little finger) and 10 meaningful gestures (e.g. moving 
the index finger back and forward to signal for someone to come closer). Performance was 
videotaped and then scored as described above:  2 points  were given if  the action was 
correctly imitated, 1 point if the action was imitated with errors but still recognizable, and 
0  points  if  the  action  was  impossible  to  recognize.  The maximum possible  score  was 
40/40. One group of controls (n = 25) performed this task with the dominant right hand, 
while the other group of controls (n = 11) performed this task with their non-dominant left 
hand. 
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Table 2.1. Summary of performance5 of all patients across all experimental tasks. Patients are sorted alphabetically by their initials. ctrls= 
controls, M=controls' mean; SD=controls' standard deviation
Object 
recognition
Pantomime 
Recognition Object Use
Pantomime
Imitation
Imitation of Intransitive 
actions
Patient % correct t score % correct t score % correct t score % correct t score(25 controls)
t score
(11 controls) % correct
t score
(25 controls)
t score
(11 controls)
AN 100 0.49 100 1.04 100 0.83 80 0.23 0.58 90 0.77 0.33
BA 97 -1.97 100 1.04 89.5 -1.35 82.5 0.4 0.76 65 -1.2 -3.72
BE 90 -7.71 100 1.04 78.5 -3.65 72.5 -0.28 0.04 50 -2.39 -6.16
BL 100 0.49 83 -2.36 80.5 -3.22 10 -4.52 -4.46 35 -3.57 -8.59
BO 100 0.49 86 -1.76 100 0.83 87.5 0.77 1.12 88.6 0.68 0.13
BR 93 -5.24 93 -0.36 81 -3.13 70 -0.45 -0.14 65 -1.2 -3.72
CA 100 0.49 100 1.04 100 0.83 87 0.74 1.08 85 0.38 -0.48
CE 90 -7.71 97 0.44 93.5 -0.52 50 -1.89 -1.58 40 -3.18 -7.78
CI 100 0.49 90 -0.96 87 -1.88 60 -1.13 -0.86 77.5 -0.21 -1.67
CS 97 -1.97 97 0.44 86 -2.08 62.5 -1 -0.68 55 -1.99 -5.35
DM 93 -5.24 100 1.04 93 -0.62 77.5 0.06 0.4 70 -0.81 -2.91
DP 100 0.49 100 1.04 100 0.83 90 0.91 1.3 72.5 -0.61 -2.51
DR 96 -2.79 93 -0.36 80 -3.33 40 -2.48 -2.29 55 -1.99 -5.35
DU 100 0.49 96 0.24 96.5 0.1 87.5 0.77 1.12 67.5 -1 -3.32
FG 100 0.49 100 1.04 93 -0.62 70 -0.45 -0.14 72.5 -0.61 -2.51
FL 100 0.49 96 0.24 88 -1.67 60.5 -1.09 -0.82 63.3 -1.34 -4.01
FS 100 0.49 86 -1.76 50 -9.58 17.5 -4.01 -3.92 42.5 -2.98 -7.38
FU 100 0.49 100 1.04 100 0.83 100 1.59 2.02 100 1.56 1.96
GO 93 -5.25 86 -1.76 86.5 -1.88 67.5 -0.65 -0.32 72.5 -0.61 -2.51
MA 100 0.49 100 1.04 98.5 0.52 90 0.91 1.3 100 1.56 1.96
ME 100 0.49 100 1.04 95.5 -0.1 85 0.57 0.94 90 0.77 0.33
MZ 100 0.49 90 -0.96 90 -1.25 52.5 -1.64 -1.4 75 -0.41 -2.1
PE 100 0.49 93 -0.36 89.5 -1.35 70 -0.47 -0.14 80 -0.02 -1.29
PI 83 -13.44 79 -3.16 98.5 0.52 92.5 1.08 1.48 87.5 0.58 -0.07
PN 97 -1.97 100 1.04 94 -0.41 50 -1.89 -1.58 52.5 -2.19 -5.75
PO 100 0.49 100 1.04 98.5 0.52 87.5 0.77 1.12 95 1.17 1.14
PT 97 -1.97 93 -0.36 91 -1.04 27.5 -3.33 -3.2 35.6 -3.51 -8.47
RO 100 0.49 69 -5.16 58.5 -7.81 10 -4.52 -4.46 42.5 -2.98 -7.38
SC 90 -7.71 97 0.44 65 -6.46 50 -1.89 -1.58 45 -2.78 -6.97
SO 100 0.49 93 -0.36 100 0.83 70 -0.45 -0.14 95 1.17 1.14
SR 97 -1.97 72 -4.56 81.5 -3.02 52.5 -1.64 -1.4 65 -1.2 -3.72
ST 90 -7.71 72 -4.56 47.5 -10.1 27.5 -3.33 -3.2 45 -2.78 -6.97
SV 93 -5.25 90 -0.96 48 -10 30 -3.16 -3.02 40 -3.18 -7.78
TO 97 -1.97 100 1.04 98.5 0.52 85 0.6 0.94 82.5 0.18 -0.88
TS 100 0.49 100 1.04 100 0.83 82.5 0.42 0.76 85 0.38 -0.48
ZA 86 -10.98 86 -1.76 63 -6.88 42.5 -2.32 -2.12 42.5 -2.98 -7.38
ZE 100 0.49 100 1.04 96 0 85 0.6 0.72 70 -0.81 -2.91
ctrls M=99,4 SD=1,22 M=94,76 SD=5,01 M=96,04 SD=4,1 M=76,6 SD=14,1 M=80,2 SD=12,4
5We have chosen the RSDT method because it is reliably less prone to type I and type II errors respect to a nonparametric test. Moreover, since 
controls show effect of difficulty in the imitation tasks, we chose a test that takes in account such discrepancy in the normal population.
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RESULTS
The performance of all patients on the praxis and recognition tasks using the same set of 
29 objects is summarized in Table 2.1. Results of the neuropsychological assessment are 
reported in Appendix 2.1.
Correlational analyses
As noted in the introduction,  recent research (e.g.,  Buxbaum et al.,  2005) has based 
inferences  regarding  the  role  of  motor  processes  in  action recognition  on  group level 
correlations observed in large numbers of patients. The logic of the present study is to 
consider whether in our group of unselected unilateral stroke patients, it is possible to 
reproduce  the  correlations  that  have  previously  been  observed  between  the  different 
praxis  related  tasks  that  were  administered.  To  that  end,  we  computed  Pearson’s 
correlations between the four praxis tasks that were performed with the same set of 29 
objects. These correlations were carried out over both t-scores and raw data, and were 
essentially the same with both data sets.
There were significant  and positive correlations between Object  Use and  Pantomime 
Recognition (r = .58, p < .001; see Figure 2.1.a), Object Use and Object Recognition (r = 
.37, p < .05; see Figure 2.1.b), and Object Use and Pantomime Imitation (r = ..78, p < 
.001). There was a significant and positive correlation between Pantomime Recognition 
and Pantomime Imitation (r = .59, p < .001; see Figure 2.1.c) but no significant correlation 
between Pantomime Recognition and Object Recognition (r = .27, p > .05). There was also 
no significant correlation between Object Recognition and Pantomime Imitation (r = .154, 
p > .05).
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Figure 2.1. Group level correlations in performance across tasks. A. The ability of patients to use a set of 
29  objects  was  correlated  (p  <  .001;  Spearman’s  Rho)  with  their  ability  to  recognize  the  same  object 
associated actions when performed by the experimenter. B. The ability of the patients to use the same set of 
objects was correlated (p < .003) with their ability to recognize those objects. C. The ability of the patients to 
imitate the same set of object associated actions was correlated (p < .001) with their ability to imitate the 
same actions.
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As described in Chapter I, the presence of correlations across tasks within a group of 
patients has served as the empirical basis for the inference that representations/processes 
involved in action production are required in order to recognize actions and objects. For 
instance,  such inferences  have  been argued to  follow from the observations  (reported 
above) that performance in using objects is correlated with performance in recognizing 
objects,  recognizing  pantomimes,  and  imitating  pantomimes.  In  the  same  vein,  the 
correlation between pantomime recognition and pantomime imitation (reported above) 
reproduces the pattern observed by Buxbaum et al. (2005). 
The mere presence of statistically significant correlations between performance across 
the group of patients on the different tasks does not,  in itself,  indicate that there is a 
relation  between  the  abilities  required  to  perform  the  tasks.  However,  the  logic  of 
demonstrating that such correlations can be obtained within the present group of patients 
is to show that this group of patients is comparable to those previously discussed (e.g., 
Buxbaum  et  al.,  2005).  In  the  next  section  we  show,  that  even  though  there  are 
demonstrated  correlations,  at  the  single  case  level  the  ‘abilities’  that  are  correlated 
between tasks in fact clearly dissociate. In this sense, the multiple single case approach 
described below cannot be criticized as being drawn from an ‘atypical’ group of patients. 
Single case dissociations
As discussed in the Introduction, a number of previous case studies have reported that 
impaired production of object associated actions can be observed despite unimpaired 1) 
pantomime recognition, and/or 2) object recognition. There have also been cases reported 
who are impaired at pantomime imitation, but spared at pantomime recognition. Here we 
describe patients from this group who demonstrated these three dissociations. Table 2.2. 
provides a summary of those cases that are discussed in this dissociations analysis.
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Figure 2.2. Double dissociations between object use and pantomime recognition (A) 
and  object  use  and  object  recognition  (B)  (*  indicates  strong  (i.e.,  disproportionate) 
dissociations).
• Impaired object use compared to pantomime recognition. As depicted in Figure 2.2a 
(see also Table 2.2.), six patients (SV, SC, BE, BR, DR and CS) were impaired at using 
objects but within the normal range for recognizing object-associated pantomimes. This 
pattern was observed both in patients who were administered the naming version of the 
pantomime recognition test  (BE,  CS)  as  well  as  in  those  who performed the multiple 
choice version of the pantomime recognition task (SC, SV, DR, BR).  Of these six patients, 
five of them were impaired at recognizing objects (SV, BE, SC, BR and DR) while CS was 
in the normal range for object recognition.   Two of the six patients were impaired for 
pantomime  imitation  (SV  and  DR)  while  the  others  were  in  the  normal  range.  The 
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imitation of intransitive actions was impaired in SV, SC and BE, but within normal limits 
for BR, DR and CS.
Another four patients (FS, RO, ST and ZA) presented with disproportionate deficits (i.e., 
strong  dissociations)  for  using  objects  compared  to  recognizing  pantomimes  (see 
Appendix 2.4a and Table 2.2.). For these four patients, performance on both object use as 
well as recognizing pantomimes was outside of the control range. All four of these patients 
were impaired at imitating pantomimes as well as imitating intransitive actions. Patients 
FS and RO performed normally on the object recognition task, whereas ST and ZA were 
impaired in recognizing objects.
• Impaired pantomime recognition compared to object use. Two patients (BO and PI) 
were able to use objects despite being impaired at recognizing the associated pantomimes. 
Both  patients  BO  and  PI  were  unimpaired  for  imitating  pantomimes.  PI’s  deficit  for 
pantomime  recognition  was  associated  with  a  deficit  in  recognizing  objects  (both 
recognition tasks performed with the multiple choice versions of the tasks).6 Interestingly, 
BO  was  in  the  normal  range  for  object  recognition.   The  observation  of  a  selective 
impairment for recognizing pantomimes, termed pantomime agnosia (Rothi, Mack, and 
Heilman,  1986),  suggests  functionally  dissociable  processes  for  action  and  object 
recognition. 
• Impaired Object Use compared to Object Recognition. As depicted in Figure 2.2b, four 
patients BL, RO, CI and FS were impaired in using objects but were within the normal 
range for  recognizing  objects.  Patients  BL,  RO,  and FS were impaired  for  pantomime 
recognition, pantomime imitation, and imitation of intransitive actions, whereas CI was in 
the normal range for these tasks.
6 It is unlikely that PI’s impairment for recognizing the pantomimes can be explained by a general visual 
impairment, because the patient  was within the normal range on the VOSP and object decision screening 
tests, ruling out at least some types of a general visual impairment (see Appendices 3.1 and 3.3).  
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Two patients  (ST and SV) presented  with  disproportionate  impairments  (i.e.,  strong 
dissociations) in using objects compared to Object Recognition. Both patients were also 
impaired  for  imitating  pantomimes  and  intransitive  actions.  ST  was  impaired  for 
recognizing pantomimes while SV was in the normal range.
• Impaired object recognition compared to object use. In contrast, four patients CE, TO, 
DM and  PI were impaired for object recognition but were within the normal range for 
using  the  same  objects.  Patient  CE,  TO  and  DM  were  unimpaired  for  recognizing 
pantomimes, whereas PI was impaired in this task (using the multiple choice version). 
These four patients performed within the normal range for imitating pantomimes, while 
only patient CE was impaired for imitating intransitive actions.
Three  patients  (ZA,  BE,  GO)  presented  with  disproportionate  deficits  (i.e.,  strong 
dissociations) for Object Recognition compared to Object Use.  Patient BE was within the 
normal range for pantomime recognition while GO and ZA were impaired on this task. 
Patients BE and GO were within the normal range for imitating pantomimes, while ZA 
was impaired on this task. Patients ZA and BE were impaired for imitating intransitive 
actions, while patient GO was in the normal range. 
• Impaired pantomime imitation compared to pantomime recognition.  As discussed 
above (see Figure 2.1; see also Buxbaum et al., 2005) we observed a significant correlation 
between the ability of patients to imitate pantomimes and their ability to recognize object 
associated pantomimes.  However, contrary to this group level pattern, patient PT was 
impaired at imitating both object associated actions and intransitive actions. Within the 
category  of  ‘intransitive’  gestures,  PT  was  equivalently  impaired  for  meaningful  and 
meaningless gestures (36.5% and 35 % correct, respectively).  However, PT was able to 
recognize object associated pantomimes and was within the normal range in using and 
naming objects.
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The pattern  of  performance  of  patient  PT represents  an  important  exception  to  the 
group level  pattern.  The performance of  PT indicates  that  even if  input  praxemes are 
‘disconnected’  from  output  praxemes,  it  is  still  possible  to  successfully  recognize 
pantomimes.   Other  studies  have  reported  patients  who  are  impaired  at  imitating 
meaningless gestures but still  able to recognize gestures (LK and EN; Goldenberg and 
Hagmann, 1997; cases 12 and 23 in Tessari et al.,  2007;  BS, Bartolo et  al.,  2001; FG, 
Rumiati et al., 2001).
• Analysis of lesions. Since the lesions results were not straightforward, we cannot draw 
strong conclusions about the anatomical bases of the different abilities. A higher number 
of dissociating cases would have allowed to make statistical analyses, in order to compare 
between the dissociating groups and to identify the lesions most probably associated with 
a given deficit (e.g. using a Chi-square analysis with MRIcro). However, the dissociations 
at the behavioural level are important to stress out the fact that two processes can be 
independently damaged by brain lesions, and the main goal of the study, was to address 
the predictions of embodied theories using a dissociation logic rather than a localization 
one.  For  the  interested  reader  we  have  included the  brain  lesions  of  the  dissociating 
patients in Appendix 2.4. 
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Table 2.2. The table presents a simplified profile of those patients discussed in the text. 
“√” indicates performance within the normal range; “X” indicates impaired performance 
compared to control subjects (n = 25). The subscript “MC” indicates that the multiple 
choice  version  of  the  task  was  completed  by  the  patient.  “*”  indicates  patients  with 
disproportionate impairments (i.e. strong dissociations).
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Patient
Initials
Object
Recognition
Pantomime
Recognition
Object
Use
Pantomime
Imitation
Imitation of
Intransitive
Actions
Impaired Object Use compared to Pantomime Recognition
SV X MC √ MC X X X
SC X MC √ MC X √ X
BE X √ X √ X
BR X MC √ MC X √ √
DR X MC √ MC X X X
CS √ √ X √ X
FS* √ X X X X
RO* √ MC X MC X X X
ST* X MC X MC X X X
ZA* X MC X MC X X X
Impaired Pantomime Recognition compared to Object Use
BO √ X √ √ √
PI X MC X MC √ √ √
Impaired Object Use Compared to Object Recognition
BL √ MC X MC X X X
RO √ MC X MC X X X
CI √ √ X √ √
FS √ X X X X
ST* X MC X MC X X X
SV* X MC √ MC X X X
Impaired Object Recognition Compared to Object Use
CE X √ √ √ X
TO X √ √ √ √
DM X √ √ √ √
PI X MC X MC √ √ √
ZA* X MC X MC X X X
BE* X √ X √ X
GO* X X X √ √
Selectively Impaired Pantomime and Action Imitation
PT √ √ √ X X
Paradoxical dissociations: the case of Patient SR
According to Laws and Sartori (2005), double dissociations can occur not only between 
patients, but also within patients. Such double dissociations across tasks, within a single 
patient,  are  called  paradoxical.  According to the authors,  the existence  of  paradoxical 
dissociations is theoretically problematic when two tasks are believed to share common 
processes. 
We  searched  for  paradoxical  dissociations  in  our  patients  sample,  considering  two 
factors: task (recognition vs. production) and type of stimulus (objects vs. pantomimes). 
Only one patient showed a paradoxical dissociation: patient SR (see Figure 2.3.), who was 
impaired in recognition of pantomimes (t=-4.56) despite being normal at imitating them 
(t=-1.64), and was normal in recognizing objects (t=-1.97) but impaired at using them (t=-
3.02). The RSDT test for dissociations was significant across tasks (p < .05). 
Figure 2.3. Paradoxical dissociation in patient SR. 
Discussion. Laws and Sartori (2005) tested Alzheimer and HSE7 patients in naming and 
feature verification tasks, using two types of stimuli: living and nonliving items. In both 
patients  samples  they  found  cases  of  classical  double  dissociations  across  tasks  (i.e. 
7 Herpes Simplex Encephalitis
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paradoxical).  Such  a  finding  is  problematic  in  the  framework  of  category  specificity, 
because it raises theoretical issues about the most suitable task to individuate the semantic 
deficit. Indeed, a semantic impairment specific for a category of stimuli should affect all 
tasks tapping that  category.  One possible  explanation that the authors propose for  the 
phenomenon of  paradoxical  dissociations  is  that  they  might  originate  from  confounds 
-such as fluctuation of attention- or they are chance findings emerging from noisy patient 
data. However, the use of RSDT test should provide excellent control over type I error rate, 
whereas nonparametric statistics like Chi-square give rise to several false negatives and 
false positives. 
Also in the case of the paradoxical dissociation found in SR, one could hypothesize that 
the  two  visual  tasks  (recognition  of  objects  and  pantomimes)  depend  on  a  common 
mechanism, as well as the two praxic tasks (imitation and object use). Instead, it might be 
the case that this result confirms the idea of fractionation within the system controlling 
object-directed actions. Indeed, the double dissociation across tasks showed by patient SR 
is compatible with the model by Rothi et al.  (1991) presented in the Introduction (see 
Figure 2.4.)8.  In the case of  patient SR, we can hypothesize that the input and output 
praxicons are disconnected  from the semantic route. Such a damage prevents the access 
to action meaning when a pantomime is presented (pantomime recognition impairment) 
and to  retrieve  the  correct  motor  pattern  starting  from the  presentation  of  an  object 
(object  use  impairment).  We  can  hypothesize  that  the  direct  route  for  imitation  is 
preserved in SR because the patient can imitate meaningless pantomimes (t= -1.2). 
The dissociation pattern of patient SR, as well as data from patients reported above, are 
better  explained by modular  models  of   praxis,  such as  the SAS/CS or  the IPM. It  is 
difficult to conciliate embodied theories with the results found.
8 However, we agree with Laws and Sartori (2005) that the best way to control for spurious findings would 
have been to test the consistency of deficit over time, but this was not possible due to time constraints (our 
battery lasted about three hours including the neuropsychological assessment).
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Figure 2.4. Hypothesized disconnections in Patient SR (modified by Heilman and Rothi, 2003)
DISCUSSION
In this chapter, I have considered the performance of brain damaged patients on tasks 
involving  the  use  and  the  recognition  of  objects,  as  well  as  the  imitation  and  the 
recognition of the corresponding pantomimes. The results show that, at the single case 
level, recognition and production processes can be dissociable for objects, although these 
functions significantly correlate at the group level. We observed individual cases whose 
performance  profiles  are  problematic  for  the  Motor  Theories  of  Action  and  Object 
Recognition. First, patients were observed who were impaired for object use, but relatively 
unimpaired for action recognition, as well as the reverse. Second, patients were observed 
who were impaired for object use but were relatively unimpaired for object recognition, as 
well  as  the  reverse.  Third,  one  patient  was  observed  who was  impaired  for  imitating 
pantomimes,  but  was  relatively  unimpaired  for  recognizing  pantomimes  and  using 
objects. 
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There is an asymmetry, within neuropsychological evidence, between specific theoretical 
proposals  and  observations  of  associations  versus  dissociations  of  abilities.  In  the 
introduction we described the IPM (Independent Praxeme Model)  in which input and 
output praxemes are functionally separable (see Rothi et al.,  1991).  This model can be 
contrasted with the Motor Theory of Action Recognition. Both the IPM and the Motor 
Theory of Action Recognition are consistent with the group level correlations that we and 
others  (Buxbaum  et  al.,  2005)  have  reported.  On  the  other  hand,  the  dissociations 
observed within single cases indicate that both object use and pantomime imitation can be 
impaired despite normal performance in pantomime and object recognition (for a similar 
discussion in the context of agrammatism, see Caramazza, Capasso, Capitani, and Miceli, 
2005).  The dissociations reported in this study indicate that: 1) the ability to use objects is 
not necessary in order to be able to recognize object associated pantomimes; 2) the ability 
to imitate pantomimes is not necessary in order to be able to recognize object associated 
pantomimes;  and 3)  the ability  to  use  objects  is  not  necessary  in  order  to  be  able  to 
recognize  objects.  This  means  that:  a)  output  praxemes  and  input  praxemes  are 
functionally dissociable, and b) that the integrity of output praxemes is not necessary in 
order for the successful functioning of input praxemes and object recognition processes. 
This conclusion means that  we must reject  the strong forms of  the Motor Theories  of 
Action and Object Recognition. It is important to note that this conclusion does not mean 
that motor production processes may not serve as important inputs to help object and 
action recognition processes.  Sensorimotor experience is probably indispensable in the 
acquisitional  phase  of  conceptual  knowledge,  but  once  the knowledge is  acquired and 
stored  in  the  ventral  stream,  the  two  pathways  become  specialized  for  their  specific 
functions (for discussion on object recognition processes,  see Mahon, Milleville,  Negri, 
Rumiati, Caramazza, and Martin, 2007). 
The fact that brain structures subserving motor production are automatically activated 
when participants observe manipulable objects (for review, see Martin, 2007) would seem 
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to be at variance with the claim that motor production processes are not necessary in 
order to recognize objects and actions. In the General Discussion (Chapter V), we will 
consider  more  closely  some  possible  roles  of  motor  simulation  in  action  and  object 
recognition. 
However,  results  from  imaging  and  behavioral  studies  showing  that  the  motor  and 
conceptual systems strongly interact cannot be ignored, and they are not completely in 
contrast with the present findings.  Indeed, we believe that in a healthy brain the ventral 
and dorsal streams interact, however selective damage to one of the two circuits does not 
significantly affect the functioning of the other. The dorsal/ventral stream dychotomy will 
be discussed more in detail in Chapter III.
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Appendix 2.1. Results of the neuropsychological evaluation for all patients.
Patient
Initials Sex Age
Educ
(years)
Months
post
onset
Oldfield IMA IA AATtoken
AAT
rep
AAT
write
AAT
read
AAT
nam
AAT
oc
AAT
wc
Raven's
CPM
VOSP
screen.
VOSP
o.d.
Span
fwd
Span
bwd Corsi
AN f 48 11 2 100 70 14 0 148 90 - 120 60 60 33 18 19 6 6 5
BA m 70 13 2 42 61 14 27 114 25 - 60 33 0 12 15 8 4 2 4
BL m 68 3 6 100 46 14 23 130 n.a. 24 108 49 47 14 20 17 3 p.u. 3
BE m 65 8 2 83 58 12 15 134 78 - 109 51 48 19 20 12 3 3 4
BO m 78 13 3 100 71 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 21 19 18 8 5 5
BR m 58 11 3 100 53 14 48 39 12 - 0 41 0 36 20 16 n.a. n.a. 5
CA m 58 8 2 100 68 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 21 20 16 4 3 4
CS m 76 12 1 83 65 13 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 22 19 13 4 4 5
CE m 61 5 2 100 51 13 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 11 10 6 6 3 3
CI m 70 8 1 -83 63 14 4 140 85 - 108 51 54 24 20 13 4 3 3
DM f 68 5 1 100 68 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 18 20 13 5 2 3
DP f 73 5 1 100 62 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 20 20 15 5 3 4
DU m 72 5 2 100 53 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 25 18 17 4 2 4
DR m 55 15 72 100 54 8 1 94 15 - 69 60 35 34 20 19 4 n.a. 5
FL f 61 8 1 100 62 12 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 33 20 19 7 5 5
FG m 50 13 60 100 60 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 29 20 19 4 4 5
FU m 62 18 2 67 60 14 3 142 88 - 120 58 59 24 20 15 6 4 4
FS f 55 9 2 100 52 14 13 133 82 - 109 60 57 29 19 16 5 3 4
GO f 78 4 1 92 59 13 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 15 20 18 4 2 4
MA m 60 13 2 100 67 14 4 131 84 - 119 58 60 34 20 15 5 4 5
MZ m 81 13 2 100 65 12 1 125 85 - 110 55 56 27 20 20 6 4 4
ME m 55 14 1 100 66 14 15 123 75 - 110 51 51 28 18 18 4 3 5
PE f 43 8 2 83 63 14 1 131 88 - 115 49 52 23 19 17 4 3 4
PT f 66 8 1 100 51 12 20 141 57 - 102 50 39 21 20 18 5 2 3
PI f 65 8 2 100 58 14 31 96 55 - 29 44 43 26 18 16 2 3 4
PO f 50 8 2 100 68 13 n.a. 148 n.a. 30 n.a. 59 n.a. 30 20 19 5 4 5
PN f 63 5 2 83 65 13 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 21 20 18 4 3 2
RO f 80 5 3 100 43 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 22 18 16 4 2 4
SR f 69 8 1 100 54 11 39 147 29 - 67 47 40 24 20 13 4 2 3
SC f 82 5 1 100 55 11 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 16 17 13 5 2 4
SO m 70 11 1 100 69 14 2 149 89 - 114 58 60 32 20 18 5 4 5
SV f 50 10 2 100 50 11 37 97 18 - 10 45 27 17 19 17 3 n.a. 4
ST m 63 5 2 100 53 14 21 73 25 - 0 48 16 29 19 16 n.a. n.a. 5
TO m 67 13 6 100 51 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18 8 5 4 3
TS m 66 15 2 100 70 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 25 18 19 6 4 3
ZA m 40 18 2 83 49 10 47 1 0 - 0 37 31 26 20 17 p.u. p.u. 4
ZE f 65 5 2 100 62 14 n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. 20 20 20 4 4 4
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Appendix 2.1. (continued) Results of the neuropsychological evaluation for all patients.
INITIALS P&P 
words
P&P 
pictures
TMT 
A
TMT
B
TMT 
B-A
WEIGL WCST 
N.cat
WCST 
pers
REY 
imm.
REY 
del.
REY 
rec.
WARR. 
faces
naming Hemisph Description of Lesion
(Numbers indicate Brodmann Areas)
AN n.a. 50 33 63 30 n.a. 5 6 35 6 26/32 n.a. 30/30 L 11
BA n.a. 50 p.u. p.u. p.u. n.a. 6 4 p.u. p.u. p.u. 15 7/30 L 17,18,19,21,22,23,37,39,40,41
BL n.a. 49 113 407 294 3  n.a.  n.a. 27 8 29/32 n.a. 28/30 L 43,48
BE n.a. 48 203 p.u. p.u. 7 n.a. n.a. 18 2 38/46 n.a. 29/30 L 48
BO n.a. 52 197 p.u. p.u. 13 6 2 29 4 27/32 n.a. 26/30 R 11,38,39,44,45,47,48
BR n.a. 48 50 p.u. p.u. p.u. p.u. p.u. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0/30 L 20,21,22,37,38,39,42,48
CA n.a. 51 70 388 318 9 3 1 37 8 43/46 n.a. 27/30 R 6,44,48
CS n.a. 51 300 460 160 n.a. 6 2 35 6 30/32 n.a. 27/30 R 2,3,20,21,22,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,47,4
8
CE 49 n.a. p.u. p.u. p.u. n.a. 4 5 25 7 27/32 n.a. 21/30 R 48
CI n.a. 44 90 p.u. p.u. 6 p.u. p.u. 17 2 26/32 n.a. 29/30 L 7,18,19,21,22,37,39,40,41
DM n.a. 50 142 530 388 n.a. 6 3 25 4 28/32 n.a. 26/30 R 48
DP n.a. n.a. 51 360 309 10 n.a. n.a. 22 4 45/46 24 27/30 L 48
DU n.a. 50 72 525 453 9 1 10 25 3 34/46 n.a. 27/30 R 42,48 
DR n.a. 51 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6 1 p.u. p.u. p.u. 19 21/30 L 2,3,4,6,8,9,10,11,20,21,22,37,38,39,40,
41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48
FL n.a. 52 41 142 101 n.a. 4 10 45 5 44/46 n.a. 20/20 L inferior parietal lobe (no scan available)
FG n.a. 52 125 p.u. p.u. n.a. 2 3 25 1 40/46 n.a. 19/20 L  2,3,4,5,6,7,17,18,19,20,21,23,37,39,40,41
FU n.a. 50 46 129 83 12 n.a. n.a. 45 10 31/32 n.a. 29/30 L 10,45,46,47,48
FS n.a. 51 78 324 246 n.a. 4 15 15 0 25/32 n.a. 25/30 L  Basal ganglia
GO n.a. 49 79 371 292 n.a. 3 4 30 6 27/32 n.a. 27/30 R 6,44,45,46,48
MA n.a. 52 32 142 110 10 n.a. n.a. 38 8 29/32 n.a. 30/30 L 48
MZ n.a. 51 152 238 86 n.a. 2 11 n.a. n.a. n.a. 20 30/30 L  nucleus lenticularis (no scan available)
ME n.a. 51 35 217 182 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 29/30 L 22,43,48 
PE n.a. n.a. 166 235 69 10 3 7 50 14 45/46 n.a. 28/30 R Subcortical
PT n.a. 50 211 p.u. p.u. 6 n.a. n.a. 21 1 28/32 n.a. 27/30 L 7,19,39,40
PI n.a. 48 n.a. n.a. n.a. 9 5 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2/30 L 20,21,22,37,38 
PO n.a. 51 30 80 50 n.a. 3 12 37 11 44/46 n.a. 29/30 R 20,21,22,37,39,41,42
PN n.a. 51 198 p.u. p.u. n.a. 6 3 40 9 30 n.a. 26/30 R 3,6,7,40
RO n.a. n.a. 76 p.u. p.u. n.a. n.a. n.a. 30 5 41/46 n.a. n.a. L 21,22,41,42
SR n.a. 46 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3 3 9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 23 17/30 L Subcortical
SC n.a. 52 197 p.u. p.u. 5 p.u. p.u. 38 8 29/32 n.a. 28/30 R 2,40,41,42
SO n.a. 52 42 215 173 8 2 5 24 1 18/32 n.a. 29/30 L 20,41
SV n.a. 47 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 24 3/30 L 21,22,37,38,39,41,48
ST n.a. 49 n.a. n.a. n.a. 10 2 5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0/30 L 2,3,4,38,47,48
TO 50 47 197 p.u. p.u. 11 3 7 43 6 n.a. n.a. 30/30 R 6,20,21,22,37,38,39,41,42,43,44,45,48
TS n.a. 51 62 300 238 10 6 0 33 7 44/46 n.a. 29/30 R 47,48
ZA n.a. 50 56 410 354 n.a. 5 7 p.u. p.u. p.u. 13 p.u. L 6,22,40,41,42,44,45,47,48
ZE n.a. 52 62 213 151 5 3 2 43 8 30/32 n.a. 29/30 R Subcortical
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Caption for Appendix 2.1. 
Abbreviations  used in  the  neuropsychological  assessment:  Oldfield =  Oldfield  (1971);  IMA = 
Ideomotor Apraxia (De Renzi, Motti, and Nichelli, 1980); IA = Ideational Apraxia (De Renzi and 
Lucchelli,  1988);  AAT = Aaachener Aphasie Test,  Italian norms (Luzzatti,  Willmes, De Bleser. 
Firenze, Organizzazioni Speciali, 1996); AAT token = token subtest; AAT rep = repetition; AAT 
writ = written language; AAT read = shortened version of the reading task with 30 items;  AAT 
name = naming;  AAT oc = oral comprehension;  AAT wc = written comprehension; Raven's 
CPM:  Raven  Coloured  Progressive  Matrices  (Carlesimo,  G.A.;  Caltagirone,  C.;  Gainotti,  1996); 
VOSP  =  Visual  Object  and  Space  Perception  battery  (Warrington  and  James,  1991).  VOSP 
screen =  screening task;  VOSP o.d.= object  decision task;  Span fwd =  digit  span forward; 
Span bwd = backward digit span;  Corsi = Corsi test, spatial short-term memory (Spinnler and 
Tognoni, 1987); P&P words = The Pyramids and Palm Trees test, version with words (Howard & 
Patterson, 1992); P&P pictures = The Pyramids and Palm Trees test, version with pictures; TMT 
A= Trail  Making Test  Version  A,  with  letters  only  (italian norms from Giovagnoli,  Del  Pesce, 
Mascheroni, Simoncelli, Laiacona, and Capitani, 1996);  TMT B = Trail Making Test Version B, 
alternating numbers and letters; TMT B-A = difference in score between TMT A and B; WEIGL = 
Weigl’s  Sorting  Test  (Spinnler  and  Tognoni,  1987). WCST  =  Wisconsin  Card  Sorting  Test 
(normative data: Caffarra, Vezzadini, Dieci, Zonato, Venneri, 2004);  N.cat = Number of correct 
categories  chosen  by  the  patient;  N pers =  Number of  perseverations;  REY  = REY Auditory 
Verbal  Learning  test;  REY  imm=Immediate  Recall;  REY  del.= delayed  recall;  REY  rec.= 
recognition (Rey, 1964); WARR. Faces = Recognition Memory Test for faces (Warrington, 1996). 
Naming = Trieste screening battery, unpublished norms; Hemisph = side of the lesion.
n.a. = task not administered
p.u. = patient unable to perform the task
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Appendix 2.2. List of the experimental stimuli in alphabetical order.
Bottle
Cigarette
Coffee mug
Comb
Duster
Eraser
Fork
Glass
Gun
Hammer
Iron
Jug
Key
Knife
Ladle
Lemon squeezer
Light bulb
Lipstick
Match
Paintbrush
Pen
Razor
Saw
Scissors
Screwdriver
Spanner
Spoon
Tennis racket
Toothbrush
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Appendix 2.3.  List  of  distractors  in  the  multiple  choice  tasks.  Target  items are  in  capital 
letters.
OBJECT RECOGNITION
PEN Eraser Scissors
LIPSTICK Razor Comb
Pen SCISSORS Eraser
screwdriver saw PAINTBRUSH
Spoon carafe COFFEE MUG
Spanner Screwdriver KEY
coffee mug Spoon CARAFE
Hammer light bulb CIGARETTE
Eraser Pen Scissors
Saw Hammer GUN
Spanner SCREWDRIVER Hammer
SAW Scissors Paintbrush
Spanner HAMMER Screwdriver
Coffee mug LEMON SQUEEZER Carafe
IRON Light bulb Carafe
Comb Lipstick RAZOR
Pen LIGHT BULB Scissors
Hammer SPANNER Screwdriver
SPOON Coffee mug Carafe
Razor COMB Lipstick
Spoon LADLE Whisk
Carafe Glass BOTTLE
TOOTHBRUSH Razor Hairbrush
Spoon Carafe GLASS
MATCHSTICK Lighter Candle
Baseball bat Table tennis bat TENNIS RACKET
FORK Coffee mug Spoon
Scissors Saw KNIFE
Vacuum cleaner sponge CLOTH
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Appendix 2.3. (continued). List of distractors in the multiple choice tasks. Target items are in 
capital letters.
PANTOMIME RECOGNITION
WRITING WITH PEN Writing with keyboard Cutting with scissors
Applying nail polish Using a nail file APPLYING LIPSTICK
Knitting Sewing CUTTING WITH SCISSORS
Turning a spanner PAINTING A WALL Turning a screwdriver
DRINKING FROM COFFEE 
MUG Pouring from a carafe Eating with a spoon
Turning a tap Opening a door handle TURNING A KEY
POURING FROM A 
CARAFE
Beating a pestle in the 
mortar Squeezing an orange
Applying eyeshadow SMOKING A CIGARETTE Shaving with a razor
Drawing with pencil RUBBING WITH ERASER Cutting with scissors
Using hairdryer Using a spray SHOOTING WITH A GUN
TURNING A 
SCREWDRIVER Hammering Using a chisel
Turning a spanner SAWING Using a chisel
Planing wood HAMMERING Cutting with an axe
SQUEEZING AN ORANGE Eating pasta Opening a bottle with a corkscrew
Vacuuming IRONING Knitting
Washing hands Brushing Teeth SHAVING WITH A RAZOR
Turning a screwdriver Using pliers TURNING A LIGHT BULB
TURNING A SPANNER Drilling Sawing
Using a whisk EATING WITH A SPOON Drinking a cup of coffee
Applying makeup COMBING HAIR Drying hair
Vacuuming Cleaning dishes with a sponge
CLEANING WINDOW 
WITH A CLOTH
Playing table tennis Playing baseball PLAYING TENNIS
Sawing CUTTING WITH A KNIFE Cutting with scissors
BRUSHING TEETH Shaving with a razor Combing hair
STIRRING WITH A LADLE Stirring with a whisk Eating with a spoon
Pouring from a carafe DRINKING FROM A GLASS Drinking from a coffee mug
Using a lighter Lighting a candle STRIKING A MATCH
Drinking from a glass Pouring from a carafe POURING FROM A BOTTLE
Eating with a spoon Drinking  from  a  coffee mug EATING WITH A FORK
61
Appendix 2.4. Lesion analysis
Here, I report the lesions of patients who showed the classical dissociations reported in 
Chapter  II,  as  computed  with  the  RSDT  test  (Crawford  and  Garthwaite,  2006).  The 
lesions, reconstructed with MRIcro software, are showed below.
 The lesion analysis of the five patients with impaired object use but spared pantomime 
recognition is reported in Figure 2.3.A. The top panel row in A shows the lesion overlap 
analysis for patients CS and SC, who had right hemisphere lesions, whereas the bottom 
panel row shows the overlap of DR, BR and BE, who had left hemisphere lesions. There 
was overlap across the two right-hemisphere lesioned patients in the supramarginal gyrus 
and the superior temporal gyrus, and across the three left hemisphere lesioned patients in 
a small portion of the putamen.
Figure  B.  shows  the  lesion  overlap  for  patients  BO  and  PI,  who  were  impaired  at 
recognizing pantomimes  despite  intact  pantomime recognition.  The lesions of  the  two 
patients did not overlap.
Figure C. depicts  the lesions of  patients CE, TO, and DM, who had right hemisphere 
lesions and were impaired for recognizing objects, but unimpaired for recognizing object 
associated pantomimes,  imitating pantomimes,  and using objects.  The lesions of  these 
three patients overlapped in the right putamen. PI’s lesion is shown in panel B. 
Figure D. reports the right hemisphere lesions overlap of patients FS, RO, BL and CI, 
which had spared object recognition despite impaired object use. There was no common 
region lesioned in all four patients.
Figure  E.  depicts  PT’s  brain,  who  has  a  selective  deficit  for  imitating  transitive  and 
intransitive  gestures.  Her  brain  lesion  is  restricted  to  a  small  portion  of  the  left 
hemisphere, in the left inferior parietal lobe and angular gyrus. 
62
Appendix  2.4.  (continued) Color  bars  indicate  (from  purple=1  to  red=all)  the  number  of  patients 
showing lesion overlap in a given region. Left and right hemispheres are not inverted. In single cases, the 
lesion is colored in red.
A. 
Patient CS: frontal inferior operculum, rolandic operculum, insula, postcentral g., inferior parietal g., 
supramarginal g., angular g., Heschl g., superior temporal. g., sup. temporal pole, mid. temporal g., inf. 
temporal g.
Patient SC: inf. parietal g., supramarginal g., sup. temporal g.
Patient DR: putamen, precentral g., middle frontal g., frontal inf. operculum, frontal inf. g., rolandic 
operculum, insula, postcentral g., inf. parietal g., supramarginal g., angular g., Heschl g., sup. temporal g., 
sup. temporal pole, middle temporal g., middle temporal pole.
Patient BR: putamen, sup. temporal g., sup. temporal pole, middle temporal g., inferior temporal g.
Patient BE: putamen, globus pallidum
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B.
Patient  BO:  frontal  inf.  operculum,  frontal  inf.  orbital,  rolandic  operculum,  insula,  postcentral  g., 
caudate, putamen, Heschl g., sup. temporal g., middle temporal g.
Patient PI: caudate, putamen, sup. temporal g., middle temporal g., inf. temporal g.
C.
Patient CE: putamen, pallidum
Patient  TO: precentral  g.,  frontal  inf.  operculum,  rolandic  operculum,  insula,  postcentral  g., 
supramarginal g., putamen, sup. temporal g., middle temporal g.
Patient DM: insula, putamen, pallidum
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D.
Patient FS:  putamen. pallidum
Patient RO: sup. temporal g., middle temporal g.
Patient BL: rolandic operculum, insula, postcentral g., sup. temporal g.
Patient  CI: middle  temporal  g.,  sup.  temporal  g.,  sup.  occipital  g.,  middle occipital  g.,  angular  g., 
precuneus.
E.
Patient PT: angular g., inf. parietal g.
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Chapter III.
The Separation of Semantic and Motor 
Knowledge of Tools In Humans
Abstract. In chapter II, we have shown that recognition and production processes for 
action and objects can be dissociable in a group of unselected patients. In this Chapter, I 
will describe in detail two single case studies that may provide insightful information about 
the relation between conceptual and motor knowledge in the mind. In study 3A9,  I will 
describe  a  double  dissociation  between the ability  to  carry  out  tasks  tapping semantic 
knowledge, and the ability to use objects in two patients with Ideational Apraxia (F.G. and 
D.R., studied also in Rumiati et al.,  2001) and two patients with semantic impairments 
(A.M. and D.L.). Study 3A proved that the two IA patients had intact semantic knowledge 
about  the  objects  that  they  failed  to  use,  whereas  the  two  patients  with  semantic 
impairment showed the reverse pattern. In study 3B, patients AM’s and DL’s performance 
on object use and on semantic tasks has been assessed two years later,  in order to see 
whether  the  patients’  ability  to  use  objects  degraded  as  a  function  of  their  semantic 
knowledge about them. Results from the assessments in 2002 and in 2004 confirmed that 
patients A.M. and D.L. had a selective loss of lexical-semantic knowledge, despite relative 
preservation of other cognitive abilities including object use. 
Since I have already described the literature on IA in the Introduction, here I will start by 
briefly introducing some studies on semantic dementia.
9 Study 3A reports data from a manuscript in preparation (Rumiati et al., in prep.), whereas data of study 2B 
are published in Negri et al. (2007a).
66
Semantic Dementia
In 1975, Elizabeth Warrington described three patients with progressive anomia and 
impaired word comprehension. This syndrome has been successively considered as the 
temporal  variant  of  the  frontotemporal  dementia  or  the  fluent  form  of  primary 
progressive aphasia (Luzzatti, 1999; Hodges et al., 1992; Snowden et al., 1989). Since it 
impacts primarily on the semantic memory of patients, the term Semantic Dementia 
(hereafter SD) has been proposed (Hodges et al., 1992, Snowden et al., 1989).  Others 
called the same neuropsychological pattern slowly progressive aphasia, as conceptual 
loss is usually accompanied by a lexical deficit (see Poeck and Luzzatti, 1988). Whereas 
SD  patients’  naming  and  spontaneous  speech  are  interspersed  with  anomias  and 
semantic  paraphasias,  perceptual  skills,  non-verbal  intelligence,  syntactic  skills  and 
repetition. Day-to-day memory may be relatively spared at least at an earlier stage of 
the disease (Bozeat et al., 2000; Lambon Ralph and Howard, 2000). SD is generally 
associated with circumscribed temporal lobe atrophy, affecting the temporal pole, the 
antero-medial  and  infero-lateral  temporal  lobe,  bilaterally  but  asymmetrically.  In 
addition, the ventromedial frontal cortex and the amygdaloid complex have been found 
affected too (Mummery et al. 2000; Mummery et al., 1999). As shown in post-mortem 
examinations, in some instances the symptoms of progressive aphasia and semantic-
lexical impairment may also be symptoms of an atypical focal dementia of Alzheimer 
type (see Galton et al., 2000; Greene et al., 1996). 
Based on the behaviour of patients with impaired semantics, conceptual knowledge 
has been suggested to be modality-specific, as it was found to be affected either in its 
verbal  (Lauro-Grotto  et  al.,  1997;  McCarthy  and  Warrington,  1988;  Coughlan  and 
Warrington,  1981)  or  visual  components  (Warrington  and  McCarthy,  1994).  These 
findings have been taken as evidence that the semantic system is indeed multimodal 
(Shallice, 1988). The fact, however, that patients with degraded knowledge for verbal 
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and non-verbal stimuli have also been reported (Hodges et al., 1992; Snowden et al., 
1989; Bozeat et al.,  2000), supported the opposite view that the semantic system is 
amodal (Caramazza et al., 1990; Riddoch et al., 1988). 
Interestingly, at least two SD patients have been reported with spared object use in 
presence  of  semantic  memory  impairments.  For  instance,  patients  R.M.  and  D.M., 
described by Lauro-Grotto et al. (1997) and Buxbaum et al. (1997) respectively, were 
still able to use objects in everyday activities despite having a deficit in object naming 
and identification. Hodges et al. (2000) also described patients who, in some instances, 
were  better  at  using  objects  than  it  would  be  predicted  based  on  their  semantic 
knowledge about those objects. 
According to some authors (Coccia et al., 2004; Bozeat et al., 2002a, 2002b; Hodges 
et  al.,  2000),  as  SD progresses,  patients  would  also  become apraxic.  Hodges  et  al. 
(2000) and Bozeat et al. (2000) reported SD patients who were still able to use highly 
familiar but not less common items, and therefore concluded that object familiarity is 
the  best  predictor  of  proper  use.  Because  of  the  strong  correlation  between 
performance  on  object  use  and  preservation  of  semantic  knowledge  about  objects, 
Hodges et al. (2000) argued that in SD patients spared praxic skills seem to rely strictly 
upon object-specific conceptual knowledge, in addition to mechanical problem solving 
abilities and visual affordances. Furthermore, object use performance also seems to be 
strongly influenced also by the context in which objects are presented. Indeed Bozeat et 
al. (2002b) observed that patients’ performance improved significantly when they were 
assessed at home using objects that belonged to them, as opposed to when they were 
tested in the laboratory  using  objects  perceptually  dissimilar  to those of  their  own. 
However,  the  theoretical  inferences  based  on  some  of  these  studies  cannot  be 
conclusive,  as the patients  who showed a dissociation were not  tested on the same 
stimuli for object knowledge and object use (e.g. Buxbaum et al., 1997; Lauro-Grotto et 
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al., 1997). Therefore the dissociations reported could have been due to items presenting 
different degrees of difficulty in either one or the other task. 
The aim of the two studies presented in this Chapter was to verify whether semantic 
information is necessary to correctly use objects, and,  vice versa, if an impairment in 
motor skills would compromise also the knowledge of objects and tools. To answer the 
first  question,  we  have  identified  two  patients  with  semantic  impairments  and  we 
tested  them  on  their  ability  to  use  objects.  On  the  other  hand,  evidence  that  the 
semantic system is not sufficient to support tool use comes from the observation of FG 
and DR, two patients with Ideational Apraxia that have lost the ability to use objects 
properly (Rumiati et al., 2001; Buxbaum et al., 2000; Hodges et al., 1999; Ochipa et al., 
1989). 
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Study 3A
A Comparison Between Two Apraxic Patients and Two 
Patients with Semantic Impairment
METHODS
Participants
Patients with the tool use deficit
Patient FG, a right-handed man, was born in 1953 and had 13 years of schooling. Before 
his illness (October 1998), he was employed in a local brewery company. In October 1998 
he was admitted to hospital with aphasia and right hemiplegia. The first CT-scan (October 
1998)  showed left  cortical-subcortical  haemorrhage  affecting  the  left  posterior  parietal 
lobe, involving Brodmann Areas 7, 39 and 40. A more recent MR scan performed in 2004 
confirmed the previous findings (see Figure 3.1.). The results reported in this study were 
obtained between February and September 2002.
Figure 3.1. lesion reconstruction performed using MRIcro software, of patient FG's lesion.
Patient DR, a right-handed male, was born in 1949 and had 13 years of schooling. Before 
his illness (December 1997), he worked as a teacher at the elementary school and as an 
administrative  staff  member.  He was admitted to hospital  with a right hemiplegia  and 
aphasia due to an infarct of the left medial cerebral artery. A series of CT scans revealed a 
large fronto-temporo-parietal ischemic lesion in the left hemisphere including BA 44 and 
45, primary motor and sensory cortices and BA 40, while the prefrontal cortex was spared. 
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In 2004, a new MR scan of DR was collected and then used by an expert neuroradiologist 
to perform the lesion reconstruction using MRIcro software. The new analysis confirmed 
the involvement of BA 40, 44 and 45 (see figure 3.2.).
Figure 3.2. reconstruction performed using MRIcro software of patient DR's lesion.
Patients with semantic impairment 
Patient DL, a right-handed man, born in 1933, had 5 years of education and worked as a 
baker and lorry-driver before retirement. He came to medical attention in October 2000 
because of word finding problems, particularly for names of people,  streets, but also of 
common objects. Since then, he was periodically assessed to monitor the progressing of the 
disease.  Data  reported  in  Study 3A were  collected  in  spring  of  2002.  A  NMR scan in 
September 2000 revealed bilateral temporal lobe atrophy, greater in the left temporal pole 
and Sylvian areas (see Figure 3.3.). 
Figure 3.3. Selected images from the MR scan performed on patient DL in September 2000. in 2004, DL 
refused to perform a new neuroradiological exam.
Patient AM, a right-handed woman, was born in 1928. She had 5 years of education and 
had  worked  as  an  agricultural  labourer.  She  came  to  the  attention  of  the 
neuropsychologists  in  March  2002  complaining  of  memory  loss  and  word  finding 
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impairments.  Two  months  earlier,  a  SPECT  was  performed  revealing  a  concentration 
deficit  of  the tracer in the left  temporal  lobe.  A more recent NMR (march 2005) scan 
revealed a diffused cerebral atrophy (see Figure 3.4.).
Figure 3.4. Selected images from the MR scan performed on patient AM in March 2005. The diffused 
amplitude  of  liquoral  spaces  is  evident  in  the  ventricular  and  subaracnoidal  spaces  and  in  the  fronto-
temporo-parietal regions bilaterally, more pronounced in the left hemisphere. This neuroradiological finding 
fits well with a diagnosis of a dementia of Alzeheimer’s type
Control participants
Since  the  demented  and  apraxic  patients  differed  in  age  and  educational  level,  two 
groups of healthy controls took part in the study. The first group (N = 10) had a mean age 
of 67.7 years (±3.6) and 8.8 years (±2.2) of education. The second group (N = 9) had a 
mean age of 51.7 years (±2.8), and 12.3 years (±1.7) of education.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Experiment 1: semantic questionnaire. Twenty-two objects were presented visually 
(coloured  picture)  or  verbally  (spoken  name) to  patients  and  controls,  one  at  a  time, 
according to an ABBA design. Five or six questions were posed orally to the subjects for 
each item, without giving them any feedback, following the procedure used by Laiacona et 
al.  (1993).  The  aim  was  to  test  different  hierarchical  levels  of  object  knowledge  (e.g. 
hammer;  correct  responses  are  underlined):  1)  higher-level  superordinate  information 
(e.g. is it an  object, a vegetable or an animal?); 2) lower-level superordinate information 
(e.g. is it a  tool, a musical instrument or a gem?); 3) subordinate perceptual information 
(e.g. is it made of glass, of metal or of cement?); 4) subordinate structural information (e.g. 
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is it smaller than a screw?); 5) functional information (e.g. is it used for cutting, screwing 
or  sticking nails?); and 6) the prototypical use of the object (e.g. is it used by the house-
painter, the carpenter, the glazier?). 
Experiment 2: knowledge of object parts.  A set of  47 questions concerning the 
functions of different parts of 23 objects (the same 22 stimuli used in Experiment 1, plus 
the matchbox), were read aloud by the experimenter. This experiment specifically aimed at 
testing  patients’  functional  knowledge  of  the  relevant  parts  of  the  same  22  objects 
presented in the other tasks.  They were given four choices in which arrows pointed to 
different parts of the object. They were asked to point to the picture where the arrows 
indicated the part relevant for the action described by the experimenter (see Figure 3.5). 
Patients performed the experiment twice, with about a four-week interval between the two 
sessions.
Figure  3.5. Example  of  a  stimulus  of  Experiment  2.  Patients  were  asked  to  point  to  the  picture 
corresponding to the sentence written on the top of the page, while the sentence was also read aloud by the 
experimenter.
Experiments  3a:  Object  Use.  Patients  were  asked  to  use  23  objects  in  simple 
common actions such as lighting a match or pouring liquid from a bottle into a glass; one 
or two objects were employed at a time. Objects were put on the table in front of patients 
for each trial, and then removed after use.
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Experiment 3b: MOTs .Patients engaged in more complex actions in which more than 
two objects were involved such as: preparing coffee using an Italian coffee machine (water, 
coffee, spoon, a disassembled coffee machine), preparing an envelope to post (envelope, 
letter, and stamp), and lighting a candle (candle, candle holder, a match-box containing 
matches). 
The  performance  of  patients  on  experiments  3a  and  3b  was  video-recorded  and 
subsequently scored independently by three raters. Actions were scored as either correct or 
incorrect. For the incorrect actions, raters used a classification developed by Rumiati et al. 
(2001)  to  categorize  patients’  errors.  The  inter-raters’  agreement  was  100%  as  far  as 
accuracy and error classification were concerned.
Experiment 4a:  Object Naming.  Patients had to name the 23 real objects used in 
experiments 1 and 2. Objects were placed one after the other in front of the patients. No 
feedback was given and no time constraints were imposed. 
Experiment 4b: Name-Picture Matching. Patients had to match the name of each 
object (N = 23) to the corresponding stimulus presented together with two semantically-
related stimuli used as distractors (e.g. glass; bottle, vase). On each trial, the experimenter 
placed the three objects on the table and said the name of one of them. After each trial, the 
objects were replaced by the experimenter with the subsequent triplet of stimuli.
Experiment 5a: Pantomime Naming. Patients were presented with pantomimes of 
object use (N = 23) and asked to identify them by either naming them or matching them to 
one of three action verbs.  The pantomimes where performed by the experimenter,  one 
after the other. 
Experiment 5b: Pantomime Recognition. Patients had to match each pantomime 
(N = 23) to the corresponding object presented together with two semantically-related 
stimuli used as distractors (e.g. glass; bottle, vase). The procedure was otherwise the same 
as in Experiment 4b.
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RESULTS
Neuropsychological profiles
Table 3.1. illustrates the performance on standardized neuropsychological tests. 
Patient  FG had  no  language  impairments  except  for  mild  difficulties  in  language 
comprehension as indicated by the Token Test (AAT). Testing did not reveal any visual 
processing or semantic knowledge deficits.  With regard to memory, his verbal auditory 
short-term memory was somewhat  pathological,  as  shown by his  performance on digit 
span. He also had memory retrieval problems: FG’s immediate and delayed recall of 15 
words were both impaired, but his recognition memory was intact. FG had also indications 
of frontal dysfunction as shown by his performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(WCST).  Concerning  his  motor  control  abilities,  FG  performed  accurately  a  Goodale-
Milner posting task making only 1 perseverative error, and could correctly reach most of 
the  times  (29/32)  for  a target  (a  disk of  a diameter  of  2 cm) placed at  eight different 
locations from the patient while fixating the nose of the experimenter. His ability to imitate 
novel and known gestures was normal. However, as in previous extensive testings6 (see 
Rumiati et al., 2001), FG had many difficulties in using real objects. 
Patient DR had extensive language problems affecting his spontaneous speech, repetition 
of  words and sentences,  written language and naming (see Table  3.1).  In contrast,  his 
verbal  comprehension was unimpaired (Token test).  This  clinical  pattern is compatible 
with a diagnosis of Broca’s aphasia. He did not show signs of visual or spatial agnosia, but 
a  mild  deficit  in  a  recognition  memory  task  was  observed.  Although his  reaching and 
grasping  abilities  resulted  to  be  normal  on  testing,  and  his  ability  to  imitate  was 
borderline,  he  was   apraxic  when  using  objects.  His  performance  on  the  WCST  was 
satisfactory, indicating preserved executive functioning. 
Patient  DL was  severely  impaired  on  naming  tasks,  producing  frequent  semantically 
related words (i.e. semantic paraphasias) and several omissions. That DL’s naming deficit 
lay in the semantic system was suggested by his pathological performance on the Pyramids 
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and Palm Trees test (Howard and Patterson, 1992) in which he was required to match 
either words or pictures based on their meaning. By contrast, DL’s repetition of words was 
remarkably spared, as was his word reading, though making few errors in writing. Early 
visual  processing  was  also  relatively  spared.  Interestingly,  despite  his  difficulties  in 
identifying and naming objects, DL did not show any problem when using common objects 
(Ideational  Apraxia  test).  His  verbal  auditory  short-term  memory  was  preserved;  in 
contrast long-term memory was dramatically impaired as shown by his pathologically poor 
performance on a word recognition test as well as on a recognition memory test for faces. 
This pattern of cognitive impairments fits well as Semantic Dementia,  a form of fluent 
progressive aphasia primarily affecting word meaning and object identity knowledge (see 
Hodges et al., 1992, Snowden et al., 1989).
Patient AM's results on the neuropsychological assessment are also summarised in Table 
3.1.  The  evaluation  of  AM's  linguistic  abilities  revealed  many  anomias  and  semantic 
paraphasias in spontaneous speech as well as in naming, and a moderate deficit on the 
Token  Test.  No  noticeable  deficits  in  writing,  reading  and repetition  were  found.  AM 
performed pathologically on only one subtest (i.e. Incomplete Letters) of the Visual Object 
and  Space  Perception  Battery  (VOSP),  that  investigates  visual-spatial  processing. 
Significant Impairments were also observed on tests assessing her long-term memory and 
semantic knowledge (both from pictures and words), however, she was not apraxic.
Overall,  the  behavioural  pattern  shown by  DL and AM in  2002  was  consistent  with 
previous descriptions of patients affected by so-called Semantic Dementia (Warrington, 
1975, Hodges et al., 1992, Snowden et al., 1989). However, when AM was assessed again 
two  years  later  (study  3B),  her  clinical  symptoms  seemed  to  have  evolved  toward  a 
Dementia of Alzheimer Type (DAT), but her praxic skills were still significantly better than 
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her semantic knowledge about objects. As a result,  patient AM likely represents one of 
those cases with an atypical DAT onset, as suggested by Galton et al. (2000). 
Table 3.1. Results on the neuropsychological assessment administered to all four patients is summarized 
here.  Bold  font  indicates  pathological  scores,  as  individuated  by  means  of  Z-scores  or  cut-offs.  R%  = 
percentile rank; a.s. = adjusted score; n.a.= not administered.
FG DR AM DL Cut-
offs
Language AAT (R%) Token Test 
Repetition
Writing
Naming 
Comprehension
81
91
93
100
91
99
36
19
41
100
68
74
84
61
81
91
94
75
60
85
60
59
58
59
55
Laiacona  et  al.  
(1993)
Naming
Comprehension between cat.
Comprehension within cat.
77/80
80/80
78/80
12/20*
80/80
80/80
40/80
79/80
73/80
32/80
79/80
65/80
61/80
74/80
74/80
Intelligence Raven’s CMT Total score 29 34 17.4 31 18.9
Linguistic 
Fluencies
For letters
For semantic categories
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
20.6
11.5
18.2
8.25
17.35
7.25
Visual 
Processing
VOSP Screening Test
Incomplete letters 
Object decision
20
n.a.
19
20
20
19
18
12
16
18
17
16
15
16
14
Memory Short-term Corsi test
Digit span                 forward
5
4
5
4
 2.25
5.5
5
4
3.75
3.75
Long-term
Semantic
Rey-words             Imm. recall
                   Delayed recall
Recognition corr.
false
Story Recall
Word recognition memory
Face recognition memory
Pyramids & Palm Trees Test
words
pictures
25
1
40/46
7
4/16
n.a.
n.a.
52/52
52/52
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
36/50
19/25
Na**
51/52
18
3.4
12/46
23
n.a.
28/50
5/25
41/52
35/52
33 a.s
5.4 a.s.
11/15
12
n.a.
28/50
12/25
40/52
38/52
28.53
4.69
48/52
48/52
Praxis Imitation
Object Use
Posting 
Reaching
60/72
14/14
19/20
29/32
54/72
  8/14
20/20
32/32
60/72
14/14
n.a.
n.a.
67/72
14/14
n.a.
n.a.
53
14
Frontal 
Functions
WSCT Categories
Total errors
Perseverations
2
13
3
6
4
1
n.a. n.a.
Attention Attentive Matrices 27/60 25/60 27/60 28/60 31/60
* shortened version 
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BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Experiment 1 (semantic questionnaire). The overall accuracy of patients and controls on 
these questions  is  plotted on Figure  3.6.  FG and DR performed excellently  on all  the 
different dimensions of object knowledge, regardless of the input modality. Both FG and 
DR scored 130/131 (99%) with line drawings of objects, and 131/131 (100%) with their 
spoken names. FG’s and DR’s performance on both versions of the questionnaire was as 
accurate as that of individuals without brain-damage of comparable age and education 
(control mean and SD: 130.4 ±0.83 for both verbal and visual presentation). In contrast, 
DL and AM had not retained full semantic knowledge concerning all the objects either 
following visual  (119/131,  90%; 109/131,  83% respectively)  or auditory-verbal  (113/131, 
86%;  112/131,  85%  respectively)  presentation  of  the  stimuli.  DL’s  and  AM’s  failures 
occurred on all dimensions of object knowledge in both conditions. Overall, DL’s and AM’s 
performance  was  worse  than  that  of  controls,  and  more  importantly,  they  performed 
worse than FG and DR, both in the verbal and visual versions of the task (Wilcoxon, p < 
.01 in all comparisons, see Figure 3.6). 
Figure 3.6. Overall accuracy of all patients as well as of the two control groups on Experiment 1.
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Experiment 2 (Knowledge of Object Parts), The scores of the patients on this experiment 
are reported in Figure 3.7. Both apraxic patients performed equally well on this task (FG: 
78
45/47, 96%, and  DR: 47/47, 100%). In contrast, DL gave correct responses to 33 (70%) 
and AM to 28 questions only (60%). DL and AM performed significantly worse than both 
FG (Wilcoxon, p < .01 and p < .001 respectively) and DR (Wilcoxon, both p <.001). The 
experiment was administered for a second time to all patients replicating the same results 
(FG: 47/47, 100%, and DR: 46/47, 98%; DL: 36/47, 76.5% AM: 27/47, 57%) (see Figure 
3.7).
Figure 3.7. Patients’ and controls’ overall accuracy on Experiment 2. The task was performed twice, in 
two different sessions. FG and DL performed the two sessions one month apart, whereas AM and DR were 
tested two years later.
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Experiment 3a (Simple Object Use). The four patients were required to use 23 objects in 
a simple context. The errors of the patients are reported in detail in Table 3.2. FG and DR 
committed 18 and 11 errors respectively, as evaluated by three independent raters. This 
was in sharp contrast with their performance on the semantic tasks (Experiments 1-2). 
As to the demented patients, DL’s performance in Experiment 3a was errorless, whereas 
AM made 2 errors: one was an argument error (she twisted the pencil sharpener instead of 
the pencil), and one orientation error (she used the saw with an appropriate movement 
but keeping the blade upside-down). 
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Table  3.2. Patients' errors in experiment 3a (simple object use)
Type of error AM DL FG DR
Misuse - - 2 6
Argument 1 - 4 -
Mislocation - - 7 -
Tool substit. - - 1 -
Sequence - -    2 1
Grasping - - 2 3
Orientation 1 - - -
Body Part as Tool - - - 1
Experiment 3b (Multiple Object Tasks). FG executed the first two activities flawlessly 
although he had some problems in folding the paper to put it inside the envelope when 
preparing the letter to post. When lighting the candle, FG first had difficulty in opening 
the matchbox, then he broke the match and initially attempted to light the wrong end of 
the  candle.  To  avoid  burning  his  fingers,  he  lit  another  match  with  which  he  now 
approached the candle holder; then he put the match into his mouth. He made a second 
attempt to light the candle at the wrong end and then eventually succeeded. As far as DR’s 
performance was concerned, he was able to make coffee and to prepare the letter to post, 
but when requested to light the candle he made many mistakes, including scratching the 
match using an inappropriate  movement  and trying  to  light  the candle  with the unlit 
match. The type of errors committed by FG and DR has been previously observed in other 
ideational  apraxic  patients  (De  Renzi  and  Lucchelli,  1988).  DL  and  AM instead  were 
surprisingly competent when using objects both in a simple and complex context, despite 
their lack of knowledge of the functions of a number of objects. DL made no errors, while 
AM made one step omission (she did not seal the envelope) and one misuse error (she 
folded the letter in a wrong manner). AM’s type of errors were comparable to those of 
normal  subjects  doing  the  same tasks  (see  Table  4.d.  In  Chapter  IV).  Combining  the 
performance on the two Experiments we found that FG made significantly more errors 
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than either DL (χ2 = 7.53, p < .01 one-tailed) or AM (χ2 = 24.23, p < .001 one-tailed). DR 
also made more errors than DL (χ2 = 3.33, p < .05 one-tailed) and AM (χ2 = 17.5, p < .001 
one-tailed). 
Experiment  4a (Object  Naming).  FG  correctly  named  all  the  objects  employed 
throughout the study (23/23, 100%), and DR named correctly only 12/23 objects (52%). 
FG’s performance suggests that it is possible to retain a perfect ability to name objects and 
yet being unable to use them properly.  DR was impaired in object  naming due to his 
severe Broca’s aphasia,  but when the task required pointing (Experiment 2) or simple 
yes/no responses (Experiment 1), he showed full knowledge of objects and their parts. DL 
could name only 56% (13/23) of the objects correctly, and AM 15/23 (65%), and they also 
showed  a  significant  loss  to  their  semantic,  functional  and  parts  knowledge  (see 
Experiments 1 and 2).
Experiment 4b (Word-Picture Matching). This task was devised to verify whether the 
naming  problem of  patients  DR,  DL and AM was  a  purely  nominal  one.  FG and DR 
correctly matched the name of each object to the target when it was presented together 
with two semantically related items (23/23, 100%). DL, however, was successful on 83% 
(19/23), and AM on 100% of the trials. These data confirm that DR’s deficit in Experiment 
4a was due to a retrieval problem, whereas the performance of one of the two demented 
patients was pathological compared to that of normal controls.
Experiment 5 (parts a and b). These experiments were carried out in order to verify 
whether  IA  patients  were  able  to  name  or  recognize  the  actions  that  they  could  not 
perform.  In  Experiment  5a  (Pantomime  Naming),  patients  were  asked  to  name  the 
pantomimes of object use performed by one of us without the object. FG performed more 
accurately  (20/21,  95%)  than DR (9/21,  43%),  DL (15/21,  71%) and AM (12/21,  57%) 
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(Wilcoxon, p < .05 in all comparisons). Unlike DR, DL, and AM, FG was able to correctly 
retrieve the action names associated with the pantomimes. Experiment 5b (Pantomime-
Object  Matching)  was  administered  to  ascertain  whether  the  difficulties  emerged  in 
naming pantomimes were purely due to aphasia or to a faulty pantomime recognition. In 
this test,  FG and DR performed at ceiling (both 21/21,  100%) while DL and AM both 
scored 19/21 (90%).
LESION ANALYSIS
Procedure
Patient FG. This lesion reconstruction was performed in two main steps:
Step 1: MRIcro software10 was used by an expert neuroradiologist (Dr. Maja Ukmar), 
who was unaware of the patients’ symptoms, to draw FG’s lesion on his original MR scan. 
Step 2: FG’s brain scan and his lesion have been spatially normalized to the stereotaxic 
space using SPM2 software11. In order to prevent its possible effect on SPM normalization 
routines,  the cerebral  lesion was masked using cost  function masking as described by 
Brett et al.  (2001).  This procedure allows aligning the patient’s  scan to the stereotaxic 
space, and avoids possible distortions caused by the presence of the lesion. The resulting 
image is shown in Figure 3.1. (red area).
Patient DR. For DR, the software did not allow us to perform the same normalization 
procedure as  it  could not  overcome the considerable  size  of  his  lesion.  Therefore,  the 
neuroradiologist  (M.U.)  drew  DR’s  lesion  directly  onto  the  standard  MRI  template 
provided by MRIcro. The resulting image of DR’s lesion is reported in Figure 3.2.  (red 
area).
10 http://www.mricro.com
11 http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/
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FG’s and DR’s lesions overlap. The previous steps allowed us to map FG’s and DR’s 
lesions  as  Regions  Of  Interests  (ROIs)  aligned  on  the  same  stereotaxic  space.  The 
following procedure allowed us to overlap them and identify the brain areas lesioned in 
both patients. 
Step 1. Using the ROI Intersection option provided by the software, it was possible to 
identify a new ROI consisting of the areas lesioned in both the patients:  the resulting 
image is provided in Figure 3.8. 
Step 2. The lesioned areas have been identified both using the Automated Anatomical 
Labelling map (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) provided by the MRIcro software and with 
reference to the atlas of Duvernoy (1991).
AM and DL. The ROI reconstruction procedure was not appropriate for AM and DL due 
to the fact that they had atrophy instead of localized lesions. The brain scans have been 
therefore interpreted by the neuroradiologist, as reported in the following paragraph.
Figure 3.8. Lesions overlap for patients FG and DR. The red area indicates the intersection of the two 
lesions. Purple color indicates the areas lesioned in one of the two patients only.
Lesions Results
Both demented patients showed brain atrophy in frontotemporal regions (see Figures 
3.3.  and  3.4.),  consistently  with  their  degenerative  disease  (Mummery  et  al.  2000; 
Mummery et al.,  1999).  Figure 3.3.  shows a MR-scan performed on DL on September 
2000, which revealed bilateral temporal lobe atrophy, greater in the left temporal pole 
and Perisylvian  areas.  Two neuroradiological  scans  were  available  for  patient  AM:   a 
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SPECT, performed in 2002 (not reported here) revealed cortical atrophy restricted to the 
left temporal region; and a new MR scan performed 2005, that revealed widened liquoral 
spaces in the ventricular and subaracnoidal areas and in fronto-temporo-parietal regions 
bilaterally, greater in the left hemisphere (see Figure 3.4.).
For the two apraxic patients, the MR scans have been analyzed using MRicro software: 
the procedure to identify the cortical brain structures involved in the lesions is described 
in detail in the previous section. Results show that the brain areas lesioned in both FG and 
DR included the superior part of the left middle temporal gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, 
angular  gyrus,  supramarginal  gyrus,  inferior  parietal  cortex,  postcentral  gyrus  and 
precentral gyrus (see Figure 3.8.).
DISCUSSION ON STUDY 3A
On a variety of occasions, FG and DR failed to use common objects correctly. Moreover, 
their impairment was at a higher level within the system controlling actions (i.e. they did 
not show ataxia or motor deficits in the ipsilesional hand). However, both patients could 
identify the objects and they retained a very substantial amount of specific functional and 
manipulation  knowledge  as  well  as  general  semantic  information.  Indeed  they  both 
performed virtually at ceiling on all these tests. DL and AM, on the other hand, could use 
almost perfectly objects that were problematic for the two apraxic patients. Unlike apraxic 
patients, DL and AM did not have a full detailed semantic knowledge about objects. This 
classical double dissociation pattern (see Shallice, 1988) strongly suggests that a higher-
level  motor  knowledge  of  manipulable  objects  may  be  represented  separately  from 
semantic  knowledge.  The  double  dissociation  reported  here  is  in  contrast  with  the 
embodied theories of conceptual knowledge, for which the semantic meaning of a concept 
is  highly  dependent  on its  re-enactment (also called  simulation)  in the sensory-motor 
system (e.g. Gallese and Lakoff, 2005).  Instead, such a pattern of results is in line with 
models that postulate a separation between conceptual knowledge and motor abilities, like 
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the distinction between the “what” and “how’ pathways described in the Introduction, but 
also like Rothi et al.’s (1991) model of apraxia. In particular, DR and FG’s error profiles in 
using  objects  (Rumiati  et  al.,  2001)  have  been  analyzed  and  discussed  in  a  similar 
framework  by  Cooper  (2007),  which  hypothesizes  in  these  apraxic  patients  a 
disconnection  between  the  action  schema  network  and  the  object  network,  within 
Contention Scheduling. 
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Study 3B
A Follow-Up Study on Patients AM and DL
Introduction
In this section we report a two-year longitudinal study in which we assessed the ability 
to use objects of DL and AM two years after the assessment reported in study 3A, as well 
as their lexical-semantic knowledge concerning the same objects. The aim of this second 
study was to verify whether the dissociation observed in study 3A maintained consistency 
over time, given the possible worsening of their symptoms. Evidence that the integrity of 
semantic  knowledge  is  not  sufficient  to  support  tool  use  comes  from  observation  of 
patients with IA (see study 3A and Rumiati et al., 2001; Buxbaum et al., 2000; Hodges et 
al., 1999; Ochipa et al., 1989). 
METHODS
Participants
Patients. AM  and  DL  were  tested  first  in  April-July  2002  (see  study  3A)  and 
subsequently  in  May-August  2004.  The  testing  was  carried  out  in  the  hospital’s 
neuropsychology room as well as at the patients’ home, in three-four different sessions 
that lasted about two hours each.
Controls.  The performance of patients in Experiments 2-5 of the study was compared 
with that of twenty individuals (10 males and 10 females) matched for age (mean = 61.1 
years, SD = 9.45 years) and education (mean = 9.7 years, SD = 3.3 years).
General Neuropsychological Assessment
Results of AM and DL on the neuropsychological assessment are reported in Table 3.3.
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•Orientation in time and space. AM was well-oriented in space and time in 2002, while 
in 2004 she was slightly disoriented in time (she was unsure about the current year but 
showed no problem in reporting the season as well as the month), but not in space. DL 
was well-oriented in time and space in both evaluations. 
•Language. Linguistic abilities were affected in both patients on the Aachener Aphasie 
Test (Luzzatti et al., 1996); in particular, their naming ability was severely impaired. In 
2002,  repetition,  comprehension,  reading,  and  writing  skills  were  well-preserved  in 
patient  DL.  In 2002 AM showed a  deficit  in  repetition particularly  of  long sentences, 
suggesting a deficit in maintaining verbal information for short time periods. She was also 
impaired in the Token subtest of the AAT, revealing a deficit in comprehension of simple 
orders. In 2004 only a short version of the AAT could be administered to DL, whereas AM 
resulted impaired also in writing and in sentence comprehension,  as compared to the 
previous evaluation.
•Memory. Spatial  (Corsi  test,  De  Renzi  and  Nichelli,  1975)  and  verbal  short-term 
memory (digit span, WAIS), and working memory (backwards digit span, WAIS) were in 
the normal range for both patients, in 2002 as well as in 2004 evaluation. However, they 
were  both  found  to  have  severe  anterograde  memory  deficits,  as  suggested  by  their 
performance  on  a  recognition  memory  test  which  employs  words  as  well  as  faces 
(Warrington, 1996), and as indicated by the results on the Auditory Verbal Learning test 
(Rey,  1964).  During the clinical  interview,  both patients had no difficulty  in reporting 
autobiographical data and information about their relatives. They were also accurate in 
describing their usual daily activities and recent personal events.
•Non-verbal intelligence (Raven CPMs, 1984). Non-verbal intelligence was stable across 
evaluations, being within the normal range for DL and in the low average range for AM.
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• Vision. In contrast to AM, who performed below the cut-off on the Incomplete Letter 
test  (VOSP,  Warrington  and  James,  1991)  in  2002  as  well  as  in  2004,  DL’s  visual 
processing resulted well-preserved in both evaluations.
In the following paragraphs, a brief description of the tests aimed at investigating the 
semantic  memory and praxic  abilities  of  the  two patients  is  provided,  followed by the 
results.
Table 3.3.  Patients’ scores on the general neuropsychological assessment. The bold character indicates 
pathological scores. Symbol “*” connotes skills that deteriorated in the second evaluation; “a.s.” = adjusted 
score; “PR” = percentile rank; “n.a.” = test not administered.
AM DL Cut
2002 2004 2002 2004 Off 
MMSE  15/30 21/30
Intelligence Raven’s CMT Total score 17.4 a.s. 19.2 a.s. 31 32.5 a.s. 18.96
Language AAT Token Test (PR) 68 77 91 n.a.
Repetition (PR) 74 64 94 46/50
Writing (PR) 84 71 75 n.a.
Naming  (PR) 61 56 60 n.a.
Comprehension (PR) 81 39 85  9/10*
Linguistic 
Fluencies
For letters 20.6 14.4
For semantic categories 11.5 7.25
n.a. 0 17.35
0 7.25
Visual 
Processing
VOSP Screening Test 18 17 18 20 15
Incomplete letters 12 10 17 n.a. 16
Object decision 16 7 16 15 14
Memory Short-term Corsi test 2.25 a.s. 4.25 a.s. 5 5
Digit span                 forward 5.5 a.s. 4.5 a.s. 4 5
                              Backward 3 3 n.a. 3
Long-term Rey-words Immediate recall 18 16 a.s. n.a. n.a. 28.53
Delayed recall 3.4 0 n.a. n.a. 4.69
Recognition  corr. 12/46 17/46 n.a. n.a.
False recognitions 23 27 n.a. n.a.
Word recognition memory  n.a. 28/50 28/50 26/50
Face recognition memory 16/25 16/25 12/25 n.a.
*reading words
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Semantic Memory Assessment
• Picture naming (Laiacona et al., 1993). Patients were asked to name 80 line drawings 
presented in a random order. As in the original study (Laiacona et al., 1993), synonyms 
and other acceptable nouns were scored as correct responses. AM’s and DL’s performance 
on this task was severely impaired in both evaluations (see Table 3.4.), making semantic 
paraphasias and omissions.
Following Laiacona et al. (1997) procedure, patients’ scores were submitted to a logistic 
regression  including  a  categorical  variable  (category:  living  vs.  non-living  items)  and 
continuous variables (familiarity, word frequency and prototypicality) in order to partial 
out  the  effect  of  possible  confounds.  AM did  not  show a  significant  effect  of  category 
neither in 2002 nor in 2004 (P > .05 for both comparisons on a Chi-square test, df = 1), 
even  when  the  effect  of  psycholinguistic  variables  was  partialled  out.  However,  her 
performance was affected by word frequency in 2002 (Chi-square = 4.8, df = 1, P < .05) as 
well as in 2004 (Chi-square = 8.54, df = 1, P < .01). 
DL showed, both in 2002 and in 2004, a significant effect of category, in that he named 
nonliving better than living items (in 2002: Chi-square = 5.99, df = 1,  P < .05; in 2004: 
Chi-square = 7.4, df = 1, P < .01), as well as a significant effect of word frequency (in 2002: 
Chi-square = 10.29, df = 1,  P = .001; in 2004: Chi-square = 18.88 df = 1,  P < .001). In 
2004 his naming performance was significantly predicted also by the familiarity of the 
stimulus (Chi-square = 4.22, df = 1, P < .05).
Patients’ accuracy in naming was consistent over time (DL: consistency coefficient = .40, 
Chi-square = 14.9,  P < 0.001; AM: consistency coefficient = .49, Chi-square = 25.2,  P < 
0.001). As compared to 2002, DL’s naming performance in 2004 worsened significantly, 
but not that of AM (Mc Nemar test, P < .05, and P > .05, one-tailed, respectively). Results 
are reported in Table 3.5.
• Word to picture matching (Laiacona et al., 1993). Patients were asked to point, among 
five pictures (one correct and four foils), to the one named by the examiner. This task was 
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presented in two different conditions: within-category, with foils belonging to the same 
category of the target, and between-categories, with foils belonging to categories different 
from  that  of  the  target.  Patients’  scores  and  cut-offs  are  reported  in  Table  3.4.  Both 
patients performed below the normal range in 2002 as well as in 2004 in the within-
category, but not in the between-categories condition. Compared to that in 2002, AM’s 
performance worsened in 2004 in the within-category condition (McNemar test, P < .05) 
but not in the between-categories condition (P > .05). DL scored worse in 2004 than in 
2002 in the within-category condition (P < .05). In 2004 he was not administered with 
the between-categories condition (see Table 3.4.).
• Pyramids & Palm Trees test (Howard and Patterson, 1992). In this test, patients were 
required to indicate,  between two foils,  the one semantically related to the target (e.g. 
pyramid:  palm tree  or  pine?).  Two versions  of  the  test  were  administered,  one  using 
written  words  and  the  other  using  pictures  as  stimuli.  AM and DL scored  below the 
normal cut-off in performing either versions in 2002 as well as in 2004, but only DL’s 
performance  on  the  second  evaluation  was  significantly  lower  than  that  on  the  first 
evaluation (McNemar test,  P < .05) performing at chance level when pictures were used 
(the verbal version was administered only in 2002). Results are reported in Table 3.4.
• SISSA  Object  Semantics (SOS).  This  test  was  created  in  order  to  investigate  the 
patients’ integrity of the knowledge about function and manipulation of objects. Three line 
drawings depicting objects were shown on a sheet to the patient,  who was required to 
identify the two objects that shared either the same manipulation (e.g. a typewriter and a 
piano) or the same function (e.g. a piano and a radio). The same test was administered 
also verbally using written words as stimuli, according to an ABBA design. Results are 
reported in Table 3.4. AM made more errors in 2004 than in 2002 (McNemar test,  P < 
.001 for both verbal and visual versions). DL was administered the test only in 2002 and 
he  made  errors.  No  differences  between  the  performance  in  the  verbal  and  the 
performance in the visual condition were found for either patient (see Table 3.4.). 
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Table 3.4. Patients’  performance  on different  tests  assessing  semantic  memory.  The  bold character 
indicates pathological scores.
Semantic Memory: Discussion
Based on the results on the naming task, the within-category and across-categories word-
to-picture matching tasks, the Pyramids and Palm Trees test and the S.O.S, we conclude 
that both AM and DL had a deficit affecting their semantic memory and that this deficit is 
progressively worsening.
The deficit is not modality specific, as patients have comparable difficulties when pictures 
and  words  are  used  as  stimuli.  Moreover,  the  logistic  regression  analyses  revealed  an 
influence  of  word  frequency  on  naming  accuracy,  and  patients’  performance  was 
consistent over time. The effect of word frequency increased with time, compatibly with 
the progression of the illness. The multi-modality of the deficit, the word-frequency effect 
and the consistency  across  evaluations  are  three  criteria  that  Warrington and Shallice 
(1979) proposed for correctly diagnosing a semantic deficit at the central level, as opposed 
to a mere deficit in accessing semantics. Thus our analyses confirmed that the deficits of 
AM and DL are within the semantic system.
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AM DL
SEMANTIC  MEMORY 2002 2004 2002 2004 Cut-off
Laiacona et al. (1993) Naming    40/80
(50%)
30/80
(38%)
32/80
(40%)
18/80
(23%)
61/80
Comprehension between-cat. 79/80
(98%)
75/80
(93%)
79/80
(98%)
n.a 93%
Comprehension within-cat. 73/80
(91%)
71/80
(89%)
65/80
(81%)
40/80
(50%)
93%
Pyramids & Palm Trees Test Words 41/52
(79%)
38/52
(73%)
40/52
(77%)
n.a 48
Pictures 35/52
(67%)
39/52
(75%)
38/52
(73%)
26/52
(50%)
48
SISSA Object Semantics:
Manipulation  knowledge Words 8/17
(47%)
6/17
(35%)
9/17
(53%)
n.a
Pictures 10/17
(59%)
7/17
(41%)
9/17
(53%)
n.a
Function  knowledge Words 15/17
(88%)
8/17
(47%)
10/17
(59%)
n.a
Pictures 13/17
(76%)
10/17
(59%)
11/17
(65%)
n.a
Apraxia Assessment 
• Ideational Apraxia (De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988). This test is commonly used in the 
clinical assessment for establishing the presence IA. Patients are asked to show how they 
would use seven common objects. For each item, 2 scores are assigned if patients perform 
correctly on the first attempt, 1 if they succeed on the second attempt, and zero if they fail 
on all occasions (maximum score = 14). In 2002 both patients performed normally but in 
2004 they both made a few errors thus falling below the normal cut-off (see Table 3.5.).
• Ideomotor Apraxia (De Renzi  et  al.,  1980).  This  test  has  been devised in order to 
diagnose the presence of  ideomotor  apraxia,  defined as  a  selective  deficit  in imitating 
actions. Patients were requested to imitate the gestures performed by the examiner. They 
were given three attempts to imitate an action correctly, scoring from 3 to 0 points, for a 
maximum of 72. AM was borderline in 2002, whereas in 2004 she performed below the 
cut-off, being unable to imitate both meaningful (e.g. the sign of the cross and the military 
salute)  and  meaningless  actions,  such  as  alternating  the  fist  and  the  open  palm 
consecutively. DL performed within the normal range in both evaluations (see Table 3.5.).
Table 3.5.  AM’s  and DL’s  results  on the  clinical  assessment  of  praxis.  The  bold character  indicates 
pathological scores.
AM DL
2002 2004 2002  2004 Cut-off
 Praxi
s 
Imitation Ideomotor Apraxia
(De Renzi et al., 1980)
60/72 48/72 67/72 64/72 53
Object use Ideational Apraxia 
(De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988)
14/14 10/14 14/14 11/14 14
Experiment 1: Object Use
AM and DL were asked to show the correct use of twenty-three common objects (see 
Appendix 3a) by performing 21 actions (see Appendix 3b). Performance of AM and DL 
was videotaped and subsequently scored by two independent judges and use was classified 
as  correct/incorrect  with  0  or  1  score.  Even partially  incorrect  actions  (e.g.  doing  the 
correct distal movement but holding the object in a clumsy fashion, or vice-versa) were 
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scored as 0. The inter-rater agreement revealed no discordances between the two raters 
(Kappa-Cohen test,  P > 0.05 for all comparisons). AM scored 20/22 (91%) in 2002, and 
19/23  (83%)  in  2004,  indicating  that  her  ability  to  perform  everyday  activities  with 
common objects was largely preserved (McNemar test, P > .05). DL performed flawlessly 
(23/23; 100%) in 2002, and two years later he could use 20/23 (87%) objects correctly 
(McNemar test, P > .05), six12 of which he claimed not to be able to use because he did not 
know what they were. However, when he was persuaded to try, he resulted surprisingly 
skilful. According to the error classification criteria put forward by De Renzi and Lucchelli 
(1988) and Rumiati et al.(2001), AM in 2004 made two omissions and two mislocations13. 
In  contrast,  DL  refused  to  use  three  objects  (orange  squeezer,  pencil  sharpener  and 
cigarette) even after several requests made by the experimenters.
Under normal circumstances, healthy individuals are at ceiling when they use familiar 
objects, making no errors. These findings indicate that both patients’ ability to use objects 
did not decline significantly over time, despite a trend toward worsening.
Experiment 2: Object Naming
Patients were requested to name the same 23 objects used in Experiment 1, without the 
possibility to touch them. AM named 15/23 (65%) objects in 2002 and 11/23 (48%) in 
2004, with no significant difference between the two evaluations (McNemar test, P > .05). 
DL named 13/23 (56%) and 2/23 (9%) objects in 2002 and 2004 respectively, indicating 
that  his  lexical  retrieval  worsened dramatically  during this  period (McNemar test,  P < 
.001).
12 Toothbrush, light bulb, match and matchbox, key and padlock, screwdriver, comb.
13 mislocations: she turned the socket instead of the light bulb; she placed the spanner above the bolt head. 
Omissions: she did not remove the cap of the toothpaste before squeezing it on the toothbrush; she tried to 
open the padlock without inserting the key.
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Experiment 3: General Semantics
Coloured pictures  of  objects  (N = 22) as  well  as  their  written names (N = 22)  were 
presented to patients and controls, one at a time on a single card. The 22 items were the 
same as in Experiment 1 except for the matchbox. Five or six questions were posed orally 
to the subjects for each item without giving them any feedback (see Laiacona et al., 1993), 
for a total of 131 questions for both visual and verbal condition. For the item “hammer” the 
questions asked were the following:
- general superordinate: is it an object, an animal or a plant?;
- same category superordinate: is it a tool, a musical instrument or a precious stone?;
- perceptual subordinate is it made in glass, in metal or in cement?;
- comparative perceptual subordinate: is it smaller than a screw?;
- associative functional subordinate:  is it used for screwing, for cutting or for driving 
nails?;
- associative contextual subordinate: is it used by the painter, by the carpenter or by the  
glassworker?.
Table 3.6. Results  on Experiment 3 (Object general  semantics).  Z-scores are calculated based on the 
control group. Symbol * indicates scores significantly worsened in 2004 evaluation (McNemar test, p<.05). 
The bold character indicates pathological scores.  Controls:  verbal: M=130,37, DS=0,83; visual: M=130,42; 
DS=0,9.
DL AM
2002 2004 2002 2004
Verbal Visual Visual Verbal Visual Verbal Visual
Raw score 113/131 119/131 107/131 111/131 109/131 89/131* 96/131
% 86% 91% 81% 85% 83% 67% 73%
Z scores (z= -20) (z=-8.4) (z=-17.5) (z=-22.3) (z=-16) (z=-47.7) (z=-25.8)
Patients’ accuracy on the semantic questionnaire is summarised in Table 3.6. Comparing 
patients’  evaluations in 2002 and 2004, AM’s performance when words where used as 
stimuli worsened with time (McNemar test, P < .05). In contrast, in 2004 DL did not show 
a  significant  decrease  in  performance  compared  to  2002  (McNemar  test,  P >  .05). 
Compared to the control group, AM and DL performed pathologically in all conditions, 
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both  in  2002  and  in  2004  (Z  scores  are  reported  in  Table  3.6).  The  differences  in 
performance on the visual and the verbal versions of the test were not found significant for 
either patient (see Table 3.9.).
Experiment 4: Knowledge of Parts
In this experiment, a set of 47 questions concerning the functions of different parts of 
the same 23 stimuli used in Experiment 1, were read aloud by the experimenter. For each 
question,  patients  and  control  subjects  (N  =  20)  were  presented  with  four  colour 
photographs  of  identical  objects  differing  only  in  the  position  of  arrows  pointing  to 
different parts of the object itself (see Figure 3.5.). They were required to point to the 
photograph  with  the  arrows  indicating  the  part  of  the  object  corresponding  to  the 
described function. AM scored 8/23 (35%) in 2002 (z = -5.7) and 9/23 (39%) in 2004 (z = 
-5.1), and DL 16/23 (69%) in 2002 (z = -2.5) and 13/23 (57%) in 2004 (z= -3.1).  The 
difference in performance between the two sessions was not significant for either patient 
(McNemar test, P > 0.05). 
AM  and  DL  performed  worse  than  the  control  group  in  both  evaluations  but  their 
accuracy did not decrease significantly in the second as compared to the first evaluation.
Experiment 5: Manipulation Knowledge
In this experiment patients and the twenty controls saw on a computer screen either the 
photographs of 20 objects used in Experiment 1 or, in a different block, their names, as 
well as three videotaped pantomimes, each lasting about 6 seconds, in sequence. Their task 
was to say which video demonstrated the correct use of the target object.
In 2002, AM identified correctly 11/20 (55%) manipulations in the verbal condition (z = 
-10.9) and 17/20 (85%) in the visual condition (z = -2.9), whereas in 2004 she scored 
14/20 (70%; z = -6.9) in the verbal (McNemar test, P > .05) and 9/20 (45%; z = -13.1) in 
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the visual condition (McNemar test,  P < .01). The difference in accuracy between verbal 
and visual condition was not significant neither in 2002 nor in 2004 (see Table 3.9).
In 2002, DL identified 16/20 (80%) manipulations in the verbal condition (z = -4.26) 
and 18/20 (90%) in the visual condition (z = -1.64), whereas in 2004 he scored 12/20 
(60%; z = -9.3) in the visual condition (McNemar test, P > .05). There was no difference 
between  verbal  and  visual  presentation  (see  Table  3.9).  The  verbal  version  was  not 
administered in 2004.
These  results  indicate  that,  compared  with  normal  controls,  the  two  patients  were 
impaired in recognizing actions. The same deficit,  called  pantomime agnosia, has been 
reported before by Rothi et al. (1986) and by Cubelli et al. (2000).
Further Analyses
Object use and semantics
In this section, performance of object use (Experiment 1) has been compared to that of 
the other experiments in which different aspects of object knowledge were tested (on a 
Wilcoxon signed rank test).  The results are summarised in Table 3.7.  Object use was 
significantly better than performance on many of the other experimental tasks. Patients’ 
ability to use objects and that to choose their correct manipulation (Experiment 5) seem 
to be equally affected, irrespective of whether words or pictures were used. The fact that 
in Experiment 5 patients were not as impaired as in the other semantic tasks reflects the 
intactness of a praxicon component (see Rothi et al., 1991), independent of verbal and 
visual semantic object knowledge.
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Table 3.7. P-values associated to a Wilcoxon signed rank tests are reported. In this test AM’s and DL’s 
performance on object use was compared to performance on the other experiments. Given the high number 
of comparisons, the α value was set at .01. The key result is that performance on object use is better than that 
on the other tasks in most contrasts. ”n.a.” = not administered; “n.s” = not significant.
Object Use (Exp. 1)
AM DL
Experiment 2002 2004 2002 2004
Exp.2 (object naming) n.s. n.s. <.01 <.001
Exp. 3 
(general semantics/words) <.01 <.001 <.001 n.a.
Exp. 3 
(general semantics/pictures) <.01 <.001 <.001 <.05
Exp.4 (semantic of parts) <.01 n.s. <.01 n.s.
Exp. 5 (manipulation/words) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.a.
Exp. 6 (manipulation/pictures) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Consistency item-by-item analysis between tasks
An  item-by-item  consistency  analysis  across  tasks  was  carried  out  with  the  aim  of 
establishing whether patients failed or succeeded with the same items across tasks, or 
whether  the  deficit  randomly affected  different  items  in  different  tasks.  None  of  the 
statistical tests led to a significant result (see Table 3.8.), clearly indicating that the lack 
of semantic and functional knowledge about objects does not necessarily prevent correct 
object use.
Table  3.8. Consistency  analysis  comparing  the  performance  in  object  use  with  the  other  experiments. 
Object use can be considered largely independent from the other abilities. C = Contingency coefficient; ”n.a.” 
= not administered.
Object Use (Experiment 1)
AM DL
Experiment 2002 2004 2002 2004
Exp.2 (object naming) C = .29
Chi-square = 1.95
P > .01
C = .20
Chi-square = 1.01
P > .01
C = .22
Chi-square = 1.23
P > .01
C = .14
Chi-square = .46
P > .01
Exp. 3 (general semantics/words) C = .04
Chi-square = .04
P > .01
C = .10
Chi-square = .22
P > .01
C = .13
Chi-square = .37
P > .01
n.a.
in 2004
Exp.  3  (general 
semantics/pictures)
C = .23
Chi-square = 1.21
P > .01
C = .08
Chi-square = .15
P > .01
C = .15
Chi-square = .56
P > .01
C = .04
Chi-square = .04
P > .01
Exp.4 (semantic of parts) C = .29
Chi-square = 1.99
P > .01
C = .32
Chi-square = 2.62
P > .01
C = .28
Chi-square = 2.09
P > .01
C = .06
Chi-square = .08
P > .01
Exp. 5 (manipulation/words) C = .35
Chi-square = 2.59
P > .01
C = .05
Chi-square = .06
P > .01
C = .37
Chi-square = 3.36
P > .01
n.a.
in 2004
Exp. 6 (manipulation/pictures) C = .15
Chi-square = .42
P > .01
C = .20
Chi-square = .81
P > .01
C = .48
Chi-square = 6.3
P >.01
C = .34
Chi-square = 2.55
P > .01
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Table 3.9. P-values associated to a Wilcoxon signed rank test, comparing AM’s and DL’s performance on 
the verbal and the visual version of the tasks. Bold character indicates significant differences. ”n.a.” = not 
administered.
Experiment
Patient AM Patient DL
2002 2004 2002 2004
Exp.3 (General semantics) >.01 >.01 >.01 *
Exp. 5 (Manipulation knowledge) >.01 >.01 >.01 *
SISSA Object Semantics
function >.01 >.01 >.01 n.a.
manipulation >.01 >.01 >.01 n.a.
DISCUSSION OF STUDY 3B
In this section we have compared the two evaluations, in 2002 and 2004, of patients AM 
and  DL,  considering  their  general  cognitive  abilities  as  well  as  semantic  and  motor 
knowledge about a set of objects. The neuropsychological investigation revealed that the 
two patients  had a semantic  impairment  but relatively normal non-verbal  intelligence, 
visual and spatial short-term memory, visual processing and praxis (see Tables 3.3., 3.4 
and 3.5.). While DL’s severe language deficits remained his prominent impairment over 
the period in which he was examined, with little change in his general cognitive abilities, 
AM showed a more general deterioration at the second evaluation, involving also visuo-
perceptual  skills  and  praxis  abilities.  Given  the  extention  of  the  impairment  to  non-
semantic functions, it is possible that the case of AM is better described as a patient with a 
dementia of Alzheimer type with an atypical onset, whose early signs of pathology were 
focal and primarily involved language skills (see Galton et al.,  2000; for a similar case 
Greene et al., 1996). The magnetic resonance performed in 2005 seems to support this 
interpretation showing a diffused cortical  atrophy.  Despite  the fact  that in 2004 AM’s 
deficit  was  no  longer  “purely”  semantic,  the  strong  dissociation  (see  Shallice,  1998) 
between object use and object knowledge remained significant. 
Overall, study 3B showed that AM and DL’s performance on object use was significantly 
better than that on tasks tapping verbal and semantic knowledge about them, showing a 
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strong dissociation (see Shallice, 1988), but it was as impaired as the ability to recognize 
the correct manipulation of objects (Experiment 5) (see Table 3.7.). Nevertheless, an item-
by-item  consistency  analysis  (Table  3.8.)  showed  that  patients  were  also  able  to  use 
objects (Experiment 1) for which they did not retain general semantic knowledge at all 
(Experiments 3 and 5) or even functional knowledge of their parts (Experiment 4). For 
example, in 2004, when requested to use a spanner, a match, a key and a light bulb, after 
showing distress for he did not know what those objects were, DL managed to use them 
correctly. Though it could be argued that object use may also rely on a non-semantic route 
in which affordances are elicited directly from the object structure (see Hartmann et al., 
2005;  Hodges  et  al.,  2000;  Goldenberg  and  Hagmann,  1998;  Gibson,  1977),  this 
explanation cannot account for instances in which object manipulation cannot be inferred 
from its shape. For example, in 2004, when a match -whose purpose and use cannot be 
readily inferred from its shape and structure- was posed in front of DL, he said: “I don’t 
know,  I’ve  never  seen it  before  and I  do not  even know what  this  thing is  used for”. 
Nevertheless, when the experimenter asked him to try to use it anyway, he could light it by 
scratching it against the matchbox, and then he blew it out correctly. Note that this is a 
task in which IA patients are highly prone to errors, despite their intact object knowledge 
about the objects presented (see Rumiati et al., 2001 and study 3A). In addition, DL in 
2004 clearly showed to know very little about the aforementioned objects, as he failed to 
name them in Experiment 1 and to answer to specific questions concerning them in the 
Experiments 3-4-5. Similarly, in 2004 AM was able to use six objects for which formal 
testing  demonstrated  that  she  did  not  retain  neither  semantic,  nor  functional  or 
manipulation knowledge (Experiments 3-4-5). Thus our findings are at variance with the 
claim that the conceptual knowledge and problem solving abilities play a critical role in 
determining the success of object use (Bozeat et al., 2002; Hodges et al., 2000; Coccia et 
al., 2004; Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998). 
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DISCUSSION OF CHAPTER III 
In order to account for the neuropsychological findings reported in these two studies, the 
functional dichotomy put forward by Goodale and Milner needs to be extended beyond 
low-level  perception  and  reaching-grasping  activities  respectively.  Thus,  besides 
perception, the ventral “what” system may also carry the conceptual knowledge used, for 
instance, in tasks tapping functional-semantic knowledge of objects, as well as in naming 
tasks. By contrast, the dorsal “how” system may contain the representation of affordances, 
namely  the  learned  associations  between  objects  and  the  basic  motor  components 
necessary for their use, such as the orientation and the shape of the hand grip (Grèzes et 
al.,  2003;  Tucker  and  Ellis,  1998;  2001;  Ellis  and  Tucker,  2000).  In  addition,  these 
findings suggest that the “how” system also involves higher-level action representations 
acquired  by past  experience,  which  are  selected  at  appropriate  times  when elicited  by 
environmental triggers (Cooper and Shallice 2000; Rumiati et al., 2001; Cooper, 2007). In 
his computational model of DR and FG’s behaviour, Cooper (2007) predicts indeed that 
the action-relevant object representations (storing the visual  and perceptual features of 
objects) and the action schemas (coding the appropriate movement for a given goal) are 
two separated networks. Such object representations can also be considered separate from 
semantic-encyclopaedic knowledge, which is impaired in patients with temporal lesions 
like AM and DL.  Considering the patients that we tested, normal performance in semantic 
tasks is possible in the presence of a deficit in  action tasks, and vice versa. Based on these 
observations, one can suggest that the two systems are at least partially separable and that, 
although in some circumstances they may interact (e.g. in a SRC task), damage to one of 
them does not lead to a significant damage to the other. In particular, I have shown that a 
deficit  in  tool  use  and  manipulation  does  not  necessarily  affect  neither  the 
verbal/functional knowledge of objects, nor the recognition of the relative pantomimes. 
The imaging data  on tool  use  (see  Chapter  V for  a  discussion,  but  also  Johnson-Frey, 
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2004) are in line with the behaviour of patients like FG and DR, whose lesions overlapped 
in the left posterior parietal cortex. 
Some authors have argued that patients who are still able to use objects despite having a 
semantic  loss  may  rely  on  visual  and/or  tactile  affordances  or  on  trials  and  errors 
strategies (e.g. Hodges et al., 2000). It has also been proposed that the loss of knowledge 
about an object is generally associated to the failure in its use (e.g. Coccia et al.,  2004; 
Bozeat et al., 2002; Hodges et al., 2000). Our results with AM and DL (studies 3A and 3B) 
seem  to  be  at  variance  with  the  above  view:  we  propose  that  semantic  and  motor 
knowledge of an object, although they usually interact, may be represented separately in 
the brain. In our patients the two abilities seem to decline independently. AM and DL’s 
performance on object use is significantly better than on other semantic tasks and they are 
still able to use objects for which the semantic properties are lost. Their failure of object 
use is not simply because this task is easier than the semantic tasks, as their performance 
double dissociates (see Shallice, 1988) with that found in patients with IA, in whom the 
ability to use objects is impaired despite a preserved semantic knowledge about the same 
objects (Rosci et al.,  2003; Rumiati et al.,  2001; Rapcsack et al.,  1995; Schwartz et al., 
1995).  We cannot  excude  that  AM and DL's  spared  ability  to  use  objects  is  based  on 
preserved visuomotor transformations that rely on parietal lobe structures. In any case, 
this would further confirm the idea of fractionation of the system components. It would be 
in conflict with the embodied view that considers the motor system necessarily ingaged in 
semantic  processing.  Still,  The  object-actions  associations  (praxemes  and/or  action 
schemata)  can  be  seen  as  motor  properties  of  a  “leopard  spots”  distributed  object 
representation, and they are held to be at fault in IA patients (see Rumiati  et al., 2001), 
whereas they are preserved in AM and DL.
So far, we have seen that models that postulate a separation between input and output 
praxicons (e.g. Rothi et al., 1991) are most suited to explain the dissociations among the 
different components of  praxis and conceptual system, and in particular between input 
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and output modalities. However, a more detailed model of the interactions between action 
and object representation is needed in order to account for the specific patterns of errors 
found in apraxics, which may qualitatively differ across patients (e.g. Rumiati et al., 2001). 
In the next chapter I will describe a group study  aimed at testing the validity of such a 
model, originally proposed by Norman and Shallice (1986) and developed by Cooper and 
Shallice (2000), which may explain the qualitative differences among apraxic patients in 
terms of damage within the Contention Scheduling System (Cooper, 2007). 
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Appendix 3a. List of the 23 objects used in Experiments 1-5. Items in italic were not used in 
Experiments 3-5.
1 knife
2 squeezer
3 pencil
4 glass
5 tea spoon
6 cigarette
7 match
8 hammer
9 pencil sharpener
10 mug
11 teapot
12 saw
13 scissors
14 nail
15 pliers
16 screwdriver
17 spanner
18 axe
19 comb
20 toothbrush
21 key
22 lightbulb
23 match box
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Appendix 3.b. List of actions that patients were required to perform in Experiment 1 (object 
use).  Object(s)  were posed in front  of  the patients  who were asked to use  them, without  any 
further instruction.
1 Cutting an orange with a knife
2 Squeezing an orange with the squeezer
3 Pouring the juice from squeezer to glass
4 Drinking from the glass
5 Pouring from a teapot in a mug
6 Stirring sugar with a teaspoon in the mug
7 Screwing (screwdriver + screw)
8 Cutting a wooden board with an axe 
9 Putting the toothpaste on the toothbrush
10 Brushing teeth
11 Using a pencil sharpener and pencil
12 Using a spanner and a bolt
13 Cutting paper with scissors
14 Screwing a lightbulb
15 Hammering a nail in a wooden board
16 Sawing a wooden board
17 Lighting a match (match + matchbox)
18 Lighting a cigarette (match + cigarette)
19 Removing a nail with pliers
20 Combing oneself
21 Using a key (key + padlock)
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Chapter IV
A Neuropsychological Investigation of the 
Contention Scheduling Model
Abstract.  In  this  chapter  I  will  present  results  from  a  group  study  on  15  left-brain 
damaged  patients,  aimed  at  testing  the  validity  of  the  computational  model  that  can 
account  for  Ideational  Apraxia  proposed  by  Cooper  (2007).  The  model  postulates  a 
modular organization of  the components that contribute to the organization of  routine 
actions,  and  explains  FG  and  DR’s  behavior  (Rumiati  et  al.,  2001)  as  due  to  a 
disconnection syndrome. In this study, we were able to find several dissociations at the 
single case level that would suggest a separation between information on action schemata 
and on object features.
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Theoretical Background of the Study
In Chapter II we were able to show that there are double dissociations between the ability 
to produce object-related actions and that to recognize them, as well as between object use 
and object recognition. The study reported in Chapter III further demonstrated that the 
two systems, “what” and “how”, can be selectively damaged following brain disease. Such 
data are in line with previous neuropsychological findings and with models holding that 
the  production  systems  and  the  input  systems  are  separated.  Moreover,  the  double 
dissociation  between  action  production  and  object  knowledge  found  in  Study  II  is 
congruent with theoretical claims which predict that the semantic system and the action 
system are separate in the brain (e.g. Rothi et al., 1991), rather than sharing similar neural 
structures  and subserving  processes  (Gallese  and Lakoff,  2005).  However,  in  order  to 
account  for  the  qualitative  differences  in  the  errors  made  by  patients  with  ideational 
apraxia, one needs to refer to a model that allows more specific predictions as to the nature 
of the links between object knowledge and the action production systems. 
The study described in this chapter is based on the theoretical considerations arising from 
Cooper’s  (2007)  simulation  of  patients’  errors  and its  implications  in  the  Contention 
Scheduling model, which I described in more detail in Chapter I (see also Norman and 
Shallice, 1986; Cooper and Shallice, 2000). The main goal of these experiments was to test 
the  existence  and  separateness  of  two  components  of  contention  scheduling  -object 
schema network and action schema network- and their connections, by studying patients 
with left brain damage and ideational apraxia. As exposed in Chapter I,  Cooper (2007) 
proposed that the error patterns of FG and DR might arise from a disconnection either 
between the action schema and the object schema (as in the case of FG) or between object 
representations and action schemas as in the case of DR (see Figure 4.1.). 
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Figure 4.1. The figure depicts the Contention Scheduling model proposed by Cooper and Shallice (2000).
These different patterns of errors were observed when patients used common objects in a 
familiar context (e.g. preparing coffee).
Thus, in patient DR, the partial disconnection from object representation to the action 
schemas led to a  high proportion  of  errors  classified  as  misuse2,  namely  gestures  that 
would be appropriate for the object at hand  but inappropriate in that particular context 
(e.g. cutting an orange by pushing downwards the knife instead of making a sawing-like 
movement). Conversely, the disconnection of action schemas from object representations 
would give rise to a pattern of errors similar to that of patient FG: here mislocation2 errors 
will be more likely to occur (e.g. scratching a match inside the matchbox rather than on the 
appropriate sandpaper strip). 
In the present chapter, I will report a study in which I tested patients with left brain 
damage, who are more likely to have object use apraxia (De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988) and 
analyzed the errors they made in performing a series of  experiments.  The deficits  that 
these  patients  may show will  allow me not  only  to  test  the  validity  of  the  Contention 
Scheduling model, but also of the Supervisory Attentional System. In fact, some tasks (in 
particular the Multiple Object Task) may also be influenced by the ability of the patients to 
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plan action sequences: patients with lesions in the frontal lobes may fail in such Activities 
of  Daily  Living  (ADL).  This  profile  has  also  been  described  as  “action  disorganisation 
syndrome” (Duncan, 1986; Humphreys and Forde, 1998; Schwartz et al., 1995). 
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Eighteen left brain damaged and 12 control participants, matched for age and education, 
were  recruited  from  the  Rehabilitation  Unit  of  the  A.O.  Ospedali  Riuniti  di  Trieste. 
Consecutively  admitted  patients  were  selected  for  the  study  if  they  met  the  following 
criteria:
-left unilateral stroke, as reported from the neuroradiological notes
-absence of previous neurological disorders
- at least five years of education
- age less than 80 years
-MRI or CT scan available
Three patients were excluded from the study: Mi.B. and Mo.T., because they had prior 
multiple  vascular  lesions  found  through  a  CT  scan  reexamination  made  by  an  expert 
neuroradiologist (Dr. Maja Ukmar); Ba.C. because of the severe comprehension deficit that 
made impossible for her to understand even simple task instructions. The final sample 
consisted of 15 patiens (age 69,13 + 6,81; education 8,57 + 3,18, see Appendix 4-I). 
Twelve control subjects (age 67.18 + 7.69; education 9.72 + 4.63) were in-patients of the 
rehabilitation ward following  orthopedic  surgery,  and before participating in the study 
they  were  assessed  for  handedness  (Edinburgh  inventory)  and  cognitive  impairment 
(MMSE, Italian norms). Patients and controls participated in the experimental tasks, but 
only  patients  were  administered  with  an  extensive  neuropsychological  assessment  (see 
Appendix  4-II).  All  patients  and  controls,  or  their  closest  relatives  in  case  of  severe 
reading/writing impairments, gave written informed consent to participate in the study.
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Experiments 1a, 1b and 1c: object use tasks
Patients and controls had to perform three object use tasks. In all tasks, objects were 
placed on the table in front of the subjects with the following verbal instructions: “Please 
show me how you would use this/these object/s”.
Experiment 1a.Multiple Object Tasks (MOT)  This task consisted of five activities that 
were repeated in 4 different sessions (20 trials in total). These activities were the following:
Preparing  Italian  coffee:  a  disassembled  moka  (filter,  upper  part,  lower  part),  a 
teaspoon, a can of coffee, an opened bottle containing water;
Lighting a candle: a matchbox containing matchsticks, a candle, a candlestick
Preparing orange juice: a knife, a glass, an orange, a squeezer;
Opening a bottle and drinking water: a bottle sealed with a crown cap, a bottle opener, a 
glass;
Preparing a letter to post: an envelope, a stamp, a stick glue, a pen, a white paper sheet.
Experiment 1b. “Multi-schemata” objects.  This experiment specifically tested the ability 
to use a set of tools that are linked to more than one action schema. A knife, for example, 
can be used to cut by pushing if it is presented with butter, or to cut by sawing with an 
orange.  Six  tools  and their  possible  targets  (for  a  total  of  14  trials,  listed below) were 
presented to the patients who were asked to show how to use them. By hypothesis, such 
tools  should  elicit  a  higher  number  of  misuse2 errors  in  those  patients  with  a  type of 
apraxia similar to that of DR (Rumiati et al.,  2001).  I predict that patients such as DR 
would fail with tools associated with more than one action schema, as in these patients the 
links  connecting  the  object  representation  network  to  the  action  schema  network  are 
supposed to be damaged. The list of stimuli of experiment 1b is the following:
Multi-schemata object Target Objects Expected action
Knife + Orange Cut by sawing
Swiss cheese Cut by pushing
Marmalade Spreading
Corkscrew + Bottle with crown cap Use the upper part of the corkscrew as a lever
Bottle with cork Use the twisted part to extract the cork
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Pinch+ Nail Extract by pulling
Bolt Extract by twisting
Teaspoon+ Coffee mug Stir
Ice cream cup Take icecream and bring to the mouth
Sugar pot Lift sugar, move it from the pot
Toothpick+ Olive Picking the olive and bringing it to the mouth
(alone) Cleaning teeth
Bottle+ Glass Pouring in the glass
(alone) Drinking from the bottle
Experiment 1c. Single Objects. Twenty-eight objects of common use, all of unimanual use 
(listed in Appendix 4.III) were presented to the subjects. This number of items is larger 
than in the clinical  test  used for  the Neuropsychological  assessment,  which contains  7 
items only and does not distinguish between multiple and single objects. 
Experiments 2a and 2b: action-target matching for multi-schemata objects
These experiments investigated the possible connections from the action network to the 
representations of multi-schemata objects and their targets. In particular, patients like DR 
should be impaired on these tasks, given that they cannot perform the correct action for a 
given tool/target combination.
Experiment  2a.  Patients  were  presented  with  a  movie  of  an  actor  using  a  tool 
appropriately for a given target (e.g. video: cut by sawing with a knife), in absence of the 
target (e.g.:  an orange). Subsequently, four possible targets appeared on the screen and 
subjects were asked to point to the correct target  for that action. The distractor targets 
were a semantically related one (pasta), one requiring a similar manipulation (a log) and 
one requiring a different manipulation but appropriate for the tool (cheese).
Experiment 2b.  Subjects  were presented first  with a picture of a target object on the 
laptop screen (e.g. an orange), then with two movies of object use (e.g. using the knife to 
cut by sawing vs by pushing). They had to decide which of the two pantomimed actions 
was  more  appropriate  for  that  target  object  for  a  total  of  14  trials,  the  same  as  in 
Experiment 1b.
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Experiment 3a and 3b. action-object matching
These experiments  were designed with the aim of  assessing  the ability of  patients  to 
associate a correct action schema once the object representation was activated, and vice-
versa. It is possible that both DR-like and FG-like patients fail in performing these tasks, 
given  their  hypotheized  impaired  connections  between  action  schemas  and  object 
representations.
Experiment  3a. The  picture  of  a  tool  is  presented  on  the  upper  side  of  the  screen. 
Subsequently, a videotaped pantomime of use (in absence of the object) appears below, 
while the picture of the tool is still present. The subject is asked  to judge with a yes/no 
response  whether  the  pantomime  is  correctly  associated  with  the  object.  The  foil 
pantomimes are related to objects that share semantic and functional features with the 
correct  one,  but  are  used  with  different  action  schemas  (for  example:  object:  knife; 
pantomimes: cutting -correct trial- or shaving -incorrect trial-). Cooper's model (2007), in 
fact,  holds  that  objects  with  similar  semantic  information  have  overlapping 
representations in the object  network. Therefore,  it  may be possible that  patients with 
impaired  links  between  action  schemas  and  object  representations  fail  to  activate  the 
correct object starting from a schema, while they are likely to activate semantically related 
objects. Object-pantomime pairs are presented in a randomized order, 50% correct and 
50% incorrect, for a total of 66 pairs.
Experiment  3b.  This experiment  is  identical  to 3a but the object  and pantomime are 
presented in the reverse order (pantomime first and object second).
Experiment 4a and 4b. Object Knowledge
Experiment  4a.  Object  Naming/Multiple  choice.  Patients  were  required  to  name  56 
objects used in Experiments 1a, b and c, presented as pictures on a computer screen. In 
case of aphasia/anomia a multiple choice comprehension was been administered, in which 
patients had to choose between a target (e.g.  hammer), a semantically related distractor 
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(e.g.  nail)  and  a  phonologically  related  distractor  (e.g.  martello/cartello =  hammer/ 
signpost)
Experimenti  4b.  Functional-perceptual  questionnaire. According  to  the  CS  model 
(Cooper and Shallice,  2000),  the object features are represented in an object network, 
separately from the action schema network. This questionnaire, similarly to that described 
in Chapter II, aims at investigating the integrity of this information by tapping on the fine-
grained functional and perceptual knowledge of the objects used in the other experiments 
of the study. Objects were presented as pictures and subjects were verbally presented with 
a short question requiring a yes/no answer. There were three types of questions assessing 
three different levels  of  object knowledge of  the tool  (e.g.  hammer):  the prototypically 
associated action (Is it used for sawing?), its material (Is it made in wood?), and the object 
usually  associated  (Is  it  used  with  a  screw?).  The  questionnaire  had  in  total  of  138 
questions: 50% required a Yes response, and the order of the question-object pairs was 
randomized. 
RESULTS
Group level analyses
Correlational analyses
a) Correlations among praxis tasks
Nonparametric correlations were calculated among patients' scores on five praxis tasks, 
including the three object use tasks (Experiments 1a, 1b and 1c) and the two clinical tests 
for  praxis  assessment, the  IMA  and  IA  tests.  The  IMA  (Ideomotor  Apraxia)  test 
investigates the ability of the patients to imitate meaningful  and meaningless gestures, 
whereas  the  IA  (Ideational  Apraxia)  test  investigates  the  ability  to  use  objects  and  it 
includes two multi-step tasks and five single objects (see Appendix 4-II). The results are 
displayed in Table 4.a.: applying a Bonferroni correction for the significance level (new 
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critical p=.005), none of the correlations resulted statistically significant. However, if we 
use a less restrictive criterion of p<.01, the results are the following: 
• Scores on the IMA test correlate with those on the IA test, but not with performance in the   
other  three  experimental  tasks. It  is  possible  that  a  general  problem  of  the  action 
production system would affect both tasks; however, since the comparison between IMA 
and Experiment 1c (in which a higher number of items with respect to the IA test is used) 
is not significant, one may hypothesize that performing De Renzi and Lucchelli (1988) test 
for IA  requires several functions that need to be disentangled, as it includes also multiple 
object  use  tasks  (i.e.  lighting  a  candle  and  closing  and  opening  a  lock  with  a  key). 
Furthermore, the number of items of the IA test might be too small, thus producing a high 
rate of false negatives.
• Experiment 1c correlates with the IA test  : Experiment 1c includes 28 objects of common 
use, like the IA test devised by De Renzi. 
• Experiment 1a correlates significantly with experiment 1b but not with experiment 1c  . This 
result is in line with the hypothesis that patients with IA do not have difficulties only with 
multi-step actions,  but also when they are  presented with objects  that  may potentially 
activate several action schemas. In Experiment 1b, in fact, subjects were not required to 
generate a series of steps and sub-goals but only to perform the appropriate action for the 
tool-target pair presented. 
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Table 4.a. Correlation matrix among the five praxis tasks used in the assessment and in the experimental 
session. (*) indicates significant correlations for p<.01
  1b. Multisch 1c. Single IA IMA
1a. MOT Spearman's rho ,655 (*) ,569 -,432 -,322
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,008 ,027 ,108 ,242
1b. Multisch Spearman's rho - ,567 -,395 -,424
 Sig. (2-tailed) - ,027 ,145 ,115
1c. Single Spearman's rho - - -,656 (*) -,505
 Sig. (2-tailed) - - ,008 ,055
IA Spearman's rho - - - ,603 (*)
 Sig. (2-tailed) - - - ,017
b) Correlations between object use tasks and recognition/semantic tasks
 We have calculated nonparametric correlations also between the praxis experiments and 
the  two  experiments  (4a  and  4b)  that  we  devised  to  investigate  the  lexical-semantic 
knowledge  of  the  objects.  Keeping  the  significance  level  used  above  (p<.01),  only  the 
correlation between task 4a and task 4b is significant, suggesting that the performance in 
recognizing  the  objects  on  a  comprehension  task  is  closely  related  to  the  semantic 
knowledge of the objects themselves. Very importantly,  the two semantic tasks did not 
correlate  with performance on any of  the object  use experiments,  suggesting again the 
relative independence of the semantic and action systems, more extensively discussed in 
Chapter III.
Table 4.b. Correlation matrix with praxis Experiments (1a, b and c) and the lexical-semantic experiments 
(4a and 4b). (*) indicates significant correlations for p<.01
1b. Multisch 1c. Single 4a. compr 4b.question  
1a. MOT Spearman's rho ,655 (*) ,569 ,241 ,164
Sig. (2-tailed) ,008 ,027 ,387 ,559
1b. Multisch Spearman's rho - ,567 ,305 ,281
Sig. (2-tailed) - ,027 ,268 ,310
1c. Single Spearman's rho - - ,305 -,013
Sig. (2-tailed) - - ,270 ,964
4a. compr Spearman's rho - - - ,737(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) - - - ,002
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Single Case Approach
In order to compare patients’ performance with the results of Rumiati et al. (2001) and to 
test Cooper's (2007) predictions, the error profiles of individual patients were analyzed. 
We compared the average number of errors that each patient made when they performed 
MOTs, with those made by FG and DR (Rumiati et al., 2001). This comparison is reported 
in Table 4c. 
Case-by-case comparison with FG and DR.
First of all, we have looked at possible similarities between behaviour in the MOTs of the 
patients in the present study and the two patients described by Rumiati et al. (2001). One 
of the aims of the present study was to identify patients who behave similarly to FG or DR, 
and analyze their performance on the other experiments we devised. In Appendix 4.IV. we 
report the full description of the errors made by the 15 patients.
DR-like patients. Two patients, Bu.S. and St.V, made a similar number of Misuse2 errors 
to DR in performing the MOTs (see Table 4c). In particular, patient Bu.S. shows an error 
profile in the MOTs very similar to that of DR, with a high rate of Sequence errors (mean = 
7.5 per session),  Misuse2 errors (mean = 2.5 per session), and low rate of  Mislocation2 
errors  (mean  =  0.75  per  session).  Patient  St.V.  instead  makes  a  smaller  number  of 
Sequence errors but a similar number of Misuse2 (mean = 1.75 per session) compared with 
Bu.S. and D.R (mean = 0.5 per session),. We think that Bu.S.’ pattern of performance can 
be explained in terms of nonspecific resource limitations (see Buxbaum et al., 1988). Bu.S. 
makes a very large amount of sequence errors (see Table4c and Figure 4.2a), similarly to 
patients  with frontal  apraxia  described by Schwartz  et  al.  (1991).  In  general,  both her 
neuropsychological profile and her scores in all the other experimental  tasks indicate a 
general  widespread  damage  that  involves  all  the  main  cognitive  functions:  her 
performance falls below normal range in the language assessment (AAT test), semantic 
memory (Pyramids and Palm Trees Test) in short-term memory (Corsi test), logic abilities 
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(Raven matrices) and attention (TMT-A), besides all the experimental tasks (see Table 4d). 
More interesting is the profile of patient St.V., who makes a high number of Misuse2 errors 
in the MOTs, despite a rather preserved neuropsychological context: his attention, logic 
abilities  and  semantic  memory  are  normal  (see  Appendix  4-II).  As  far  as  the  other 
experimental tasks are concerned, patient St.V. shows an interesting dissociation between 
his impaired performance  in experiments 2a-2b (involving action knowledge for objects 
that  elicit  multiple  action schemata)  and his  normal  scores  in  experiments  3a  and 3b 
(testing action knowledge for single objects). This pattern of results suggests that this high 
rate of Misuse2 errors was somewhat related to a altered knowledge of the action/target 
links, specific for multischemata objects. This is confirmed by the fact that St.V. performs 
below cutoff also in Experiment 1b (that requires to use multischemata objects together 
with possible targets), but not in Experiment 1c (the single object use).
FG-like patients. None of the patients of this group performed similarly to FG, namely 
making a high number of Mislocation2 errors in Experiment 1c.
Table 4c. Average number of errors on four MOTs for our 15 patients compared with FG and DR. Symbol 
♥ indicates patients similar to DR. Note that FG and DR were asked to perform ten MOTs, whereas our 
patients performed five MOTs, so we halved FG and DR's scores reported in  Rumiati et al., 2001 (grey rows).
 Sequence Misuse1 Misuse2 Misloc1 Misloc2 Tool Om Pantom Perplex Toying
F.G. 5.25 .36 0.62 1.25 2.87 0.75 0.37 2.87 1.25
D.R.♥ 2.37 - 2.5 0.87 - .36 - .12 -
BE.F. 0 0.25 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
BU.A. 1 0 0.75 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0
BU.S. ♥ 7.5 0.75 2.5 0 0.75 1.75 0 0 0
CI.G. 4.25 1 0 0.75 0.75 0.5 0 0.5 0.25
CO.M 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0
DB.M. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FE.M. 1.25 0 0 0 0.25 1 0 0 0
GU.B. 1.5 0.25 0 0 0 0.75 0 0.25 0
IE.N. 3.5 0.75 0.5 0 1 0.75 0 0 0
JU.A. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RA.F. 4 0.25 0.25 0 0.75 1.75 0.25 1 0
SA.N. 1.75 0.75 0 0 0 0.75 0 0.25 0
ST.V. ♥ 0.5 1 1.75 0 0.75 0.25 0 0 0
ULC. 4.5 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 2 0.5 0 0.25
VI.N. 0.25 0.25 0.75 0 0.75 0 0.25 0 0
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Figure 4.2.A. Number and percentage of errors (divided by type) made by the 15 patients in Experiment 
1a.
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Figure 4.2.B. Number and percentage of errors (divided by type) made by the 15 patients in Experiment 
1b.
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Figure 4.2.A. Number and percentage of errors (divided by type) made by the 15 patients in Experiment 1c.
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Considerations on Experiments 1a, 1b and 1c
Patients Bu.S., Ra.F. And Vi.N. made the highest number of errors in Experiment 1b. 
However, their patterns of performance in the three object use tasks look quite different 
from each other. While Bu.S. is the most impaired patient in MOTs, making in total 65 
errors, she is not the most impaired in the simple object use task, in which she makes 8 
errors only. Patient Ra.F. instead makes 20 errors in the single object tasks, but less errors 
than Bu.S. in the MOTs. Patient Vi.N. is the most impaired in experiment 1b,   he is also 
quite impaired with single objects, but he has a relatively good performance in MOTs.
Such data allow to think that there is not just an effect of difficulty of the tasks or severity 
of damage, because in this case we should not observe double dissociations.  Instead, it 
could be that these experiments are able to elicit different patterns of errors because they 
tap  different  abilities.  MOTs  are  more  involved  with  action  sequencing  and  the 
organization of routine behavior. Multischemata objects can be prone to error because, in 
case of damage within the CS, more schemas compete for activation when the tool is held 
in hand. Single object use is more prone to errors like errate grasping, timing, misuse and 
so on, which are related to low-level action schemas (like pick up, put down).
Dissociations in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3.
In  this  section,  we  will  consider  the  possible  existence  of  dissociations  between 
performance on Experiment 2 and performance on Experiment 3 and we will try to relate 
the results to the patients’ behavior on Experiments 1a, b and c. Since Experiments 2a and 
2b had a different number of alternatives, we operated a linear transformation14 on the 
subjects’ score. We thus obtained  a new score (see Table 4d), that we called “criterion”, 
that  reaches a  maximum of  1  (if  all  the  responses  are  correct).  Zero  corresponds to  a 
14 [(Xp*N)-1]/(N-1), where Xp is the proportion of errors made by the patient, and N is the number of 
alternaticves in the task
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random performance, like 25% in case of a task with four alternatives like in Experiment 
2a.
Double dissociation between Experiment 2a and Experiment 2b. Three patients (Bu.S., 
Ra.F.  and  Ulc.)  performed  relatively  better  in  Experiment  2a  than  in  Experiment  2b 
(Crawford and Garthwaite’s RSDT test15, p<.05 one-tailed). It is interesting to note that 
Bu.S, Ra.F. and Ulc. made the largest number of  tool omissions in Experiment 1a (mean 
per session = 1.75, 1.75 and 2 respectively). This result seems to suggest that, if one is no 
longer able to associate the correct action schema for the use of a tool combined to the 
object-target, then he/she would attempt to act on the object-target without the using a 
tool  (e.g.  trying  to  remove  a  cap  with  the  hand  instead  of  using  the  bottle  opener). 
Appendix  4.IV.B.  shows  the  overlap  of  the  three  patients’  lesions,  reconstructed  with 
MRIcro software: this corresponds to a small subcortical portion of the left temporal lobe. 
On  the  other  hand,  four  patients  (Fe.M.,  Gu.B.,  Ie.N.,  and  Ju.A)  performed  on 
Experiment 2b better than on Experiment 2a (RSDT test, p<.05 one-tailed). In this case, 
the pattern of errors made by the patients is  not  homogeneous and we will  not give a 
neuropsychological interpretation of this result. Lesions are reported in Appendix 4.IV.B: 
three out of four patients have a lesion overlapping in a subcortical area adjacent to insula. 
The fact that there are patients whose performance in Experiment 2a double dissociates 
from that in Experiment 2b rules out the explanation that one task is more difficult than 
the other. In contrast, it is possible that the two tasks rely on cognitive abilities that are at 
least functionally separable (see Shallice,  1988 and the discussion in chapter III of this 
thesis).  In  this  case,  we  observed  that  the  connections  from  action  schemas  to  target 
representations can be selectively spared despite damage to the connections from object 
representations to action schemas, and vice versa. 
15 Crawford, J. R., & Garthwaite, P. H. (2005). Testing for suspected impairments and dissociations in single-
case studies in neuropsychology: Evaluation of alternatives using Monte Carlo simulations and revised tests 
for dissociations. Neuropsychology, 19, 318–331.
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Dissociation  between  Experiment  3a  and  Experiment  3b. We  observed  two  patients 
(Co.M. and Ci.G.) who performed Experiment 3b better than Experiment 3a (Chi-square = 
4.86 and 4.08 respectively, p<.05). Their lesion overlap is depicted in Appendix 4.IV.C.: 
the  areas  commonly  lesioned are  more  posterior  with  respect  to  the  patients  showing 
dissociations  between  Experiments  2a  and  2b.  They  involve,  among  others,  cortical 
parietal structures associated with tool-use abilities (see Johnson-Frey, 2004 for a review). 
Co.M and Ci.G. did not make similar errors in experiments 1a, 1b and 1c. Moreover, the 
opposite side of this dissociation was not found in this sample, therefore we will not make 
further neuropsychological considerations about this dissociation because it might be due 
to a task difficulty effect.
Object Knowledge (Exp. 4) and its relation with the other Experiments.
Using this  new series  of  experiments,  we were able to partially  replicate  the findings 
described in Chapters II and III, in which we reported double dissociations between the 
fine-grained  semantic  knowledge  of  tools  (or  at  least  their  visual  recognition)  and the 
actual  ability  to use them. The correlational  analyses  showed that  performance on the 
experiments tapping on semantics did not correlate significantly with that in experiments 
action production. Moreover, within this sample, three patients (Be.F., Co.M. and Fe.M.) 
performed above the cutoff on the semantic questionnaire, despite showing apraxia when 
performing the MOTs, showing intact semantic and functional knowledge of the tools that 
they failed to use in the Experiment 1a. Such findings strengthen the view that the motor 
knowledge of tools is not necessary for the intactness of fine conceptual representation of 
the tools. In particular, the questions contained in Experiment 1c were devised in order to 
explicitly  tap the functional  and action knowledge of the items presented,  as it  overtly 
investigated  object  features  like  its  prototypical  action,  its  material  and the  associated 
objects.  On  the  other  hand,  we  were  not  able  to  find  patients  showing  a  semantic 
impairment in answering questions contained in the questionnaire (such as AM and DL, 
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described in  Chapter  II)  but  normal  performance  in  performing object  use  tasks.  This 
result may be due to the nature of the disease of the patients of this sample, as the most 
common lesions associated with strokes are usually caused by infarction or hemorrhage of 
the middle cerebral artery, which supplies the outer surface of the cerebral hemisphere. 
Instead, AM and DL’s atrophy mainly involved the temporal poles. 
123
Table 4d.  Results in experiments 2, 3 and 4. Symbol * represents performances below cutoff (controls’ lowest score); Nam = Naming; MC = Multiple Choice; crit = 
patients’ score linearly transformed, considering the number of alternatives of the task.
MOT multi-sch single Exp2a Exp2b Exp3a Exp3b Exp4a Exp4b
initials n.err n.err n.err % crit % crit % crit % crit Nam % MC% %
BE.F. 12* 0 1 92.8 0.90 100 1.00 87.9 0.76 87.9* 0.76* -- 98.2 96.4
BU.A. 15* 6* 5 78.6 0.71 92.9 0.86 92.4 0.85 90.9 0.82 -- 92.9* 79.7*
BU.S. 65* 10* 8* 71.4* 0.62* 71.4* 0.43* 74* 0.48* 74.2* 0.48* 0 92.9* 91.3*
CI.G. 34* 6* 10* 28.6* 0.05* 57.1* 0.14* 57.6* 0.15* 74.2* 0.48* 0 42.9* 60.9*
CO.M 4* 1 3 78.6 0.71 85.7 0.71 86.4 0.73 97 0.94 -- 100 97.8
D.B.M. 1 1 2 85.7 0.81 92.8 0.86 98.5 0.97 98.5 0.97 -- 96.4 97
FE.M. 10* 2 2 42.9* 0.24* 78.6* 0.57* 63.6* 0.27* 72.7* 0.45* -- 89.3* 97.8
GU.B. 11* 5* 8* 35.7* 0.14* 85.7 0.71 77.3* 0.55* 86.4* 0.73* 58.9 89.3* 82.6*
IE.N. 28* 5* 9* 35.7* 0.14* 78.6* 0.57* 87.9 0.76 87.9* 0.76* 0 98.2 94.2*
JU.A. 0 0 3 71.4* 0.62* 100 1.00 90.9 0.82 93.9 0.88 -- 96.4 99.3
RA.F. 39* 13* 19* 85.7 0.81 64.3* 0.29* 84.8* 0.70* 87.9* 0.76* -- 91.1* 88.4*
SA.N. 14* 5* 3 42.9* 0.24* 64.3* 0.29* 77.3* 0.55* 75.8* 0.52* -- 75* 72.5*
ST.V. 17* 4* 2 50* 0.33* 71.4* 0.43* 86.4 0.73 84.8* 0.70* 0 83.9* 87*
ULC. 40* 7* 10* 57* 0.43* 50* 0.00* 77.3* 0.55* 78.8* 0.58* 44.6 91.1* 88.4*
VI.N. 11* 16* 9* 57.1* 0.43* 78.6* 0.57* 83.3* 0.67* 90.9 0.82 -- 96.4 94.9*
cutoffs 3 3 5 78.6 0.71 85.7 0.71 86.4 0.73 90.9 0.81 94.6 96.4
DISCUSSION
Of the 15 patients who took part in this study, six were found to be apraxic as assessed 
with the De Renzi and Lucchelli (1988) test for object use. All the patients that failed in the 
De Renzi test were also below cutoff in experiment 1c. However, five patients who were 
normal when performing the IA test (Be.F., Bu.A., Sa.N., St.V. and Ulc.) performed below 
cutoff in the MOT task, and two patients (Gu.B. and Ulc.) normal when performing the De 
Renzi  test,  were  instead  below  cutoff  in  Experiment  1c.  As  suggested  also  by  the 
correlational results, we hypothesize that the IA test devised by De Renzi and Lucchelli 
(1988)  used  in  the  clinical  practice  is  probably  influenced  by  several  confounding 
variables, in addition to the fact that it contains a small number of items.
 The pattern of distribution of errors performed by each patient in Experiments 1a, 1b 
and 1c  is  very  heterogeneous:  it  includes  patients  who made  few errors  (like  Ju.A.  or 
DB.M.) and patients who produced a much higher error rate (e.g. Bu.S. or  Ulc.). The error 
profile analysis has shown that the majority of them cannot be considered similar either to 
FG  or  to  DR,  suggesting  that  their  errors  in  MOTs  may  originate  from  damage  to  a 
different module within contention scheduling, or outside CS itself (see for example the 
discussion about patient Bu.S.).
As reported in Figure 4.2. and 4.3., the most frequent type of errors made by patients are 
sequence errors, including step omissions, action anticipations and perseverations. 
The  documented  double  dissociation  between  performance  in  Experiment  2a  and 
performance in Experiment 2b suggests that, for the multischemata objects, there might be 
selective deficits in activating the correct object representation starting from the action 
schemas in presence of intact connections in the other direction, and vice versa. Moreover, 
patients who performed Experiment 2a better than 2b also shared common features as far 
as their performance on the MOTs is concerned. 
As for Experiments 3a and 3b, we were able to find dissociations only for patients who 
performed 3b better than 3a. Although we cannot rule out the explanation of the difficulty 
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of the task (controls also performed slightly better in 3b, although not significantly), we are 
skeptical in accepting it because Experiment 3a has exactly the same structure and items 
(re-randomized) as Experiment 3b. 
We observed dissociations among the tasks that we have devised in order to tap on the 
different modules and links within CS. We showed that not all apraxic patients behave in 
the  same  way  when  they  are  asked  to  perform  recognition  tasks  tapping  action  and 
semantic  knowledge.  Although  the  explanation  of  apraxia  proposed  by  Buxbaum  and 
colleagues (1998) holds for one of the cases presented (Bu.S.), the individual differences 
among  patients  in  the  dissociations  that  emerged  and  in  the  error  profiles  suggest  a 
modular interpretation of the action organization systems.
To conclude this chapter I would like to use the present data in order to compare the CS 
model with another model that has been proposed to explain action slips in normal and 
apraxic behavior. Botvinick and Plaut (2004) trained a recurrent connectionist network in 
a task very similar to that used by Cooper and Shallice (2000). The important difference 
from the CS approach is that Botvinick and Plaut propose that the structure of the task is 
not  hierarchically  organized,  and  the  sequencing  of  the  different  task  subgoals  is 
achievable also by a network that does not support hierarchical structures. The authors 
compare the network results with that of patients with action dysorganization syndrome 
due to closed head injury (CHI), described in Schwartz et al (1998) and, since the pattern 
of errors of the network is similar to that of the CHI sample, they conclude that their model 
is suitable to explain action disorganization deficits.
We have plotted in Figure 4.3 and 4.4. the two samples of patients: those participating in 
this study and the patients of Schwartz et al. (1998). We have modified the colors in order 
to consider only two type of errors: a) those called by Botvinick and Plaut “substitution” 
errors (in white), in which the correct action is done with the wrong object, or the wrong 
action  is  performed  with  the  correct  object  (correspoding  to  our  mislocations  and 
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misuses); b)  sequence errors, that include step omissions, perseverations,  anticipations, 
repetitions etc.
Figure 4.3.  Data from Schwartz et al. (1998), showing the relationship between overall error rate and 
types of errors, divided into sequence and substitution errors (modified graph)
Figure 4.4. this graph reports the proportion of sequence (black) and substitution (white) errors in MOTs 
for our sample of 15 left unilateral stroke patients.
It  is  evident  at  first  sight  that,  in  our  sample,  the  proportion  of  substitution  errors 
compared to sequence errors is much higher, as our stroke patients make in proportion 
much more substitution errors than Schwartz (1998)'s CHI patients. In the simulation of 
Botvinick  and  Plaut  (2004),  the  authors  are  able  to  reproduce  CHI  error  patterns  by 
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adding noise to the network connections.  More problematic  would be to obtain a high 
proportion of substitution errors in this kind of network. In the context of the SAS/CS 
model  however,  by  altering  the  top-down control  coming from the SAS to  the  CS,  we 
should provoke something more similar to the “frontal” apraxia. The pattern of errors of 
our  left brain damaged patients can be accounted for by hierarchical models of routine 
actions, but it is not easily explained in the framework of recurrent networks that consider 
the MOTs as sequences of actions. In the recurrent network model, lesions to the hidden 
units cause increase of substitution errors only at high stages of damage. In left stroke 
patients however there are cases (Be.F., Vi.N.), which show high proportion of substitution 
errors even in presence of mild impairment in the MOTs. These data are also at variance 
with studies that conclude for the absence of qualitative differences across patients (reft, 
right  or  frontal)  as  to  the  types  of  error  they  make  in  multi-step  actions  (Buxbaum, 
Schwartz and Montgomery, 1998).
 Further  investigation  is  needed  in  the  future,  in  particular  new  computational 
simulations of the novel error profiles will be necessary, in order to see whwther the model 
can account for both frontal and ideational apraxia. Moreover future work will allow us to 
clarify whether the Contention Scheduling hypothesis fits with the data that we found and, 
in case of affirmative response, we could find the locus of damage within CS for the new 
patients who behaviorally differ from FG and DR.
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APPENDIX4-I. Patients’ demographic and lesion data. BG = Basal Ganglia, P= Parietal, O= Occipital, F = Frontal, T= Temporal
AGE EDU handedness ONSET AETIOLOGY LESION SITE (left) DATE DIAGNOSIS
INITIALS   coeff    EVALUATION APHASIA (AAT test)
BE.F. 67 8 100 05/04/2004 emorr BG 04/05/2006 NO APHASIA
BU.A. 71 7 92 02/10/2005 isch P-O 09/11/2005 WERNICKE severe
BU.S. 76 5 100 07/04/2005 isch T-P 11/05/2006 GLOBAL
CI.G. 77 17 100 24/11/06 isch T-P 15/12/06 WERNICKE severe
CO.M 59 10 83 08/07/2005 emorr P 26/10/2005 WERNICKE moderate
D.B.M. 58 13 100 27/12/05 isch Semioval center 05/03/2006 output phonological buffer deficit
FE.M. 61 12 100 18/02/2006 tce+emorr F-T-P 17/03/2006 TRANSC MIXED mild
GU.B. 67 11 100 18/11/2005 emorr T 19/12/2005 WERNICKE (96,5%) mild
IE.N. 71 8 100 05/06/2007 isch (+emorr) F-P 06/04/2007 WERNICKE severe
JU.A. 74 15 83 02/07/2005 isch P 21/02/2006 CONDUCTION
RA.F. 72 7 100 27/01/2006 emorr T-P-O 02/03/2006 TRANSC SENSORIAL mild
SA.N. 64 8 100 18/04/2006 isch BG + F-T 30/05/2006 BROCA severe
ST.V. 67 5 100 04/05/2006 isch(+emorr) BG + P 30/06/2006 BROCA severe
ULC. 71 6 83 09/07/2006 isch(+emorr) BG+ int. & est. capsula+claustrum 16/08/2006 BROCA mild
VI.N. 82 5 100 25/01/2006 isch(+emorr) T-P 01/03/2006 BROCA mild
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APPENDIX 4-II. Patients’ neuropsychological profiles. Red colour indicates severe impairment. Blue indicates mild impairment. “n.a.” = not administered
 AAT 
Written Language Comprehension LTM STM
 Patient Token Rep. Read. Writ.1 Writ.2 Nam. Oral Written Verb. Vis. Verb. Vis. P&P
BE.F. 7 140 30 27 27 107 51 50 41 22 4.25 4 50
BU.A. 50 9 22 0 0 15 43 48 n.a. 24 n.a. 4 49
BU.S. 36 44 9 0 0 15 26 14 n.a. 16 n.a. 2.25 46
CI.G. 50 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. ---- 47
CO.M 25 102 14 14 19 61 49 43 n.a. 25 n.a. 4.75 50
D.B.M. 39 71 24 8 12 83 51 48 31 25 n.a. 4 51
FE.M. 41 95 23 14 21 34 31 31 n.a. 20 2.75 4 47
GU.B. 29 134 30 16 25 29 34 21 32 23 4.25 4.25 32
IE.N. 30 31 5 0 0 43 49 37 n.a. 24 n.a. 4.5 51
JU.A. 6 134 26 24 24 109 58 60 36 16 2.75 4 52
RA.F. 40 139 0 0 22 59 44 0 n.a. 19 6.25 3.25 46
SA.N. 36 101 16 3 0 29 28 18 n.a. 21 n.a. 6.25 39
ST.V. 40 94 16 12 3 43 42 21 n.a. 22 n.a. 1 47
ULC. 36 122 15 0 0 88 39 11 n.a. 3 4.5 3 47
VI.N. 7 100 22 14 7 98 52 56 n.a. 25 n.a. 3.5 52
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APENDIX 4-II (continued)
IA IMA ATTENT. EXECUTIVE FUNCT. VISUAL PERC.
INITIALS MF ML total TMT A TMT B
BWD 
DIGIT WEIGL RAVEN SCREEN
OBJ
DEC.
BE.F. 14 MF=28 ML=31 59/72 118 n.c. 2 6.75 27 20 17
BU.A. 14 MF= 19 ML= 25 44/72 22 275 n.s. 10 32.6 20 16
BU.S. 9 MF=17 ML=19 36/72 n.s. n.s. n.s. 7.25 21.2 14 16
CI.G. 7 MF=12 ML=19 31/72 194 n.s. n.s. 1.5 20.8 19 12
CO.M 13 MF= 34 ML= 31 65/72 10 92 n.s. 8.5 36 20 17
D.B.M. 14 MF=36 ML=36 72/72 48 76 n.s. 13 (p.g.) 31 20 16
FE.M. 14 MF=28 ML=28 56/72 133 303 2 3 21.8 20 15
GU.B. 14 MF=35 ML=34 69/72 238 n.c. 2 3.75 32 20 14
IE.N. 5 MF= 17 MF= 17 34/72 94 n.c. n.s. 5 20.6 20 16
JU.A. 14 MF=15 ML=20 35/72 39 134 2 11.75 29.8 20 17
RA.F. 5 MF= 21 ML= 26 47/72 n.s. n.s. 3 5 18.6 19 11
SA.N. 14 MF=26 ML=29 55/72 94 n.s. n.s. 9.75 28 20 13
ST.V. 14 MF=33 ML=32 65/72 63 n.s. n.s. 4.75 28.9 20 16
ULC. 14 MF=29 ML=28 57/72 n.c. n.s. 0 5 23.5 20 17
VI.N. 10 MF=18 ML=16 34/72 79 n.c. n.s. -- 22 20 17
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APPENDIX 4-III. list of the objects used in experiment 1c.
axe 
bolt and screw 
carpet beater 
cigarette 
coffee mug 
drawing pin
dropping bottle 
fish net 
flywisk
glass 
gun 
hammer 
key 
ladle 
light bulb 
lighter 
lipstick 
liquid soap 
match 
paint brush 
painting roll
pen 
razor 
saw 
screw cap 
spray 
squeegee
tweezers
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Appendix 4.IV. Brain lesions of the patients reported in the single case analysis. Red=area lesioned in all 
patients. Purple=area lesioned in one patient.
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Appendix 4.IV. errors description of the patients in Experiments 1a, 1b and 1c
Patient BE.F
MOT 1
Preparing a letter: he tries to write without opening the pen but then he succeed (conduite). He 
folds the letter in a wrong manner (misuse2). He glues the stamp on the edge of the envelope, like a 
seal (misuse1 and mislocation2, qualitative)
MOT 2
Preparing a letter: he tries to write without opening the pen but then he succeed (conduite). He 
folds the letter in a wrong manner (misuse2).  He glues the stamp on the wrong corner of the 
correct side of the envelope (mislocation2, quantitative)
MOT 3
Preparing a letter: he writes on the sheet keeping it in a landscape orientation (orientation). He 
folds the letter in a wrong manner (misuse2).  He glues the stamp on the wrong corner of the 
correct side of the envelope (mislocation2, quantitative)
MOT 4
Preparing a letter: He folds the letter in a wrong manner (misuse2). He glues the stamp on the 
wrong corner of the correct side of the envelope (mislocation2, quantitative)
MULTI-SCHEMATA OBJECTS
No errors.
SINGLE OBJECTS
Lighter. He blows it out like a candle (misuse1) 
Carpet beater. The movement is very quick (frequency)
 
Patient BU.A
MOT 1
Preparing an Espresso pot. He shows how to pour water in the coffee pot but without eventually 
pouring, although the experimenter repeats that he should actually use the objects (pantomiming 
and step omission). He does not open the coffee box (step omission) and he shows that he would 
pour the coffee from the box without using the spoon (tool omission). 
Preparing an Orange Juice. He opens the squeezer (action addition), he cuts the orange holding 
it in his hand as one would cut an apple (Misuse 2). 
Preparing a Letter. He writes on the paper sheet put in a wrong orientation (orientation), he folds 
the sheet in a wrong manner but he realizes that it does not fit in the envelope, so he folds it again 
(conduite). He glues the external edge of the envelope, on the part where one usually writes the 
sender’s address (Mislocation 2. quantitative error?).
MOT 2
Preparing a Letter. He folds the paper sheet but it does not fit in the envelope, so he folds it again 
but in a wrong manner (action addition), he pretends to use the glue (pantomiming) then when he 
is asked to actually use it, he does not know what to do (perplexity). He glues the external edge of 
the envelope (mislocation 2), he writes on the envelope without opening the pen (step omission).
MULTI-SCHEMATA OBJECTS
Knife + Orange. He cuts the orange holding it in his hand, as it was an apple (Misuse 2).
Knife + Marmalade. He initially shows perplexity, then he drops the marmalade from the knife as 
he was using a spoon (Misuse 1), without spreading it.
Pliers + bolt.  (the bolt  is  presented to the patients screwed in a piece of wood and they are 
supposed to remove it with the pliers. The experimenter holds the piece of wood so that it remains 
still) He grasps and rotates the piece of wood instead of the bolt (Mislocation 2, qualitative error), 
then he unscrews the bolt with his hand (tool omission).
Corkscrew + cork. He holds the corkscrew’s arms while turning the upper part, and they cannot 
lift (clumsiness).
SINGLE OBJECTS
Lighter. He pantomimes the use of the object (pantomiming).
Carpet beater. He grasps the object inappropriately (grasping) and the movement is too narrow 
(frequency)
Ladle. The grasping looks inappropriate.
Tweezers. He shows a movement similar to “cut with a knife” (misuse 1).
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Patient BU.S
MOT 1
Lighting a candle. She scratches the match on the  short external side of the matchbox – the one 
without glasspaper (Mislocation2. quantitative error?)
Preparing coffee. She pours water correctly, she does not put coffee (step omission) and she tries 
to  close  the  moka twisting it  in  the  wrong direction (orientation).  She  realizes  that  there  is  a 
mistake (Conduite) so she unscrew the moka, she wants to pour water from the base to the bottle 
(action addition) without removing the filter (step omission). The experimenter empties the basis 
because the patient expressed the wish to restart. She puts the filter without pouring water (step 
omission) or coffee (step omission), she closes the moka, then she reopens it and she adds coffee 
(conduite) but not water (step omission). She closes the moka.
Preparing orange juice. She attempts to squeeze the orange without cutting it (tool omission and 
step omission), then she self-corrects (conduite) and she attempts to cut the orange by pushing 
instead of sawing (Misuse2). She does not squeeze the orange (step omission) and she does not 
pour juice in the glass (step omission and tool omission).
Preparing a letter to post. She attempts to open the glue by twisting the wrong end (mislocation2 
I think this is a qualitative error because she acts on the wrong part of the object- visually different 
from the correct one). She opens it (conduite), she glues the stamp first (action anticipation) and 
she says she has completed the task (3step omissions, 2 tool omissions). Then she attempts to write 
on the envelope without opening the pen (step omission).
Drinking from a bottle. She uses the bottleopener as a lever (Misuse 1), then she removes the cap 
with her hand (tool omission).
MOT 2
Preparing a letter to post. She writes without opening the pen (step omission), then she opens the 
pen  (conduite)  and  she  writes  on  the  envelope.  She  glues  the  stamp  correctly  (but  action 
anticipation) and she twists the glue cap while closing it (action addition). Then she opens the glue 
and she closes it  (action addition).  She writes again (perseveration)  with the closed pen (step 
omission). She folds the sheet in a wrong manner (Misuse 2), she tries to fit it in the envelope but 
she has to fold it again (conduite), in a wrong manner. Then she puts the sheet in the envelope and 
she licks the envelope to seal it.
Preparing coffee. She pours water correctly, she takes a spoonful of coffee but she goes back to 
the coffee can and takes another spoonful without having poured the first one (perseveration 2). 
The remaining steps are done correctly.
Drinking from a bottle. She removes the cap with the hand (tool omission)
Preparing an orange juice. She attempts to cut the orange by pushing the knife (Misuse2), she 
says that her hand hurts, so the experimenter cuts the orange. She squeezes the half orange with 
her hand, above the squeezer but without twisting it (misuse2).
Lighting  a  candle.  She  cannot  light  the  candle  because  she  scratches  the  match  too  slowly 
(frequency), she puts the unlit match vertically on the top of the candle (action addition), then she 
acts correctly with the correct end of the match close to the wick and she puts the match again 
vertically on the top of the candle (perseveration2, spoiling)
MOT 3
Preparing  orange juice.  She  attempts  to  cut  the orange  by pushing the  knife  (Misuse2).  The 
experimenter cuts the orange. She squeezes the half orange with her hand, above the squeezer but 
without twisting it (misuse2).
 
Preparing coffee. She puts the filter first (action anticipation) and she pours water in the filter. 
she understands that she made an error (conduite) the experimenter empties the pot. This time she 
puts coffee in the filter first (action anticipation) then she removes the filter and pours water in the 
basis (conduite).
Lighting a candle. She scratches the match with a slow movement (frequency)
Drinking from a bottle.  She grasps the bottle opener but she removes the cap with her hand (tool 
omission).  She  puts  the  cap  on  the  bottle  again  and  she  attempts  to  use  the  bottle  opener 
(conduite) but she can only use it as a lever (Misuse 1).
Preparing  a  letter.  She uses  the  pen upside-down (orientation)  and without  opening it  (step 
omission). She folds the sheet correctly and puts it in the envelope. She tries to open the glue by 
twisting the cap instead of pulling it (misuse2), then she twists the wrong end (Mislocation2 again, 
qualitative). She opens the glue (conduite) then she glues the stamp correctly but she does not seal 
the envelope (step omission)
MOT 4
Lighting a candle. She cannot light the match because she scratches too slowly (frequency). She 
performs the task correctly with the unlit match.
Drinking from a bottle.  She uses the bottle opener as  a lever pushing the bottom of  the cap 
(Misuse1). The other steps are correct.
Preparing coffee. She does everything correctly.
Preparing a letter to post. She grasps the pen and she puts it back (action addition). She glues the 
stamp (action anticipation), she attempts to open the pen by twisting it, but it is a pen with button 
(Misuse2).  She folds  the sheet  correctly,  she puts  it  in the envelope but  she does not  seal  the 
envelope (step omission).
Preparing  orange  juice.  She  tries  to  cut  by  pushing  (Misuse2)  but  her  hand  hurts  so  the 
experimenter cuts the orange for her. She squeezes the orange on the top of the squeezer,  but 
without twisting the orange (misuse 2)
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Patient CI.G
MOT 1
Lighting a candle. He tries to verbally explain what he would do with the objects (but Wernicke’s 
aphasia).  He  brings  the  matchbox  near  the  candlestick,  then  brings  the  candle  close  to  the 
candlestick (toying), without actually  doing the actions.  He refuses to perform the task (3 step 
omissions, 1 tool omission)
Drinking from a bottle. He opens the cap correctly then he shows (perplexity). The experimenter 
encourages him and he terminates the task correctly
Preparing coffee. He shows (perplexity) at the beginning. He puts water in the bottom part of the 
moka correctly, then he puts the filter correctly. He takes the upper part of the moka and pretends 
to pour from this to the filter (action addition). He puts it down, then he puts correctly coffee in the 
filter. He takes again the upper part of the moka and pretends to pour from this to the filter (action 
addition). He wants to seal the moka correctly, but he does not succeed because of (clumsiness)
Preparing a letter. He places the stamp on the envelope without gluing it (step omission). He 
attempts to write with the glue (misuse 1). He folds the sheet correctly, he puts it in the envelope 
but he does not seal the envelope (step omission) and he writes the address with the pen.
Preparing orange juice. no errors
MOT 2
Lighting a candle. He puts the candle on the candlestick. He lights the lighter correctly. Then he 
lifts  the candle (action addition) and put the lit  match near  the candlestick  (mislocation1).  He 
blows the match and puts the candle back in the candlestick.
Drinking  from  a  bottle.  He  attempts  to  open  the  cap  with  the  wrong  end  of  the  opener 
(mislocation2, quantitative). Then he self-correct (conduite).
Preparing Italian coffee. He pours water and the filter correctly. He pours coffee in the filter by 
pouring from the can, without using the spoon (tool omission). Then he grasps the spoon without 
using it  (action addition), seals the moka correctly. At the end he opens and closes the lid of the 
moka (acrion addition)
Preparing a letter. No errors
Preparing orange juice. the task is done correctly but at the end he stirs the juice with the knife 
(misuse1 and action addition)
MOT 3
Lighting a candle. No errors
Drinking from a bottle. No errors
Preparing Italian coffee. He first puts coffee (action anticipation) in the bottom part of the moka 
(mislocation1). He adds water and puts the filter, he seals the moka correctly.
Preparing a letter. He writes on the sheet with the glue (misuse1). Then he understand the error 
and he takes the pen, but he wirites without opening it (step omission). He folds and puts the sheet 
in the envelope correctly. He attempts to write the address with the glue (misuse 1), he glues the 
stamp. He does not seal the envelope (step omission).
 
Preparing orange juice. he does not cut the orange in half. He cuts only a tiny part of the orange 
skin (mislocation2, quantitative) and he attempts to squeeze the whole orange. the rest is correct 
(he pantomimes the actions of pouring the juice in the glass and drinking)
MOT 4
Lighting a candle. No errors
Drinking from a bottle. No errors
Preparing Italian coffee. He first puts coffee (action anticipation) in the bottom part of the moka 
(mislocation1). He adds water and puts the filter, he seals the moka correctly.
Preparing a letter. He writes on the sheet, folds it and put it in the envelope correctly. He glues 
the stamp with the glue but he does not twist the glue in order to make it work (step omission). He 
does not seal the envelope (step omission).
Preparing orange juice. he does not cut the orange in half but he cuts only a tiny part of the 
orange skin (mislocation2, quantitative) and he attempts to squeeze the whole orange. The rest is 
correct (he pantomimes the actions of pouring the juice in the glass and drinking)
MULTI-SCHEMATA OBJECTS
Pliers + nail. He twists the nail (misuse 2)
Corkscrew + crown cap. He puts the corkscrew on top of the bottle, as with a cork (misuse 2)
Corkscrew + cork. He attempts to remove the cork with the hand (tool omission) then he uses the 
tool correctly, but before pulling out the cork he twists the tool (action addition)
Knife + marmalade. He uses it like a teaspoon, bringing it to the mouth (misuse1)
Knife + cheese. He cuts by sawing (misuse 2)
SINGLE OBJECTS
Axe. He moves it on the horizontal axis but the blade is facing down (orientation)
Dropping bottle. He cannot open it, he pantomimes the action (pantomiming)
Match. (perplexity)
Ladle. First (toying 2) then he shows the use but with an incorrect (grasping)
Makeup brush. He uses it like a brush for shaving foam (misuse1)
Tweezers. He uses them on the nails, like scissors (misuse1)
Fish net. He moves it in the air (frequency, timing and orientation)
Lipstick. He does not remove the cap (step omission)
Liquid soap. He pours as if it was a bottle (misuse1)
Flywhisk. He uses it as carpet beater (misuse 1)
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Patient CO.M
MOT 2
Preparing a Letter to post. He folds the sheet in a wrong manner for that particular envelope, 
then he corrects the action (conduite), he does not use the glue (tool omission) and he closes the 
envelope by licking it.
MOT 3
Preparing an espresso pot. He stirs the coffee in the box before putting it in the coffee pot (action 
addition). 
MOT 4
Preparing an Orange juice. He cuts the orange in two halves correctly but he does not completely 
separate them (step omission), so he squeezes one half while the other one is still joint.
MULTI-SCHEMATA OBJECTS
Knife + cheese. He cuts the cheese by sawing (Misuse 2)
SINGLE OBJECTS
Gun. He tries to shoot by pulling the hammer with his thumb (Mislocation 2 the action is correct 
but it’s done on a completely wrong part of the target object= qualitative error ), then he succeeds 
(conduite). 
 
Patient D.B.M
MOT 1
Preparing  a  letter. She  folds  the  letter  in  two,  then  she  realizes  that  it  would  not  fit  in  the 
envelope and she folds it correctly (conduite)
MOT 2
No errors
MOT 3
No errors 
MOT 4
No errors 
MULTI-SCHEMATA OBJECTS
Teaspoon + ice cream cup. She stirs (misuse2)
SINGLE OBJECTS
Carpet beater. She uses it like a tennis racket (misuse1)
Fishing net. She uses it like a butterfly net (misuse1)
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Patient FE.M
MOT 2
Preparing a Letter. She does not use the pen to write the address on the envelope (tool omission 
and step omission)
MOT 3
Preparing a Letter. She does not use the pen (Tool omission and step omission). She glues the 
stamp on the bottom of the envelope instead than on the top (Mislocation 2, quantitative error).
MOT 4
Drinking  from  a  Bottle.  She  does  not  pour  the  water  in  the  glass  (step  omission and  tool 
omission).
Preparing a Letter. She glues the stamp as first step (action anticipation), she does not use the 
pen (Tool omission and step omission). 
MULTI-SCHEMATA OBJECTS
Pliers  and bolt.  She  does  not  use  the  pliers  and she  removes  the  bolt  using  the  hand (tool 
omission).
Corkscrew and cork. She attempts to remove the cork with her hands (tool omission).
SINGLE OBJECTS
Fishing net. She uses it like a butterfly net (Misuse 1).
Liquid soap. She pours the soap, as it was a bottle (Misuse 1).
 
Patient GU.B
MOT 1
Making an Orange Juice. She cuts the orange in two (correct) but then she cuts one half in two 
parts (perseveration or action addition), she does not use the glass (tool omission)
Preparing a Letter to post. She does not glue the stamp (step omission), she does not recognize 
the glue (tool omission).
MOT 2
Preparing a Letter to post. She glues the stamp at the beginning of the sequence instead than at 
the end (action anticipation).
MOT 3
Preparing  a  Letter  to  post.  She  glues  the  stamp  at  the  beginning  of  the  sequence  (action 
anticipation), she does not recognize the glue and she uses it as if it was an eraser (Misuse 1).
MOT4
Preparing  a  Letter  to  post.  She  glues  the  stamp  at  the  beginning  of  the  sequence  (action 
anticipation), she does not use the glue (step omission and tool omission).
MULTI-SCHEMATA OBJECTS
Corkscrew + cork. She twists the corkscrew anticlockwise instead of clockwise, then she does the 
action correctly (conduite).
Corkscrew + crown cap. She attempts to use the corkscrew as if she is opening a cork (Misuse 2), 
then she tries to lift the cap using the curly part of the corkscrew as a lever instead of using its 
upper part (Mislocation 2, qualitative error).
Knife + marmalade. She attempts to use the knife as a lever to open the cap of the jar (Misuse 1).
SINGLE OBJECTS
Makeup brush. She uses it on the table (mislocation 1, I think that mislocation1 are all qualitative 
errors), as a paintbrush (misuse 1).
Flywhisk. She shows perplexity but eventually she uses it correctly (conduite.
Knife. She uses it correctly after several attempts (conduite).
Light bulb. She uses it correctly after several attempts (conduite).
Lipstick. She pantomimes the use of the object (pantomiming), and then she uses it correctly 
(conduite).
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Patient IE.N
MOT 1
Drinking  from  a  bottle.  She  removes  the  cap  with  her  hand  (tool  omission).  After  several 
attempts she uses the bottle-opener in a wrong manner, as if she was opening with another type of 
tool16 (misuse 1). She manages to open the cap, and then she pours correctly and drinks correctly
Preparing  coffee.  She first  put  the  filter  (step omission).  She  pours  the  coffee  from the  can 
without using the spoon (tool omission).
Preparing a letter to post. She does not click the pen button in order to use it (step omission). She 
shows clumsiness in using the pen with left and right hand. She pretends to use the glue on the 
external edge of the envelope (mislocation2), without actually gluing it (toying). She just lays the 
stamp on the envelope (step omission)
Preparing orange juice. She puts the whole orange on the squeezer (action anticipation), she tries 
to cut with her index finger (body-part-as-tool), then she sees the knife, she takes it, she cuts the 
orange in a wrong orientation. She squeezes the orange correctly. She drinks from the empty glass 
(action anticipation), then she pours the juice and she drinks again (conduite)
MOT 2
Drinking from a bottle. She attempts to use the bottle opener as if she was opening with another 
type of tool (misuse 1). The rest is done correctly.
Preparing coffee. She pours water and she puts the filter, then she closes the moka without putting 
coffee (step omission and action anticipation). She opens the coffee can, she takes the spoon and 
she stirs the grounded coffee in the can (action addition)
Preparing  a  letter  to  post.  She  folds  the  sheet  in  a  wrong  manner  (misuse2),  she  glues  the 
external part of the edge of the envelope (mislocation2). The rest is correct.
 
MOT 3
P  reparing a letter to post  . She folds the sheet correctly, she glues the external part of the edge of 
the envelope (mislocation2). She lays the stamp on the envelope without gluing it (step omission). 
She is extremely clumsy in using the pen.
MOT 4
Drinking  from  a  bottle.  She  uses  the  bottle  opener  by  pushing  under  the  cap  like  a  lever 
(misuse1). The rest is correct.
16 This the kind of bottle opener used in the task, but the patient makes an action more appropriate to 
this kind of opener 
 
Preparing coffee. She adds water and puts the filter, then she pours coffee in the filter directly 
form the can (tool omission). At the end she uses the spoon but to remove the exceeding coffee 
from the edge of the moka (action addition).
Preparing a letter to post. She lays the stamp on the sheet (action addition). She writes on the 
envelope (but she is agraphic), she glues the pictured side of the stamp (mislocation2). She glues 
the envelope correctly. She does not fold the sheet, she does not put it in the envelope and she does 
not seal the envelope (3 step omissions)
Preparing orange juice. She cuts the orange by pushing although she had started the movement 
correctly (misuse 2 and spoiling). The rest is correct.
MULTI-SCHEMATA OBJECTS
Corkscrew + crown cap: clumsy but correct
Corkscrew + cork: she puts the corkscrew on top of the cork. She lifts and lowers the arms of the 
corkscrew without succeeding.
Toothpick alone: she moves it orizontally close to the mouth, like a toothbrush (misuse1)
Knife + marmalade: she stirs in the marmalade; the experimenter asks her to pretend to have a 
slice of bread in her hand: she stirs on the imagined slice of bread (misuse2)
SINGLE OBJECTS
Axe: wrong orientation, timing and grasping
Carpet beater: the orientation is wrong, but the rest is correct
Dropping bottle: first she squeezes the rubber part (action anticipation) then she opens the cap, 
she does not squeeze the rubber in order to make the drops go out (step omission)
Matchstick: the movement is correct but she execute it on her cheek (mislocation1)
Light bulb: wrong grasping, she rotates the arm in the air without moving the wrist (frequency? 
Timing?)
Hammer: wrong orientation (with the thinner part hitting on the nail)
Tweezers: the movement is similar to a razor, performed on the cheek and not pinching on the 
object (misuse1)
Drawing pin: she starts  toying with the object; she performs an unrecognizable movement just 
moving the pin near to the table surface
Razor:  the  movement  is  clumsy.  She  moves  the  razor  on  a  horizontal  axis  rather  than 
perpendicularly to the blade (orientation?)
Lipstick: the movement is too wide, reaching the cheeks (mislocation or frequency?)
Painting roll: the grasping is upside-down, the movement is correct
Flywhisk: she moves it in the air (normal subjects usually flap it on the table or on a surface): 
mislocation 1
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Saw: the orientation axis is parallel to the patient’s chest, rather than perpendicular
Spray: (presented after the gun) she makes a perseveration like trying to pull the gun’s hammer
 
 Patient JU.A
MOT
No errors.
MULTI-SCHEMATA OBJECTS
No errors.
SINGLE OBJECTS
Dropping bottle. He tries to pour from the sealed dropper (action omission) similarly to a bottle 
(Misuse 1).
Makeup brush. He uses it on his hand (Misuse 2).
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Patient RA.F
MOT 1
Drinking from a bottle. She does not use the bottle opener, she removes the cap with her hand 
(Step Omission + Tool Omission)
Making an Orange juice. She peels the orange (action addition) with her hand (tool omission), 
she opens the squeezer (action addition) before squeezing the orange
Preparing a Letter. She does not put glue on the envelope (step omission) but she uses the glue 
for the stamp.
MOT 2
Lighting a Candle. She lights the match before putting the candle on the candle-holder (action 
anticipation). The correct sequence would have been to put the candle on the holder first, then 
light the match, otherwise the match could burn your fingers while you make the other steps (but 
this is arbitrary).
Drinking from a bottle. She does not use the bottle opener, she removes the cap with her hand 
(Step Omission + Tool Omission)
Making an Orange juice. She peels the orange (action addition) and she opens it with her hand 
(tool omission),  she  opens  the  squeezer  (action addition)  before  pantomiming the  use  of  the 
squeezer, she does not use the glass (tool omission)
Preparing a Letter. She does not seal the envelope (step omission)
MOT 3
Drinking from a bottle. She does not use the bottle opener; she removes the cap with her hand 
(Step Omission + Tool Omission)
Making an Orange juice. She does everything correctly but she grasps the squeezer in a wrong 
manner (grasping error).
Preparing a Letter. She does not seal the envelope (step omission), she does not glue the stamp 
(step omission), and she tries to glue the stamp with the wrong end of the glue (Misuse2).
MOT 4
Drinking from a bottle. She does not use the bottle opener; she removes the cap with her hand 
(Step Omission + Tool Omission).
Making an Orange juice. She cuts away the bottom of the orange (action addition), she peels it 
(action  addition),  she  uses  the  knife  with  the  blade  upside-down (orientation),  she  holds  the 
squeezer in a wrong way (grasping)
Preparing a letter to post. She does not seal the envelope (step omission), she attempts to use the 
glue upside-down but she eventually succeed in gluing the stamp (conduite).
MULTI-SCHEMATA OBJECTS
Corkscrew + cork. She uncorks the bottle with her hand (tool omission) saying that the corkscrew 
has nothing to do with the task. She grasps the corkscrew and looks a t it (perplexity), toying with 
the object (toying 2).
 
Pliers + nail. She is perplex about what to do (perplexity), she toys with the pliers (toying 2) and 
she does not remove the nail from the wood (step omission).
Knife + cheese. She cuts the cheese by sawing (Misuse 2)
Spoon and coffee pot. She succeds after several attempts (conduite).
Corkscrew and cork. She removes the cork with her hand (tool omission)
Pliers and bolt. She pulls the bolt with the pliers, the same movement that should be used for a 
nail (Misuse 2)
Spoon and sugar jar. She brings the spoon to the mouth (Misuse 2).
SINGLE OBJECTS
Axe. She show perplexity before using it correctly (perplexity).
Razor. She uses it as a knife (Misuse 1).
Flywhisk. She shows perplexity.
Soap dispenser. She uses it as a spray (misuse 1).
Spray. She uses it as a soap dispenser (Misuse 1 but also perseveration, as the dispenser was the 
previous item).
Makeup brush. She shows perplexity.
Squeegee. She shows perplexity and she toys with the object (toying 2).
Painting roll. She shows perplexity and she toys with the object (toying 2).
Hammer. She uses the tool in a wrong orientation (orientation).
Dropping bottle. She uses it as a perfume spray, pushing the cap with her index finger (misuse 1), 
then she tries to open it  but she unscrews the rubber part  of the cap instead of the hard part 
(Mislocation 2, quantitative error).
Gun. She pantomimes the use of the gun without actually shooting (pantomiming), she toys with 
the object (toying 1).
Lighter. She pushes on the button but not on the flint (mislocation 2, quantitative error?).
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Patient SA.N
MOT 1
Drinking  from a  bottle.  She  handle  the  bottle  opener  with  perplexity  (perplexity),  then  she 
removes the cap with the hand (tool omission)
Preparing orange juice. She squeezes the orange above the squeezer, like a half-lemon (misuse1)
Preparing a letter. She does not seal the envelope (step omission), she does not use the glue (tool 
omission), she does not open the pen before using it (step omission)
MOT 2
Drinking from a bottle. She removes the cap with the hand (tool omission)
Preparing  espresso.  She assembles  the  moka  without  coffee  (step omission)  and water  (step 
omission). Then she redo everything correctly (conduite)
Preparing orange juice. She squeezes the orange above the squeezer, like a half-lemon (misuse1)
Preparing a letter. She does not seal the envelope (step omission), she does not open the pen 
before using it (step omission)
MOT 3 
Preparing a letter. She does not seal the envelope (step omission)
MOT 4
Preparing a letter. She does not seal the envelope (step omission)
MULTI-SCHEMATA OBJECTS
Corkscrew + cork. She does not lower the levers of the corkscrew (step omission)
Teaspoon + sugar. She eats like an ice cream (misuse2)
Corkscrew + crown cap. She puts the corkscrew on top of the bottle, as for a cork (misuse2)
Knife + jam. She eats like with a spoon (misuse2)
SINGLE OBJECTS
Dropping bottle. She does not press on the rubber part (step omission)
Makeup brush. She brushes the table and her chest (mislocation1, qualitative error)
Fishing net. She does correctly after few attempts (conduite)
 
Patient ST.V
MOT 1
Preparing orange juice. He cuts the orange by pushing (misuse2), he squeezes the orange above 
the squeezer, like a half-lemon (misuse1)
Preparing a letter. He licks the stamp and he sticks it as first action (action anticipation). He 
folds the letter in a wrong manner (misuse2). He does not use the glue (tool omission)
MOT 2
Preparing espresso. He puts the water but not the coffee (step omission)
Preparing orange juice. He cuts the orange by pushing (misuse2). he squeezes the orange above 
the squeezer, like a half-lemon (misuse1)
Preparing a letter. He folds the letter in a wrong manner (misuse2). 
MOT 3
Preparing orange juice. He cuts the orange by pushing (misuse2). he squeezes the orange above 
the squeezer, like a half-lemon (misuse1)
Preparing a letter. He licks the stamp and he sticks it as first action (action anticipation). He folds 
the letter in a wrong manner (misuse2).
MOT 4
Preparing orange juice. He squeezes the orange above the squeezer, like a half-lemon (misuse1)
Preparing a letter. He licks the stamp and he sticks it as first action (action anticipation).  He 
folds the letter in a wrong manner (misuse2).
MULTI-SCHEMATA OBJECTS
Corkscrew + crown cap. He holds the corkscrew in a wrong orientation (orientation)
Toothpick + olive. He eats the olive (utilization behaviour?)
Teaspoon + sugar. He lift the sugar but does not pour it (step omission)
Knife + jam. He eats like with a spoon (misuse1)
SINGLE OBJECTS
Key. The movement is too wide (frequency)
Drawing pin. He perseverates with the movement for key (perseveration)
Soap dispenser. He uses it like a body deodorant (misuse1)
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Patient ULC.
MOT 1
Drinking  from  a  bottle.  He  shows  the  opening  action  without  actually  performing  it 
(pantomiming),  then he puts down the bottle opener and he pours without opening the bottle 
(step omission)
Preparing coffee. He seals the moka without putting water (step omission) and coffee 
(step omission). Then, after solicitation, he pretends to put coffee (pantomiming) but in 
the upper part of the moka (mislocation 2, qualitative error)
Preparing a  letter.  He puts  all  the objects  on top of  each other,  without  using them (4 step 
omissions)
MOT 2
Preparing a letter. He attempts to write without pushing the pen button (step omission), he folds 
the sheet in two but it cannot fit in the envelope, so hoe folds it again (conduite) but in an incorrect 
manner  (misuse2).  Then  he  glues  the  stamp  on  the  side  with  the  picture  (mislocation2, 
quantitative or quantitative??) and he self-correct (conduite). He glues the stamp in the wrong side 
of the envelope (mislocation 2, qualitative). He does not seal the envelope (step omission), he does 
not write on the envelope (step omission), he does not use the pen at all (tool omission).
Preparing italian coffee. He pours too much water (action addition)
Preparing Orange Juice. He squeezes the orange with the hand, above the squeezer but without 
putting the orange on the squeezer, as a lemon (misuse1 ?).
MOT 3
Preparing orange juice. He squeezes the orange with the hand, above the squeezer but without 
putting the orange on the squeezer, as a lemon (misuse1 ?).
Preparing italian coffee. He pours too much water (action addition)
Preparing a letter. He does not push the pen button (step omission), he folds the sheet in an 
appropriate manner (misuse 2). He does not seal the envelope (step omission), he glues the stamp 
on the wrong side of the envelope (mislocation2,  qualitative), he does not write on the envelope 
(step omission)
MOT 4
Preparing a letter. He folds the sheet in a wrong manner (misuse2). He does not write on the 
sheet nor on the envelop (tool omission and step omission). He glues the stamp on the wrong side 
of the envelope (mislocation2, qualitative)
Preparing orange juice. He squeezes the orange with the hand, above the squeezer but without 
putting the orange on the squeezer, as a lemon (misuse1 ?).
Drinking from a bottle. He does not use the bottle opener (tool omission) and he pours without 
opening the bottle (step omission)
MULTI-SCHEMATA OBJECTS
Coffee cup + teaspoon: he pretends to eat something from the cup (misuse2)
 
Toothpick: he pretends to eat an olive (misuse2)
Corkscrew + crown cap: he attempts to use the corkscrew like with a cork (misuse 2)
Knife + jam: he uses the knife to eat, as a spoon (misuse 1)
SINGLE OBJECTS
Tweezers: he uses on his fingernails (misuse2)
Cigarette: he breaks it in two parts (toying1)
Dropping bottle: he does not open it (step omission), he pretends to pour from it like a bottle 
(misuse1)
Flywhisk: he uses it like a ladle (misuse 1)
Makeup brush: he paints the table (misuse 1)
Lighter: he holds it in a wrong manner, twisting the lever in the wrong direction (orientation)
Soap dispenser: he pours on the table (misuse1)
Carpet beater: uses like a ladle (misuse1)
Saw: wrong grasping (grasping)
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Patient VI.N
MOT 1
Preparing a Letter. She folds the paper sheet in a way that would be correct for a smaller envelope 
(Misuse 2).
MOT 2
Preparing a Letter. She writes on the paper sheet in a wrong orientation (orientation), she folds 
the paper sheet in a way that would be correct for a smaller envelope (Misuse 2). 
MOT 3
Preparing a Letter. She folds the paper sheet in a way that would be correct for a smaller envelope 
(Misuse 2). She does not open the pen used to write (step omission).
Preparing Orange juice. She initially grasps the knife in a wrong manner (grasping) then she 
does everything correctly.
MOT 4
Lighting a Candle. She pretends to light the match (pantomiming)
Drinking from a Bottle. She does not use the bottle-opener properly (misuse 1)
Preparing a Letter. She tries to use the glue without removing the cap (step omission), she uses 
the pen upside-down (orientation). 
MULTI-SCHEMATA OBJECTS
Corkscrew + cork. She tries to remove the cork with her hand (tool omission), then she pushes 
the corkscrew in the cork without twisting (action omission), finally she twists the bottle instead of 
the corkscrew (Mislocation 2, qualitative error).
Knife + cheese. She uses the knife with the blade upside-down (orientation).
Pliers + bolt. She uses the pliers with the same movement as a can opener (Misuse 1), then she 
uses her hand to remove the bolt (tool omission) and she finally succeeds (conduite)
Corkscrew + crown cap. She initially uses the corkscrew in a wrong orientation (orientation) then 
she corrects the action (conduite)
Knife + marmalade.  She picks  up the marmalade with the knife  but she does not  spread it 
(action omission) and she brings the knife to the mouth (Misuse 1).
Spoon + sugar. She does not put the spoon in the pot to pick up sugar, (action omission), but she 
just brings the spoon to the mouth (Misuse 2)
SINGLE OBJECTS
Lighter. She pushes the button without pushing the flint (misuse 2).
Match. She pretends to blow it but not to light it (Misuse 2).
 
Light bulb. She grasps the wrong end, then she pretends to screw it upside-down (grasping and 
orientation), the movement ha an inappropriate timing (frequency).
Hammer. She uses it in a wrong orientation (orientation).
Makeup brush. She brings to the face the brush in a wrong orientation.
Tweezers. She brings it to her head like a hairpin (Misuse 1).
Liquid soap. She pours from it like a bottle (Misuse 1).
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Chapter V
General Discussion
The objective of the studies I presented was to directly address a recent divergence in 
theoretical claims that have been made with respect to the relationship between action 
systems  and conceptual  knowledge  about  actions  and objects.  On the  basis  of  patient 
group  studies,  imaging  and  psychophysical  results,  it  has  been  argued  that  motor 
production processes involved in using objects are critically involved in recognizing those 
same objects (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005) and in recognizing and imitating object associated 
pantomimes (Buxbaum et al., 2005). On the other hand, the theoretical claims based on 
single case dissociations hold that recognizing objects and actions does not require the 
reenactment of sensory-motor representations. Such different views may critically depend 
on the  type  of  approach  used:  single  case  dissociations  or  group analysis.  While  both 
theoretical frameworks can explain the group patterns of correlations across tasks, single 
case dissociations are predicted only by those models which postulate a certain modularity 
of the system, such as the IPM and the SAS/CS .
In order to address this divergence, in Chapter II, I carried out analyses at both the group 
and the single case level in a sample of 37 brain damaged patients considering four tasks: 
action imitation, action recognition, object use and object recognition. We reproduced the 
associations  at  the  group  level  that  have  been  previously  reported,  as  well  as  the 
dissociations  at  the  single  case  level  that  are  critical  for  cognitive  neuropsychological 
methods (Shallice, 1988). Indeed, at the group level there were significant correlations (see 
 
also Buxbaum et al., 2005) between pantomime recognition and pantomime imitation, and 
between pantomime recognition and object  use.  These  correlations have  served as the 
basis for the argument from neuropsychological data that action production processes are 
constitutively involved in action recognition. However, within our group of patients, we 
also observed individual cases whose performance profiles are problematic for the Motor 
Theories  of  Action  and  Object  Recognition.  First,  patients  were  observed  who  were 
impaired for object use but relatively unimpaired for action recognition,  as well  as the 
reverse. Second, patients were observed who were impaired for object use but relatively 
unimpaired for object recognition, as well as the reverse. Third, one patient was observed 
who was impaired for imitating pantomimes, but was relatively unimpaired for recognizing 
pantomimes and using objects. Such results are quite in disagreement with the embodied 
view,  which  postulates  common  neural  and  cognitive  mechanisms  to  recognition  and 
production of actions and object-related concepts.
In Chapter III, on the basis of single case analyses of two apraxic patients and two patients 
with  semantic  impairments,  I  have  found  that  the  former  had  intact  fine-grained 
knowledge  of  the  object  that  they  failed  to  use,  whereas  the  latter  could  use  objects 
properly for which conceptual knowledge was lost. Based on these data, I have argued that 
motor production processes associated with object use are not necessary for  successful 
object  and  action  recognition,  and  that  the  loss  of  semantic  visual  and  functional 
knowledge of tools does not affect significantly the ability to use them. Results support a 
separability of the “what” and “how” systems, in line with cognitive neuropsychological 
models  that  argue  for  a  separate  semantic  system as  well  as  input  and output  action 
systems (that we called IPM, Independent Praxeme Models, see also Heilman and Rothi, 
2003). 
In general, IPM models can account for dissociations between components within the 
praxis system. However, it has been shown that in those patients which show a selective 
disruption in action production, there may be qualitative differences between the error 
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profiles in the use of common objects (Rumiati et al., 2001). In Chapter IV, I have reported 
a  neuropsychological  study that  assesses,  in  particular,  the validity  of  a  computational 
model  of  routine  action production,  namely  the  Contention Scheduling  Model.  Such a 
model not only postulates the distinction between action and conceptual knowledge, but it 
provides an essential distinction is also able to account for qualitative differences in the 
error profiles of apraxic patients (Cooper, 2007). In order to test the predictions of this 
model,  I  have  tested  15  left  brain  damaged  patients  on  their  ability  to  use  objects  in 
complex or simple tasks, as well as their fine-grained knowledge about those objects and 
their ability to associate action schemata to the corresponding objects. Dissociations at the 
single case level suggest not only that the action production systems are dissociable from 
object representations (as seen before), but also that the action production deficits may be 
affected by brain damage in qualitatively different ways, and that the classical object use 
tests used in clinical  practice  are not  sufficient  to individuate  the locus of  the damage 
within the action production system. In particular,  it  is  possible to find disconnections 
between the ability to activate the correct object representation starting from the action 
schemata  in  the  presence  of  intact  connections  in  the  other  direction,  and vice  versa. 
Furthermore, the object representation network of the CS model does not overlap with the 
whole  semantic  memory.  It  is  meant  to encode action-relevant  object features,  and its 
neural  bases are  putatively  based in the frontoparietal  structures activated during SRC 
experiments (Grèzes et al., 2003).
The separation between action and conceptual system
As outlined above, in this thesis I have shown that actions and concepts representation are 
relatively  independent  processes  that  can  be  selectively  impaired  after  brain  damage. 
Considering the anatomical substrates of such processes, the relative separability of motor 
and semantic information about tools has also been supported by neuroimaging studies 
investigating their neural bases in human healthy adults (for reviews, see Johnson-Frey, 
 
2004,  and  Lewis  2006).  At  least  three  cortical  areas  have  been  implicated  in  the 
representation of man-made objects/tools (Martin and Caramazza, 2003; Damasio et al., 
2001):  the left ventral precentral gyrus in the frontal  lobe (or ventral  premotor cortex, 
VPMC), the left posterior parietal cortex in the region of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), and 
the posterior middle temporal gyrus (PMTG) either in the left hemisphere or bilaterally. 
Each of these areas seem to represent different features of object-related information. In a 
PET  study  subjects  were  asked  to  make  judgments  about  the  actions  and  functions 
associated with manipulable man-made objects contrasted with non manipulable objects 
(Kellenbach, Brett, and Patterson, 2003). Neither the left VPMC nor the PMTG were found 
to  be  selective  for  tool  stimuli,  although  both  regions  responded  more  strongly  to 
manipulable objects. The IPS, however, showed a clear selectivity for explicit  retrieval of  
action  information about  manipulable  objects.  A  comparable  activation  in  the  left 
posterior and inferior parietal cortex in 14 healthy subjects was found in another recent 
PET study (Rumiati et al., 2004), where the subjects had to produce a wide range of skilled 
actions  triggered  by  objects  and  effects  of  low-level  perceptual,  motor,  semantic,  and 
lexical processes were controlled. More importantly, the inferior posterior parietal region 
was found activated in the interaction term of the study of Rumiati et al. (-52; -44; +46). 
This area roughly corresponds to the supramarginal gyrus in  Brodmann area 40, that is 
lesioned in both DR and FG, described in study 3A and in Rumiati et al (2001). Thus, the 
activation in the IPS found in the study of Kellenbach  et al. (2003) may reflect implicit 
activation of sensory-motor transformations specific to individual object-types which have 
been explicitly triggered in the study of Rumiati et al. (2004). Similarly, Moll et al. (2000) 
found  an  activation  of  left  Posterior  Parietal  Cortex  (PPC)  and  IPS  when  subjects 
pantomimed or imagined tool-use gestures, as opposed to performing meaningless finger 
and limb movements. 
In  general,  all  these  findings  are  in  contrast  with  the  strong  embodied  views  that 
attribute  a  causal  role  of  the  motor  knowledge in  the processing of  concrete (but  also 
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abstract,  in  some  views)  concepts.  More  plausibly,  we  think  that  the  sensory-motor 
systems may play a critical role in the acquisition of concepts and perhaps, in some way, 
they  drive  the  organization  of  visual  knowledge  in  the  ventral  stream,  computed  over 
similarity metrics that also include motor features (see Mahon et al., 2007). However, the 
dorsal stream (here conceived as “how” system, extending the notion of “where” system) 
can  still  operate  efficiently  when  the  ventral  stream  is  damaged,  and  the  opposite 
dissociation is found too.
What is the Role of Motor Simulation in Action and Object Recognition?
In Chapters I and II, I proposed an operational definition of ‘motor simulation’: motor 
simulation refers to the automatic activation of motor production processes in the course 
of recognizing actions and objects. I chose this construal of the term ‘motor simulation’ 
because  it  is  theoretically  neutral  regarding  whether  or  not  the  activation  of  motor 
production  processes  is  necessary  in  order  for  successful  recognition  of  actions  and 
manipulable objects to occur. According to this construal, the Motor Theories of Action 
and Object Recognition can each be decomposed into two separate assumptions. The first 
assumption, common to both hypotheses, is that observation of an action or a manipulable 
object  automatically  activates  the motor  system of  the observer  (for  discussion of  this 
‘direct matching hypothesis’ as it applies to the Motor Theory of Action Recognition, see 
Prinz, 1997, Greenwald, 1970; Rizzolatti et al., 2001).  The second assumption shared by 
the Motor Theories of Action and Object Recognition is that the activation of the motor 
system is required (i.e. necessary) for successful recognition of actions and manipulable 
objects. The validity of drawing a distinction between these two theoretical assumptions 
obtains only in the measure to which substance can be given to the notion of ‘automatic’ as 
opposed to ‘necessary’ activation.
As reviewed in Chapter I, there is a wealth of empirical data supporting the view that the 
motor  system is  ‘automatically’  engaged when observers  view actions and manipulable 
 
objects.  The Motor Theories of Action and Object Recognition are theories about the ways 
in which stimuli are processed, in that they claim that motor relevant information must be 
retrieved in order for successful recognition to occur. The neuropsychological  data that 
have been reported and reviewed herein indicate that motor production processes are not 
necessary for successful recognition of either actions or objects.  This conclusion sets in a 
new light the (undisputed) empirical fact that motor regions are automatically activated in 
tasks in which the retrieval  of motor information is not necessary.  In other words, the 
question  is  not:  What  role  do  motor  production  processes  play  in  action  and  object 
recognition? A more basic question is: Why would there be activation of the motor system 
if that activation is not causally involved in the task?
To this point, discussions of the role of production processes in recognition have been 
very general (Buxbaum, Kyle, and Menon, 2005; Cubelli et al., 2000; Gallese and Lakoff 
2005;  Helbig,  Graf,  and  Kiefer,  2006;  Johnson-Frey,  2004;  Kellenbach  et  al.,  2003; 
Mahon and Caramazza, 2005; Martin et al., 2000; Pulvermüller, 2005; Rosci et al., 2003; 
Rothi et al., 1991). This generality respects our current knowledge in that it is not obvious 
how  the  term  ‘recognition’  should  be  intended  when  discussing  action  and  object 
recognition.  The  way  in  which  the  term  ‘recognition’  is  used  may  imply  various 
commitments about the nature of the information that is required in order to accurately 
recognize (i.e., categorize) objects for use, and/or accurately identify objects for naming. 
One way in which we might be able to get some traction on this issue is by articulating the 
processes that are implicated by the term ‘recognition’.  How is it  possible to observe a 
patient who is impaired at recognizing objects (e.g., for naming or conceptual judgments) 
but who can nevertheless use the objects correctly? Such dissociations suggest that the 
term  ‘recognition’  may  fractionate  into  ‘recognition  for  use’  and  ‘recognition  for 
naming/conceptual access’.
Previous authors have proposed the IPM (Rothi et al., 1991; Cubelli et al., 2000) in which 
separate processes mediate action production, action recognition, and object recognition. 
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Left unspecified, however, this model is not satisfactory in that it provides no explanation 
of the fact that the motor system (e.g., output praxemes) is activated in tasks in which such 
activation would not apparently be required. For instance, naming pictures of manipulable 
objects differentially activates premotor and posterior parietal structures (e.g., Martin and 
Chao,  2001).   However,  the  single  case  analyses  suggest  that  such  activation  is  not 
necessary. The IPM, in its strongest ‘disembodied’ form, provides no natural explanation 
of why there would be such activation. A further assumption would have to be made in 
order to explain why motor production processes are activated in task irrelevant situations 
when  observers  view  actions  or  manipulable  objects.   With  this  model,  such  motor 
activation would be taken to be informative of the dynamics of activation flow throughout 
the system.
For discussion, let us assume a set of assumptions regarding the dynamics of activation 
flow  throughout  the  cognitive  system  that  collectively  explain  the  activation  of  motor 
processes  when observers  view actions and manipulable  objects.  Even so,  the ultimate 
reason for such an architecture would remain unresolved: it would remain unaddressed as 
to what purpose is served by such ‘automatic’ spreading of activation. One possibility is 
that the automatic activation of the motor system may serve the function of keeping the 
organism in a state of readiness. An alternative, and not mutually exclusive function, may 
concern feedback loops from motor processes to perceptual and conceptual processing (see 
Mahon  et  al.,  2007,  for  discussion).  In  other  words,  it  may  be  the  case  that  motor 
information shapes the way in which non-motor relevant information is acquired by the 
system. It remains an open issue as to whether activation of motor information facilitates 
normal  action  and  object  recognition.  We  can  now  address  this  question  with  clear 
constraints  on  what  might  be  implied  by  such  facilitation,  given  the  strong  evidence 
provided  by  neuropsychological  data,  neurophysiological  data,  and  functional 
neuroimaging data.
 
Alternatively,  it  might be argued from a strong Embodied Cognition perspective,  that 
these neuropsychological  data are not relevant to the embodied cognition hypothesis – 
that  only  activation  evidence  is  relevant.  This  line  of  argument,  however,  does  not  go 
through.  In  the  measure  to  which  the  activation  data  are  taken  as  evidence  for  the 
embodied cognition hypothesis, then the neuropsychological data are problematic for that 
hypothesis. If the embodied cognition hypothesis were to be changed in such a way that 
the neuropsychological data were no longer relevant to that hypothesis, then one would 
have to reconsider what the activation evidence implies about the dynamics of information 
retrieval within the sensory/motor systems.
On the basis of the evidence available to date, it cannot be decided whether the automatic 
activation  of  motor  information  (i.e.,  motor  simulation)  contributes  to  the  richness  of 
conceptual  experience.  For  instance,  while  the data we have reported from single case 
analyses  indicate  that  output  processes  are  not  necessary for  successful  recognition,  it 
remains an open question as to whether patients  who have impaired output praxemes 
have, on some level, impoverished concepts of actions and manipulable objects. To this 
point, the associations at the group level and the dissociations at the single case level, that 
have been observed in neuropsychological studies, permit a model of praxis to be outlined 
in its basic features.  An important issue that merits further research involves fleshing out 
the processes and content contained within the putative input systems that mediate action 
and object recognition.
 The IPM model and the CS/SAS model: a possible integration.
In this thesis, we have shown that patients dissociations are better explained by models 
that conceive the action production system as modular and separated from the conceptual 
processing. Two models have been discussed throughout the chapters: the IPM proposed 
by  Rothi  et  al.  (1991)  and the  CS model  by  Cooper  and Shallice  (2000).  Both  aim at 
explaining  normal  and  abnormal  praxis.  While  the  IPM  was  proposed  to  account  for 
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several phenomena and dissociations found mainly in the imitation domain, the CS model 
is most suited to explain disturbances in  routine tasks involving objects. 
Another model that comes into play for disorders of imitation is the dual route model 
presented in the Introduction (Tessari et al.,  2007).  This model can be considered as a 
modified Rothi (1991)'s model, as it postulates a separability of semantic and direct route. 
Since Tessari's model is not meant to explain also disorders in object use, we have not 
considered it in our patients discussion. The important difference with the IPM is that the 
notion of  praxicons is not included and that in order to imitate well, one working memory 
must be intact. We agree that working memory plays an important role in the imitation of 
actions (especially in action sequences and pantomimes) and it should always be tested in 
patients study on Apraxia. In the CS/SAS model, working memory could be integrated in 
the concept  of  resources available  to the system and in the top-dowm control  that  CS 
receives from the SAS.
As stated in the Introduction, we think that the CS/SAS and the IPM can be integrated and 
are not mutually exclusive, as they  share  important features: i) they consider the action 
production system separate from semantic representation; ii)  they can predict patients' 
behaviour in terms of disconnections or damage to modules of the system; iii) complex 
action production can be fractioned in basic action representations, which are stored in the 
praxicon (IPM) or in the action schema network (CS). 
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